Fear is the Beginning of Wisdom

When an enemy issues a threat, too many here quake in their boots. And when one of our leaders makes a threat to the enemy, too many here quake in their boots. Stop that. 

General Grant put it well to his subordinates during the 1864 Wilderness Campaign after they pestered him with worries about what Lee could do when Grant's army marched:

Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.

Precautions are good. But force protection is not the objective when America goes to war (quoting my 1997 Iran-Iraq War paper):

Our soldiers' lives are indeed valuable, and our country's insistence that we minimize risks to them is laudable (as well as being necessary due to the small size of the Army). Undue concern, however, is false compassion and, as was the case for Iraq in 1980, could result in even greater casualties in a prolonged war should we refuse - because of the prospect of battle deaths - to seize an opportunity for early victory.

Obsessing on force protection measures should not paralyze our war effort. Our enemies should spend more time terrified about what America will do to them. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Portrait from here.

The Winter War of 2022 Peeks Behind the Facade

Did Ukraine's winter counter-attacks expose the Russian ground force juggernaut as a hollow facade? Is this just the most apparent problem? Things seem different enough from the continuity of the big picture over the last several years to make me wonder if Russia has serious problems.

The war goes on. But things seem ... different:

Ukraine has been imposing increasing challenges on Russia at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels since the beginning of 2026.

ISW in early March assessed the Ukrainian counter-attacks exploiting Russia's loss of Starlink communications:

The cascading effects that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions have generated in other sectors of the front show how constrained the Russian force structure in Ukraine really is.

And as the counter-attacks have continued, ISW stated:

Ukrainian counterattacks in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are forcing Russia to redeploy forces and means from other areas of the frontline and likely from operational level reserves.

If Russia needs more than local reserves to cope with apparently smaller scale counter-attacks, what does this say about the supposed juggernaut of Russian troops that continues to grow? 

Over the last couple years I've repeatedly called into question the reality behind the image of a relentless steamroller that Russia tries to create with reports of always expanding troop numbers:

I have strong doubts that Russia is managing to increase the raw numbers of its troops fighting inside Ukraine to continue its grinding offensive as long as it takes. Does Putin have a Potemkin Invasion Force? Would he even know he only has that?

Russia has maintained the strategic initiative with continuous attacks somewhere along the long front. This helps to conceal any Russian weaknesses on the ground. Ukraine exposed the weakness in its August 2024 offensive into Russia's Kursk region. There are probably more such weak points. Ukraine's strategic defensive strategy of trading space for time to inflict much heavier casualties on the Russians than the Ukrainians suffer has supported Russia's strategy, in effect, by leaving those Russian weak points untested.

How much will Ukraine's counter-attacks cascade? Can Ukraine's new corps formations exploit this to create a counteroffensive? 

Russia is still living in another world:

The Kremlin is likely setting informational conditions to expand Russian demands of Ukraine and NATO by making it clear that its current demands are no longer sufficient.

Really? Putin and what army? 

Could this troop shortage I've suggested exists, if true, push Putin--if he is aware of it--to change course to end the war? 

Are Russia's threats to NATO at Narva, Estonia, and aid to Iran to target American and allied targets around the Persian Gulf desperate efforts away from the main war to change the apparently ... different ... situation in their invasion of Ukraine? 

And (okay, this is my last string of conditional events that lower the overall odds of it happening) would that plan explain Russia's new efforts to be able to shut down the Internet in Russia? Can't have angry or confused Russians using it to express opposition, eh? Tip to Instapundit.

I've often said I try not to let my hopes guide my analysis. It is difficult. But there is an opposite problem. When the situation has been mostly the same for years, it is easy to assume current trends will continue. 

Is this a blaring alarm about Russia's capacity to wage war?

Russia suffered its deadliest day of the year in Ukraine on Tuesday, losing more than 1,700 troops in 24 hours.

Ukraine’s general staff said it had killed or wounded 1,710 Russian troops on March 17 and destroyed 29 artillery systems as well as 230 vehicles and fuel tankers.

It could just be a bigger example of the same old thing as Russians batter themselves against Ukraine's defenses. Russia is now using armored vehicles again:

Russian forces are increasingly conducting mechanized assaults on the frontline, possibly as part of intensified preparation for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.

Perhaps Russia over the past year got the Ukrainians used to fighting infantry assaults and calculates that resuming mechanized assaults with accumulated armored vehicles will break those defenses optimized for slower attacks.

Maybe. But things seem ... different ... now. 

UPDATE (Monday): This certainly doesn't contradict my gut feeling (that is hopefully a distillation of lots of data points bouncing around in my head):

Even with all this money spent on recruiting, after four years of war in Ukraine and over 1.3 million soldiers killed, disabled or missing in combat, Russia is having problems recruiting soldiers. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Map of Ukrainian gains in this year's counter-attacks from ISW.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

Duplicating the Weekend Data Dump here and on Substack is too much of a hassle. I'm just moving it THERE. So hop on over and read it! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: Conventional Air Power as a Counter-UAV Asset

In case you missed it on Substack: Chum, Despondency, and Whiplash

In case you missed it on Substack: Distributed Artillery

In case you missed it on Substack: NATO's Achilles Heel

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section. 

