Strategypage writes about the Russian conquest of Crimea:
Apparently several hundred members of the GRU 45th Spersnaz Regiment were then sent in, disguised as civilians, to create a “popular uprising” that would enable Russia to annex Crimea. Some of the uniformed men who then took control of Crimea were apparently hired, pro-Russia, locals, but the core of this “local militia” are men with obvious military training and who have been using those skills recently. ...
The 11,000 Russian troops normally stationed in Crimea are mostly support personnel for the naval bases of the Black Sea Fleet. The exception was 2,000 marines. These were reinforced by another 7,000 troops, mostly infantry and special operations forces flown in or arrived by ship by early March. These were followed by 15,000 more ferried across the 4.5 kilometer wide Kerch Strait that separates Crimea from southern Russia. By late March Russia had over 30,000 troops in Crimea, including over a thousand spetsnaz.
This tracks my pre-war description of a Kharkov Storm pretty closely:
I'd also annex the Crimea, claiming that the transfer to Ukraine in the Soviet period was premised on Ukraine remaining part of Russia and so is not valid. It doesn't matter if that stands up legally as a good argument. That's my story and I'm sticking to it. And with the Crimea being majority ethnic Russian, who will complain? Especially with lots of local militias springing up? ...
Crimea would be secured with 25,000 new forces.
Fifteen thousand paratroopers would be airlifted to Crimea and ten thousand paramilitary forces would cross the Kerch Strait to reinforce the Russian naval infantry regiment and other troops based in Crimea.
I didn't specifically mention Spetsnaz, but I tend to think in terms of maneuver units. But the raising of local militias was a special forces job, as far as I was concerned.
But the Russians sent in 22,000 troops, although it was weighted more to Kerch than I thought.
I expected a concurrent invasion of eastern Ukraine. But I assumed Yanukovich could be installed as a figurehead leader. Strategypage writes that Yanukovich was poison by that time. So perhaps the Russians didn't think they could manage the pretext without a leader.
Or perhaps it was because the Russians wanted a quiet takeover and they didn't believe that was possible in eastern Ukraine. I assumed Ukrainian resistance in Crimea and so it would be war just there, so why wouldn't Russia grab eastern Ukraine while they could?
Perhaps the Russians didn't have the number of troops I assumed were ready to operate in eastern Ukraine at the same time as the Crimea operation.
Anyway, not too shabby for sitting in my figurative basement.
UPDATE: I will say that I assumed the airlifted forces would be the spearhead with the Spetsnaz-raised militias the supporting force. I remain shocked that the Spetsnaz were allowed to lead the take over. I simply did not imagine that the Ukrainians would not fight enough to require the paratroopers to roll out of Sevastopol.
