No, not forgotten by all.
Not by a long shot.
UPDATE: One of the most disappointing aspects of President Obama has been his failure to communicate with the American public the need to win the war he once called the necessary war and which his supporters called (dishonestly, I believe) the "good war."
I consistently complained that President Bush too infrequently spoke to the public about Iraq, but by comparison to this president, Bush was a chatterbox.
UPDATE: In related matters, I'm grateful that our anti-war left is quiet. During the Bush presidency, reaching 2,000 casualties in the Iraq War was an event for the anti-war side to celebrate has an indictment of the whole war effort. That mark will go virtually uncommented by our left for Afghanistan.
Mind you, I'm grateful for the silence of the lambs. But it is infuriating for the hypocricy. And it reflects the reality during the 2004 campaign when one liberal war supporter writer argued that Republicans concerned about winning the war should vote for Kerry because the only way liberals would support a war is if a Democrat wages it.
I've tried in the past, and failed, to find that article, so I haven't looked for it now. But it surely was an accurate appraisal of the anti-war left.
Tuesday, August 21, 2012
Training for an Operational Reserve
Our ground force reserves have gone from being a strategic reserve with little role in day-to-day military operations to an operational reserve that our military counts on to carry out their day-to-day operations. Training is following this change.
The Army has organized to provide 4 or 5 Army National Guard brigade combat teams to the force pool each year. This means that members of the Guard can expect to be sent overseas once every 5 years (and they generally have a 6-year term of service unless they are coming from the active component to serve their remaining 2-4 years of reserve obligation).
Training is gearing up for that cycle:
This adds predictability to reservists' lives and means that the units earmarked for potential deployment each year are at their peak readiness.
The Army has organized to provide 4 or 5 Army National Guard brigade combat teams to the force pool each year. This means that members of the Guard can expect to be sent overseas once every 5 years (and they generally have a 6-year term of service unless they are coming from the active component to serve their remaining 2-4 years of reserve obligation).
Training is gearing up for that cycle:
After 11 years of war and as the U.S. draws down in Afghanistan, soldiers in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve will largely see a return to the peacetime schedule of drilling one weekend a month and two weeks a year.
However, in an effort to maintain the components’ readiness and combat edge, some soldiers can expect additional training days as they get closer to the fifth year of the Army Force Generation model.
The Guard and Reserve are on a five-year rotational ARFORGEN model, which progressively resets and trains units for possible deployment. Units spend a year in reset and three years in training. During the fifth year, they are available for mobilization and deployment if needed.
This adds predictability to reservists' lives and means that the units earmarked for potential deployment each year are at their peak readiness.
Inhuman. Relentless. Unstoppable
The First Man-Teleprompter Cyborg--the Talkenator--is unleashed on an unsuspecting press corps.
That's my submission in the contest.
I'll concede picking on the photo is juvenile. But the Reuters photographer had to know it would be a source of mirth.
UPDATE: On reflection, I'd call the Man-Teleprompter Cyborg a different name: the One-Term-inator. But that might be the hope and change talking.
That's my submission in the contest.
I'll concede picking on the photo is juvenile. But the Reuters photographer had to know it would be a source of mirth.
UPDATE: On reflection, I'd call the Man-Teleprompter Cyborg a different name: the One-Term-inator. But that might be the hope and change talking.
How Far Will Assad and Putin Go?
Russia doesn't seem to show any shame about supporting Assad despite some hints that Moscow was trying to distance itself from Assad. But if this support is to mean something, Moscow needs to provide overt support for Assad to reach an achievable objective.
Assad is losing his battle to hold all of Syria, and large sections of the country are not controlled by Syrian forces. Further, Assad focus on fighting for the large city of Aleppo seems to be a failure as press reports indicate that the rebels hold two-thirds of the city. I felt the battle was futile and seems to be so.
Yet Assad has vocal Russian support:
That's bold talk for a Russia with a military with little capability below strategic nuclear weapons. What is the wider combat zone that Russia has in mind with that statement? Or is it mindless talk to scare off others?
Even without overt Western support, the rebels are gaining ground on Assad. Syria's army is plain wearing out with no rotation base able to relieve the troops in combat.
The questions are, what would Russia do to support Assad?
And what can Assad do to reverse his losing momentum?