The Strategy That Dares Not Be Named

There is method to Trump's apparent madness on the global stage.

One aspect of America’s foreign policy of strengthening America's position in the world is weakening our foes:

Donald Trump’s behaviour during this presidential term reveals a surprisingly deep strategic logic.

The core goal remains to restore absolute American superiority over China and Russia. But Trump wants to avoid confronting these major rivals directly. He is rather working to isolate Beijing and Moscow from their international partners and deprive them of any major means of external support.

At the same time, Trump is building a program of sustained economic, technology and other sanctions to markedly weaken the Chinese and Russian economies over the longer term.

Pushing our allies--often done bluntly without running the language through the State Department to sand down the rough edges--to spend more on defense rather than rely on America is another aspect.

Consider too that talks to end the Winter War of 2022--publicly bolstered by some kind words from Trump--may (and this is sheer speculation by me) quietly involve discussions on splitting Russia from China, which is the ultimate prize for isolating this shaky alignment. 

Will Russia or China decide it wants to be the partner with America on economic cooperation rather than a target of economic isolation and potential war?

I've long wanted this type of shift. It makes sense to try. But I can't say I know we are doing this, of course.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing. 

NATO's Achilles Heel

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

NATO is vulnerable at the city of Narva on Russia’s border. While its Russophile citizens may not actually be happy with experiencing the loving embrace in practice as Ukrainians have suffered under and rejected, Putin could pretend they do to justify invasion. Ultimately, Narva’s main defense is prying Belarus from Russia’s imperial grasp.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Will Russia Bow Or Pivot?

Is Russia going to settle into vassal status under China's thumb? Or will it stand up and finally pivot east to the real threat?

I've long figured vassalage is the path Russia is on. The war against Ukraine is accelerating that journey. This author looks at the question:

To what degree will Russian dependency on China continue after the war? I predict this dynamic will be centered on two competing forces: China will serve as the economic lifeline for Russia, with the latter expected to align within the former’s sphere of influence. At the same time, Russia will attempt to reduce this dependency by developing alternatives to China with success depending on its level of geopolitical isolation following the war.

In the short run, Putin wrecked his military enough to require him to continue his post-Soviet policy of appeasement of China while he rebuilt Russia and its military. The result should be alarming in Moscow:

Russia is increasingly dependent on China for economic support and help in rebuilding an economy ravaged by more than four years of war in Ukraine. China is willing to help, but not as an ally but as a patron for its new Russian client state. China seeks to turn Russia into a vassal state. 

In the long run, to break free Russia will have to erase the long-term need for China and the pointless and insane framing of NATO as a threat to Russia. Does anybody doubt Europeans would reverse rearmament if Russia pivoted east and stopped behaving like total a-holes?

If Russia can admit that China is their primary enemy, as Russia rebuilds its military--again--it could have the power to organize resistance to China if Xi's priority of undoing the Century of Humiliation hits too close to home, and earn NATO support to do so.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

Distributed Artillery

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

Can the Army get rocket launchers that roam the battlefield for ground support and air defense? I’m skeptical of filling a complex battlefield with unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) that we can command and control in large numbers. Artillery robots might be a proof of concept before trying to bring in direct-fire UGVs.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

The Camp Followers Move Their Camp

Iraq imported the logistics element for Sunni jihadis from Syria. I'm sure this will work out just swell. 

The camp is notorious? 

Around 22,000 Iraqis have been transferred to Iraq from the notorious al-Hol camp in Syria, which housed the families of fighters from the terrorist group Islamic State, according to official figures.

The fighters terrorists are the notorious aspect. And the families were basically the logistics arm of the "fighters."

Pray they don't attract new jihadis around their new logistics hub homes in Iraq and resume functioning as logistics depots. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article. 

Chum, Despondency, and Whiplash

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

I’ve long been worried about the Royal Navy. Britain’s inability to rapidly deploy warships to protect British interests has been revealed by the Iran War. Britain is being forced to confront the shock that its once globe-spanning fleet cannot rule even portions of the seas. ... [CONTINUE READING]

The Iran War of 2026

America, Israel, and associated powers are winning the military campaign against Iran. Western opinion is skewed by American domestic politics. Yet allied victory of some sort is likely. What form is acceptable in the short run remains unclear.

I've covered the Iran War of 2026* in two essays (here and here) plus numerous smaller posts in Weekend Data Dumps and in my Substack Notes. 

We are clearly winning the military campaign so far. Talk of Iran really winning because they are enduring the ass-kicking is weird but common. Not that Iran hasn't hurt us or our allies with their (weakened) military. Enemies do that. War isn't target practice with a nice little bonus in your paycheck the next month.  

And now, increased emphasis is on securing the Strait of Hormuz enough to allow oil exports to resume. Was this a failure in the initial plan? Or was it considered too much of a warning to Iran to see escort and counter-mine assets gathered? Perhaps the need to take out the leadership in a fleeting moment accelerated the start of the campaign. Perhaps we knew the world would survive a few weeks without the exports in order to gain surprise. I can't know what the thinking was. 

