The new year is charged with possibilities for armed incidents in the South China Sea that always risk a wider conflict. But China isn't ready to fight that war. One approaching threat is the Indian navy:
India is far more likely to become a regular naval presence in the Pacific than many previously imagined, due to its rapidly expanding economy, improving military technologies, and growing energy interests. The Indian Navy has historically been the smallest and most poorly-resourced of India's three military services, in keeping with the country's security preoccupations at home and its unresolved land border disputes with Pakistan and China. It has just 60,000 active personnel and a $7 billion annual budget, roughly a quarter of the strength and resources of China's People's Liberation Army Navy. ...
But power is relative, and this seemingly small flotilla today constitutes the largest naval presence in the Indian Ocean after the U.S. Navy. Beyond the United States and China, only Japan, South Korea, and perhaps Taiwan boast even comparable capacities for the region, although their navies are more narrowly focused. ... The temporary presence of even a small Indian squadron in the Pacific could make a meaningful difference to the region's balance of power.
And India is adding naval power.
Plus, consider what China would face in a fight for the South China Sea.
Japan with American naval and air power would hold the gap from Japan to the Philippines. South Korea would hold Japan's western flank.
Taiwan's air and naval power would also soak up attention, even if Taiwan doesn't want to fight alongside nations who challenge Taiwan's claims along with China's.
The Philippines, while militarily weak, has bases that American naval and air forces practice using in contingencies. Behind Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines stand our Guam bases in a supporting role.
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore (which will soon host American Littoral Combat Ships) hold the southern end, with Australia also available to bolster new Indian and local forces at the southern end of the South China Sea.
And along the west is our new friend Vietnam, with a strong army that once bested China's attempts to "teach them a lesson" over thirty years ago, and which could be a thorn in the side of any Chinese fleet element operating in the South China Sea. Behind Vietnam stands Thailand, an American ally. American aircraft flying from Thailand, possibly refueling at Vietnamese air bases, could reach the South China Sea.
Sure, China could use those DF-21s in a southern direction as easily as they could to the east, but China would be putting their head in a noose and begging a lot of states to collectively tug very hard. China might not need to ask twice:
The Chinese announcement that it would begin enforcing new rules, starting January 1st, that will have Chinese naval patrols escorting, or expelling, foreign ships from most of the South China Sea has mobilized a lot of resistance. This should not be surprising as the new rules include offshore areas of the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei and Vietnam that international law does not recognize as Chinese. India and the United States have both announced that they will not obey and that Indian and American warships expect to move unmolested through the South China Sea in 2013.
And remember, regardless of how many decide to fight China, China has to worry about all of them jumping in.
Even Russia--Vietnam's friend--has to be watched at least a bit.
Heck, the end of the campaign might be spearheaded by a U.S. Marine division going ashore on Hainan Island to capture that power projection platform that enables Chinese efforts to fight for the South China Sea.
China has, apparently, pulled back their initial threat:
China announced that it would not enforce tight control throughout the South China Sea after January first, but only in waters off mainland China and the Paracel islands. Apparently China is hoping that this will calm down threats of resistance to growing Chinese claims of control of international waters. This is an example of China playing it smart. They have made it clear what their goals are and now remind everyone that they are willing to take their time to get there.
But China's intent is clear. And who knows what Chinese local government or "civilian" coast guard-type outfit might make a decision on their own that could spark an incident?
A lot of people say China is very patient, playing a long game. I have my doubts about that conventional wisdom. We shall see if they are patient enough not to provoke a war over the South China Sea that they cannot yet win in the new year.