The latter question must be answered first. There is no way Russia can send a couple hundred thousand troops to Syria to pacify the entire country. So Assad has to abandon some part of the country to shrink the area and population to be controlled to one that is manageable.
At the beginning of the year, I thought Assad could hold a Core Syria running in an arc from Idlib province leaving Aleppo to the north out of the perimeter) through Hama, Homs, and Damascus and then down to the Israeli and Jordanian borders. That would allow Assad to continue to call his realm "Syria" by holding the capital and also maintain leverage in the region by remaining in control of land access to Lebanon and have borders with Israel and Jordan.
But Assad's armed forces have eroded to a level too small to hold even this region.
Now, Assad can either hold his Rump Alawite homeland in the western mountains along the coast; or perhaps hold a Rump + Buffer by adding inland land along the main Damascus-to-Aleppo highway from Idlib down to Homs. I leave open the question of whether Assad has the capabilities to add Aleppo to that realm. I don't think he does, but maybe he could build that capabilities if he contracts his state down.
Then we get to the question of Russian support that goes beyond shielding Assad from UN authorized Western intervention and scaring the West from going outside the UN.
Marines in Tartus with a hefty naval visit would be a start. Money, fast delivery of lower tech training aircraft capable of ground attack, and oil would all help Assad survive in a smaller state.
If Russia wants to be really bold, they might send a regiment of paratroopers (Russia's only ready ground force) to hold positions along the smaller border with Turkey that would result, and deter direct Turkish intervention in the western part of Syria that would be the entirety of a Rump Alawite Syria or a Rump + Buffer Syria.
Russia wants to give "space" to President Obama in order to get American concessions after President Obama wins reelection. Is Russia willing to risk the loss of Assad by refraining from this course of action and thus contribute to achieving that space?
God help us if the Russians have already written off our president's reelection campaign.
Assad is losing his battle to hold all of Syria, and large sections of the country are not controlled by Syrian forces. Further, Assad focus on fighting for the large city of Aleppo seems to be a failure as press reports indicate that the rebels hold two-thirds of the city. I felt the battle was futile and seems to be so.
Yet Assad has vocal Russian support:
Russia and China have opposed military intervention in Syria throughout the revolt. They have vetoed three U.N. Security Council resolutions backed by Western and Arab states that would have put more pressure on Damascus to end the violence.
After meeting Lavrov in Moscow, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil said Obama's talk of action against Syria was media fodder. ...
"Direct military intervention in Syria is impossible because whoever thinks about it ... is heading towards a confrontation wider than Syria's borders," he told a news conference.
That's bold talk for a Russia with a military with little capability below strategic nuclear weapons. What is the wider combat zone that Russia has in mind with that statement? Or is it mindless talk to scare off others?
Even without overt Western support, the rebels are gaining ground on Assad. Syria's army is plain wearing out with no rotation base able to relieve the troops in combat.
The questions are, what would Russia do to support Assad?
And what can Assad do to reverse his losing momentum?
The latter question must be answered first. There is no way Russia can send a couple hundred thousand troops to Syria to pacify the entire country. So Assad has to abandon some part of the country to shrink the area and population to be controlled to one that is manageable.
At the beginning of the year, I thought Assad could hold a Core Syria running in an arc from Idlib province leaving Aleppo to the north out of the perimeter) through Hama, Homs, and Damascus and then down to the Israeli and Jordanian borders. That would allow Assad to continue to call his realm "Syria" by holding the capital and also maintain leverage in the region by remaining in control of land access to Lebanon and have borders with Israel and Jordan.
But Assad's armed forces have eroded to a level too small to hold even this region.
Now, Assad can either hold his Rump Alawite homeland in the western mountains along the coast; or perhaps hold a Rump + Buffer by adding inland land along the main Damascus-to-Aleppo highway from Idlib down to Homs. I leave open the question of whether Assad has the capabilities to add Aleppo to that realm. I don't think he does, but maybe he could build that capabilities if he contracts his state down.
Then we get to the question of Russian support that goes beyond shielding Assad from UN authorized Western intervention and scaring the West from going outside the UN.
Marines in Tartus with a hefty naval visit would be a start. Money, fast delivery of lower tech training aircraft capable of ground attack, and oil would all help Assad survive in a smaller state.