As I noted in that first linked essay, Trump succinctly stated our objectives when he addressed remarks to the Iranian people:

When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.

Opposition to the U.S. president contorts much of the war analysis. And a fixation on having THE PLAN spelled out to the final victory as if that is wise in an ongoing war--or even relevant when no plan survives contact with the enemy--is not new. Plans are a framework that must be flexible in the face of reality. And the president described that flexibility if you'd accept that rather than insisting on seeing the operational orders.

Preventing Iran from getting nukes is the obvious military and political objective. Overthrowing the mullah regime is the ideal political outcome to do that. And destroying Iran's conventional military and weakening its internal security apparatus is currently the main effort by volume. This both reduces the mullah ability to harm and intimidate neighbors for years; and increases the ability of internal actors (many of the people and hopefully defecting security forces) to drive from power the mullah regime and their Revolutionary Guard base of power.

So far it doesn't seem as if the internal security forces are sufficiently weakened. Yet I assume Israel has the uprising portfolio in the campaign. I have no idea where they are in that effort. They aren't saying.

You can see the divisions between America and Israel from presidential statements and allied target focus. Israel is first up in Iran's nuclear crosshairs and so is obviously more committed to regime change than America. America as a global power has broader concerns and doesn't want a long war in this narrow theater. So America and Israel approach even the same war we are jointly fighting with very different perspectives.

So if Iranians can't rise up successfully now, America will finish its military campaign and pocket the relatively inexpensive narrow military win that knocks down Iran's conventional and nuclear capabilities. And Iranians will have lost their best shot at freedom "for generations." Then American and Israeli plans will need to be adjusted for the long run.

UPDATE (19MAR26): I don't think this threat by the president to let others worry about keeping the Strait of Hormuz open is serious literally (tip to Instapundit).

Our advantage in not relying on Persian Gulf energy directly is a wartime--as in The Big One--advantage. That's why the Strategic Petroleum Reserve was established. It was to buy time for our military to regain access to foreign oil if we went to war with the USSR. It is easy to forget that when it is now used to lower gasoline prices.

Keep in mind that fact when you hear America is not reliant on Persian Gulf energy. In peacetime America is absolutely reliant on Persian Gulf indirectly. Our allies and trading partners rely on that energy. And our economy and prosperity relies on trade with them.

Further, the Gulf allies we are now getting more cooperation from in the Iran War of 2026 rely on oil exports. If we were really going to leave the Strait of Hormuz for someone else, we'd be given a week to evacuate our bases in the Gulf and the Gulf Arab states would cut a deal with the mullahs for peace.

Just saying. The president's statement was commentary on our allies' unwillingness and/or inability to send warships to the Gulf to assist us in a war that benefits them and us (remember the possibility of mullah nukes?)--and hopefully the Iranian people, too.

UPDATE (19MAR26): The U.S. may send additional ground forces to CENTCOM to expand options. With Marines on the way by sea, Army Rangers and a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division could be useful for taking Iran's island bases in the Gulf. 

UPDATE (19MAR26): Not nearly as bad as I feared. And Iraq's government doesn't seem in any hurry to stop us from hitting back: "Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to launch drone attacks targeting US forces and interests in Iraq." Also, ISW provides updates on the war.

UPDATE (19MAR26): Are Japan and some of the NATO European states edging toward contributing to Strait of Hormuz security?

*And really, this is a campaign in the 47-year war since the Iran Revolution and their invasion of our Tehran Embassy and subsequent lengthy hostage crisis. But it is common to call any upsurge in organized violence a "war." So I usually do. But it isn't really that. Although the difference is indistinguishable to those fighting and paying the price for fighting.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image adjusted from WorldAtlas.com 

Conventional Air Power as a Counter-UAV Asset

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

I observed regarding the Iran War of 2026 that we are ignoring the power of conventional air power to disable enemy drone attacks while we curse our failure to pay attention to Ukrainian air defense skills in the face of Russian drone and missile attacks.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

 

Indian Seapower

India needs seapower as Pakistani weakness reduces the conventional threat from the west and as the Himalayas limit the conventional threat from the north.

India's land problem with Pakistan has been reduced as India's relative power increased over the army with a UN seat across its border. And while India borders China, the Himalayas are India's long walls that prevent decisive land defeats. So India goes to sea:

Both China and India, as rising powers, see the value of having a blue-water navy. India views dominance in the Indian Ocean as essential for projecting power and protecting critical trade routes. Additionally, it is very well aware of its neighbors’ naval build-up and sees fit to make its own plans for naval reform and expansion. In accordance with this principle, the Indian Navy has come to focus on three main areas: aircraft carriers/naval aviation, anti-submarine technology, and a transfer to domestically designed and produced weapon systems.

I believe India has the advantage on the land front from geography. So yes, China is the only real threat to India at sea. 

Yet India has it's advantages to help keep China from using the Indian Ocean. With one exception. 

But I must say, I have my doubts that India's corrupt and inefficient defense industry can achieve one of their main objectives of designing and producing major weapons systems.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the Indian navy.