If Russia wants to be really bold, they might send a regiment of paratroopers (Russia's only ready ground force) to hold positions along the smaller border with Turkey that would result, and deter direct Turkish intervention in the western part of Syria that would be the entirety of a Rump Alawite Syria or a Rump + Buffer Syria.
Russia wants to give "space" to President Obama in order to get American concessions after President Obama wins reelection. Is Russia willing to risk the loss of Assad by refraining from this course of action and thus contribute to achieving that space?
God help us if the Russians have already written off our president's reelection campaign.
She's Only Technically Commissioned
It's great that Constitution has sailed from Boston harbor after so long in port.
But please tell me we aren't rebasing Old Ironsides to the Pacific as part of our rather symbolic "pivot" to Asia.
But please tell me we aren't rebasing Old Ironsides to the Pacific as part of our rather symbolic "pivot" to Asia.
Monday, August 20, 2012
Freeze!
Would we really attack Syria if Assad merely orders chemical weapons stockpiles moved from pre-revolution storage sites?
Because that is what our president said:
I can understand a strong response if Assad starts using chemical weapons against civilians and insurgents.
The movement angle is interesting, depending on what Assad wants to hold, since the chemical depots are reportedly in four areas:
The article says the president mentioned movement in a threatening manner, but the quote used doesn't say that and there is no clarifying quote. So it seems like just movement is considered a threat.
If Assad tries to hold all of Syria, obviously he doesn't need to move any chemical weapons and their launchers.
If Assad tries to hold the Core Syria, stretching from Idlib and down an arc through Hama, Homs, Damascus, and down to the Israeli and Jordanian border, Assad also doesn't need to move chemical assets.
If Assad retreats to an Alawite homeland plus a buffer running from Aleppo to Homs, he needs to move the Damascus assets.
And if Assad retreats to a mountain Alawite homeland only, he needs to move the Damascus, Homs, and Hama stockpiles.
Or if not move, destroy what he doesn't take to keep them from getting in the hands of al Qaeda types who'd use it on Assad's forces. Or did our president just tell Assad to abandon any chemical weapons outside whatever perimeter Assad decides to hold? If so, why would we do that?
Or would Assad just abandon the chemical weapons just to spite the West and figure securing chemical weapons will keep the West too busy to interfere with a retreat to a realm more easily held?
I have to believe we'd need airborne troops to drop right on top of the sites with relief columns racing in overland to link up. I can't imagine that air strikes are an option under these circumstances. What level of bombing would be required to burn up chemicals rather than crack the bunkers to let gas escape to affect nearby civilians or allow looters in?
Unless this is just bluster on our part, the implications are interesting, to say the least.
Because that is what our president said:
"We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized," Obama said. "That would change my calculus."
I can understand a strong response if Assad starts using chemical weapons against civilians and insurgents.
The movement angle is interesting, depending on what Assad wants to hold, since the chemical depots are reportedly in four areas:
The U.S.-based Global Security website says there are four suspected chemical weapons sites in Syria: north of Damascus, near Homs, in Hama and near the Mediterranean port of Latakia.
The article says the president mentioned movement in a threatening manner, but the quote used doesn't say that and there is no clarifying quote. So it seems like just movement is considered a threat.
If Assad tries to hold all of Syria, obviously he doesn't need to move any chemical weapons and their launchers.
If Assad tries to hold the Core Syria, stretching from Idlib and down an arc through Hama, Homs, Damascus, and down to the Israeli and Jordanian border, Assad also doesn't need to move chemical assets.
If Assad retreats to an Alawite homeland plus a buffer running from Aleppo to Homs, he needs to move the Damascus assets.
And if Assad retreats to a mountain Alawite homeland only, he needs to move the Damascus, Homs, and Hama stockpiles.
Or if not move, destroy what he doesn't take to keep them from getting in the hands of al Qaeda types who'd use it on Assad's forces. Or did our president just tell Assad to abandon any chemical weapons outside whatever perimeter Assad decides to hold? If so, why would we do that?
Or would Assad just abandon the chemical weapons just to spite the West and figure securing chemical weapons will keep the West too busy to interfere with a retreat to a realm more easily held?
I have to believe we'd need airborne troops to drop right on top of the sites with relief columns racing in overland to link up. I can't imagine that air strikes are an option under these circumstances. What level of bombing would be required to burn up chemicals rather than crack the bunkers to let gas escape to affect nearby civilians or allow looters in?
Unless this is just bluster on our part, the implications are interesting, to say the least.
They Must Do No Such Thing
A former Clinton administration National Security Council staffer believes Egypt under the Islamist-friendly President Morsi has to take certain steps to allow Egypt to prosper. The headline says it all:
"Must?" And what "reality" would Mr. Ross be speaking about?
I hope Ross is right. But the basic problem in the Middle East is that so many leaders and their people do not accept what we think of as reality. It is more accurate to say we would like Egypt's new leaders to accept reality.
Given enough relatively free elections, I think Egyptians will have no choice but to eventually accept a reality close enough to our view of reality to work for them.
The problem is making sure their voting continues long enough for them to learn how to elect good men.
We've lost the first battle in keeping threats to democracy from using democracy to gain power. Now we have to hope that we can keep these new rulers from shutting down democracy before it can be used to put someone else in the presidential palace.
Egypt’s new leaders must accept reality
"Must?" And what "reality" would Mr. Ross be speaking about?
I hope Ross is right. But the basic problem in the Middle East is that so many leaders and their people do not accept what we think of as reality. It is more accurate to say we would like Egypt's new leaders to accept reality.
Given enough relatively free elections, I think Egyptians will have no choice but to eventually accept a reality close enough to our view of reality to work for them.
The problem is making sure their voting continues long enough for them to learn how to elect good men.
We've lost the first battle in keeping threats to democracy from using democracy to gain power. Now we have to hope that we can keep these new rulers from shutting down democracy before it can be used to put someone else in the presidential palace.
Puppet Show and President Obama
It could be worse. At least the president still gets top billing.
And the smaller crowds make it easier to turn up the volume to 11.
And the smaller crowds make it easier to turn up the volume to 11.
Reconsidering America
Iraq may have proven a point to their people by sending our force home at the end of last year that we aren't an occupying power. Worries about Iran may now be a bigger concern, justifying an open relationship with our military.
At long last, there are signs that Iraq is recognizing the importance of our friendship:
Good. They need us to prosper and we need them to succeed.
Also, our continuing relationship--let alone the prospect of a more normal military-to-military relationship--should show that it is ridiculous for so many analysts to speak of Iraq as being in Iran's sphere of influence as if Iraq is a client state of Iran.
Syria is an Iranian client state. Iran simply has influence in Iraq. Not that I am happy with that, but that is a fact of life of Iraq's current weakness relative to Iran. Would we speak of Canada as in our sphere of influence? I think not. Nor would Canadians, I dare say.
But I welcome a chance to expand our influence in Iraq. The majority of Iraqis do not want Iran to dominate Iraq. Nor do we want that.
UPDATE: Max Boot addresses our lack of a presence in Iraq.
At long last, there are signs that Iraq is recognizing the importance of our friendship:
Eight months since American troops withdrew from Iraq, Baghdad has signalled a readiness to bolster military ties with the US, [General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff] said ahead of a visit to the country. ...
"I believe they've concluded that they missed a window of opportunity to establish a more normal relationship with us," said Dempsey, referring to discussions with Iraqi defence chiefs.
"I don't mean to say we're coming back to Iraq," he said.
"I think they recognise their capabilities may require yet more additional development and I think they're reaching out to us to see if we can help them with that."
The Iraqi defence minister and military chief have both inquired about staging drills with the US military, organising training for Iraqi officers and other "security cooperation", Dempsey said.
Good. They need us to prosper and we need them to succeed.
Also, our continuing relationship--let alone the prospect of a more normal military-to-military relationship--should show that it is ridiculous for so many analysts to speak of Iraq as being in Iran's sphere of influence as if Iraq is a client state of Iran.
Syria is an Iranian client state. Iran simply has influence in Iraq. Not that I am happy with that, but that is a fact of life of Iraq's current weakness relative to Iran. Would we speak of Canada as in our sphere of influence? I think not. Nor would Canadians, I dare say.
But I welcome a chance to expand our influence in Iraq. The majority of Iraqis do not want Iran to dominate Iraq. Nor do we want that.
UPDATE: Max Boot addresses our lack of a presence in Iraq.
Sunday, August 19, 2012
A Bold Policy of Appeasement
Preparing for war with China is the best way to preserve the peace in the western Pacific. If we can't fight China in the western Pacific, our allies will increasingly see advantage to peeling away from us and doing what China wants.
Some here are confused, and wish to "accommodate" China:
Oh, China doesn't accept this? Why didn't you say so in the first place? By all means, then, let's explore what the freaking Chinese want! This isn't mere appeasement, you sad little, cloistered rube. The author proposes highly calibrated accommodation to give just enough to keep China from wanting more but not so much that our core interests are sacrificed! See? Nuance.
But I don't think the question we should be answering is what is acceptable to China? Shouldn't the question be what Asian countries want? What about their choices? Are we really supposed to negotiate their fates over their heads by dealing directly with China's dictatorship and cutting deals at the expense of our friends? Really? Thumb up or down? You live and you die? You remain free and you are absorbed? This is where we draw our defense line in Asia and everything outside it is on its own?
We aren't trying to impose primacy on China. Heck, they seem to be doing just fine working within the system we built and defend. We are trying to defend friends and defend our interests. Their choice of who they want to be friends with--and who they worry about--should be the issue, not the People's Republic of China whims.
To that end, AirSea Battle doctrine is not a plan to attack China. We're not eager to take on Iran, does anyone think we are truly eager to go to war with China? No, AirSea Battle is an insurance policy that makes sure China faces too many nations that value their independence and freedom to intimidate or conquer:
And do not become confused. "Accommodating" China means writing off important regions--and potentially hundreds of millions of people who might not enjoy being written off.
And even in war, AirSea Battle is not a recipe for quick escalation to nuclear war. I've expressed concerns about speculation that we'd need to strike a vast array of targets within China to counter their anti-access forces. The targets are there, but the capabilities we seek to build can be used for many things at times or our choosing--or not:
In short, AirSea Battle does not have to mean that we focus everything on enabling our carrier task forces to operate close to China. Depending on circumstances, nuclear attack submarines, long range air power, and small combatants from our fleet and allied fleets could operate forward in the western Pacific and frustrate China's ability to control their nearby seas or deny us access to those seas with relevant assets.
Our allies don't need us to penetrate China's anti-access/area denial shield with our aircraft carriers. They just need us to penetrate that shield with assets sufficient to help them defend their sovereignty.
What would be more likely to cause war? China with pro-American states near it who wish to preserve their independence? Or client states of the Middle Kingdom compelled to serve Chinese interests? I'm sure the behavior of China's clients (North Korea, Burma, and Cambodia) has no relation to what China might want in others they manage to bring into their orbit, right?
AirSea Battle doctrine--hopefully boosted by a Land component--is the best way to reassure our friends and allies that they don't have to surrender in part or in whole to China in order to save what they can because they are on their own. Let's spend more time thinking about how to accommodate the needs of our friends than the wants of China.
Some here are confused, and wish to "accommodate" China:
In The China Choice I argue that America should try to accommodate China’s growing power. I propose that it should be willing negotiate a new regional order in which it continues to play a major strategic role, but not the kind of primacy that it has exercised until now. The main reason is simply that China no longer accepts U.S. primacy as the basis for the Asian order, and that as its power grows to equal and overtake America’s, the chances of successfully imposing primacy on China are too low, and the risks and costs of trying are too high, to be justified.
Oh, China doesn't accept this? Why didn't you say so in the first place? By all means, then, let's explore what the freaking Chinese want! This isn't mere appeasement, you sad little, cloistered rube. The author proposes highly calibrated accommodation to give just enough to keep China from wanting more but not so much that our core interests are sacrificed! See? Nuance.
But I don't think the question we should be answering is what is acceptable to China? Shouldn't the question be what Asian countries want? What about their choices? Are we really supposed to negotiate their fates over their heads by dealing directly with China's dictatorship and cutting deals at the expense of our friends? Really? Thumb up or down? You live and you die? You remain free and you are absorbed? This is where we draw our defense line in Asia and everything outside it is on its own?
We aren't trying to impose primacy on China. Heck, they seem to be doing just fine working within the system we built and defend. We are trying to defend friends and defend our interests. Their choice of who they want to be friends with--and who they worry about--should be the issue, not the People's Republic of China whims.
To that end, AirSea Battle doctrine is not a plan to attack China. We're not eager to take on Iran, does anyone think we are truly eager to go to war with China? No, AirSea Battle is an insurance policy that makes sure China faces too many nations that value their independence and freedom to intimidate or conquer:
The debate over AirSea Battle swirls mostly around technology and whether the doctrine is aimed at China. To answer the latter question first: Yes, it is about China. It has to be.
This is no prophecy of doom. From a political standpoint, war with China is neither inevitable nor all that likely. But military people plan against the most formidable capabilities they may encounter. And from an operational standpoint, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) presents the sternest “anti-access” challenge of any prospective antagonist. Either strategists, planners and warfighters prepare for the hardest case, or the United States must write off important regions or options.
And do not become confused. "Accommodating" China means writing off important regions--and potentially hundreds of millions of people who might not enjoy being written off.
And even in war, AirSea Battle is not a recipe for quick escalation to nuclear war. I've expressed concerns about speculation that we'd need to strike a vast array of targets within China to counter their anti-access forces. The targets are there, but the capabilities we seek to build can be used for many things at times or our choosing--or not:
We applaud the Air-Sea Battle component as the most effective means of preparing for the most challenging conflict—full-scale conventional war. We propose, however, an intermediate strategy, one providing American leadership additional flexibility to avert the need to exercise the potentially escalatory strikes that the Air-Sea Battle strategy may require. Predicated on American relative strengths, particularly in the undersea domain, it is a “war at sea” strategy.
A war-at-sea strategy’s purpose is to provide U.S. political leadership less intrusive ways to deter war and inspire allied engagement in peace. It is a maritime strategy confining conflict to the sea without land invasion or strike, thereby diminishing the threat of escalation. The strategy affords leadership the means to reinforce any relationship between the United States and China, whether cooperation, competition, confrontation, conflict short of war, or war. In this short article we describe the ends, ways, and means of the strategy, why its adoption provides more options for deterrence, and how it plays to American strengths.
In short, AirSea Battle does not have to mean that we focus everything on enabling our carrier task forces to operate close to China. Depending on circumstances, nuclear attack submarines, long range air power, and small combatants from our fleet and allied fleets could operate forward in the western Pacific and frustrate China's ability to control their nearby seas or deny us access to those seas with relevant assets.
Our allies don't need us to penetrate China's anti-access/area denial shield with our aircraft carriers. They just need us to penetrate that shield with assets sufficient to help them defend their sovereignty.
What would be more likely to cause war? China with pro-American states near it who wish to preserve their independence? Or client states of the Middle Kingdom compelled to serve Chinese interests? I'm sure the behavior of China's clients (North Korea, Burma, and Cambodia) has no relation to what China might want in others they manage to bring into their orbit, right?
AirSea Battle doctrine--hopefully boosted by a Land component--is the best way to reassure our friends and allies that they don't have to surrender in part or in whole to China in order to save what they can because they are on their own. Let's spend more time thinking about how to accommodate the needs of our friends than the wants of China.
The Ultimate Neighborhood Watch
When government or Coalition forces are hours away, and the Taliban is there right now, minutes matter for Afghan villagers. Which is why I am confused that some don't like the idea of arming and organizing local defense forces.
But Afghans are willing to resist the Taliban even when we aren't around. Winning hearts and minds doesn't mean that all the people have to love everything we love--just have a common enemy we can both fight. This article recounts incidents of local resistance that I noted in an update to that post I first linked to above:
These forces have to be the first line of defense in defeating the Taliban. Not all security forces need to be special forces. You need armed civilians willing to defend their homes and report on Taliban movement; you need organized militias with the ability to call for help if they face forces they can't handle; you need full time police with more numbers and equipment to be on watch and patrol all the time; you need regulars who can be called in when firepower and training are needed to bolster numbers; and you need--for a while longer--US forces as the ultimate hammer.
On top of all that you need air power for killing and surveillance that hopefully can preempt attacks and help to atomize enemy formations in addition to their ability to react to enemy attacks in progress or assist in pursuit when the enemy retreats.
Each layer of ground forces handles what it can, but calls for a higher level of force when it can't handle what it faces.
Even here we are familiar with this ring of concentric defenses: armed individuals in their own home; private security guards guarding businesses; neighborhood watches on local patrol; local police forces and county sheriffs; local SWAT teams; state police; National Guard; and federal armed forces. All this, and we're at peace.
We did more when we had to. How many Westerns have you watched where a frontier sheriff rounds up a posse of armed civilians to track down a criminal or gang too tough to handle by the sheriff and regular deputies alone? Heck, how many of you are in your state's unorganized militia and don't even realize it?
We have to work with the Afghan local forces that have our common enemy rather than try to force them into a national government template (From The Economist article):
The central government of Afghanistan isn't capable of organizing and paying for defenses everywhere; and the locals have little love for that distant alien Kabul elite. We shouldn't try to make that unworkable solution to the insurgencies and drug gangs work.
Before the various surges in Afghanistan really took off, I called for emphasizing local points of government rather than trying to create a nation where none exists:
I know I've quoted that portion of that post a lot, but it bears repeating.
We need to get involved with these people who resist the Taliban. Special forces need to be on the ground with them to get a feel for them, provide access to air power and reinforcements, and otherwise monitor them.
Militias are a tool to defeat insurgents, but they can also turn on you if they insist on continuing after they are no longer needed. Remember, early in the Iraq War, I counted Shia militias as part of the government order of battle because they defended their neighborhoods against Baathist and al Qaeda attacks. Eventually, these Sadrists became threats to the government of Iraq and had to be fought by US and Iraqi forces. But that doesn't erase the fact that they were useful--and perhaps irreplaceable--at first.
So take advantage of these people who would fight our common enemy. They are the first line of defense, and we can't waste them or risk them being intimidated into ignoring or aiding the enemy presence around them. Aid them. Work with them. And monitor them very carefully to watch for signs that they are changing from being an asset to a liability.
But Afghans are willing to resist the Taliban even when we aren't around. Winning hearts and minds doesn't mean that all the people have to love everything we love--just have a common enemy we can both fight. This article recounts incidents of local resistance that I noted in an update to that post I first linked to above:
[Excitement] has grown since reports emerged earlier this summer of clashes between villagers and the Taliban in Andar district in Ghazni province, south of the capital. Confrontations had happened before, but the scale and duration of what is taking place in Andar is unusual. In an all-out war, the Taliban were driven from villages, with fatalities on both sides. When the Taliban tried to counterattack, the locals successfully resisted.
These forces have to be the first line of defense in defeating the Taliban. Not all security forces need to be special forces. You need armed civilians willing to defend their homes and report on Taliban movement; you need organized militias with the ability to call for help if they face forces they can't handle; you need full time police with more numbers and equipment to be on watch and patrol all the time; you need regulars who can be called in when firepower and training are needed to bolster numbers; and you need--for a while longer--US forces as the ultimate hammer.
On top of all that you need air power for killing and surveillance that hopefully can preempt attacks and help to atomize enemy formations in addition to their ability to react to enemy attacks in progress or assist in pursuit when the enemy retreats.
Each layer of ground forces handles what it can, but calls for a higher level of force when it can't handle what it faces.
Even here we are familiar with this ring of concentric defenses: armed individuals in their own home; private security guards guarding businesses; neighborhood watches on local patrol; local police forces and county sheriffs; local SWAT teams; state police; National Guard; and federal armed forces. All this, and we're at peace.
We did more when we had to. How many Westerns have you watched where a frontier sheriff rounds up a posse of armed civilians to track down a criminal or gang too tough to handle by the sheriff and regular deputies alone? Heck, how many of you are in your state's unorganized militia and don't even realize it?
We have to work with the Afghan local forces that have our common enemy rather than try to force them into a national government template (From The Economist article):
The progress of Mr Kamrani and his comrades is being closely watched from the capital. Just because they are fighting the Taliban does not mean they are friends of Mr Karzai, still less of NATO. Many villagers say they are sickened by the corruption and injustices of the Kabul regime. They just want to be left alone.
The central government of Afghanistan isn't capable of organizing and paying for defenses everywhere; and the locals have little love for that distant alien Kabul elite. We shouldn't try to make that unworkable solution to the insurgencies and drug gangs work.
Before the various surges in Afghanistan really took off, I called for emphasizing local points of government rather than trying to create a nation where none exists:
The end result in Afghanistan, if all goes well, will be a nominal national government that controls the capital region and reigns but does not rule local tribes and which actually helps the locals a bit rather than sucking resources from the locals, who in turn do not make trouble for the central government or allow their areas to be used by jihadis to plan attacks on the West. We press for reasonable economic opportunities, with bribes all around (I mean, foreign aid), to keep a fragile peace.
And we stick around this time, unlike after the Soviets left Afghanistan when we ignored the place, for a generation or two to see if we can move Afghanistan into the 19th century (hey, let's not get ahead of ourselves).
I know I've quoted that portion of that post a lot, but it bears repeating.
We need to get involved with these people who resist the Taliban. Special forces need to be on the ground with them to get a feel for them, provide access to air power and reinforcements, and otherwise monitor them.
Militias are a tool to defeat insurgents, but they can also turn on you if they insist on continuing after they are no longer needed. Remember, early in the Iraq War, I counted Shia militias as part of the government order of battle because they defended their neighborhoods against Baathist and al Qaeda attacks. Eventually, these Sadrists became threats to the government of Iraq and had to be fought by US and Iraqi forces. But that doesn't erase the fact that they were useful--and perhaps irreplaceable--at first.
So take advantage of these people who would fight our common enemy. They are the first line of defense, and we can't waste them or risk them being intimidated into ignoring or aiding the enemy presence around them. Aid them. Work with them. And monitor them very carefully to watch for signs that they are changing from being an asset to a liability.
You May Have Noticed We're Not All Dead
Geniuses keep telling us we're doomed. But the truly smart ones innovate through the problems.
Can we get on to the next panic? I'm getting bored with peak oil talk.
Can we get on to the next panic? I'm getting bored with peak oil talk.
Choosing Their Last Stand
Is Assad contemplating a retreat to a rump Alawite state plus a buffer?
Assad is fighting hard for Aleppo. With reports that Assad's forces are abandoning eastern Syria and are withdrawing to Alawite areas, the issue of Russia's support for Assad's moves become important. Without Russian support, a rump Alawite state won't have the resources to survive, from what I understand.
Despite some past reports that Russia was distancing itself from Assad, so far it has just been some words. In practice, Russia is still shielding Assad, according to Sky News Arabia:
Is Assad preparing to hold a modified Alawite homeland that extends from the Lebanon border along the coast north and then east out to a line running north from Homs to Aleppo along the main highway?
I've assumed a couple retreat options for Assad, including a Core Syria running from the Jordan and Israel border region and arcing around Lebanon to Idlib, and including Damascus but excluding Aleppo. This seemed possible months ago before Assad's security forces dwindled under the attrition of an expanding war.
Or I thought Assad might retreat to the mountains for a more pure Alawite homeland, making a rump Alawite state smaller than Lebanon. This seemed more possible with Assad's shrunken ground forces.
But maybe a rump Alawite state plus a buffer zone is an option. That would at least explain why Assad is fighting so hard for Aleppo while abandoning large chunks of territory in the east.
But Assad will need more than a Russian shield. Assad will need open and perhaps direct support just to bolster the morale of his forces as they give up most of Syria.
Assad is fighting hard for Aleppo. With reports that Assad's forces are abandoning eastern Syria and are withdrawing to Alawite areas, the issue of Russia's support for Assad's moves become important. Without Russian support, a rump Alawite state won't have the resources to survive, from what I understand.
Despite some past reports that Russia was distancing itself from Assad, so far it has just been some words. In practice, Russia is still shielding Assad, according to Sky News Arabia:
"Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserted that his country rejects the imposition of any no-fly zone on Syria," the website said.
"This will be a violation of sovereignty if it included Syrian territory," it said in Arabic, quoting Lavrov.
Is Assad preparing to hold a modified Alawite homeland that extends from the Lebanon border along the coast north and then east out to a line running north from Homs to Aleppo along the main highway?
I've assumed a couple retreat options for Assad, including a Core Syria running from the Jordan and Israel border region and arcing around Lebanon to Idlib, and including Damascus but excluding Aleppo. This seemed possible months ago before Assad's security forces dwindled under the attrition of an expanding war.
Or I thought Assad might retreat to the mountains for a more pure Alawite homeland, making a rump Alawite state smaller than Lebanon. This seemed more possible with Assad's shrunken ground forces.
But maybe a rump Alawite state plus a buffer zone is an option. That would at least explain why Assad is fighting so hard for Aleppo while abandoning large chunks of territory in the east.
But Assad will need more than a Russian shield. Assad will need open and perhaps direct support just to bolster the morale of his forces as they give up most of Syria.
Saturday, August 18, 2012
A Problem and Not a Reason to Retreat
Keeping American troops safe from angry or hostile Afghan security forces who serve with our troops is a problem we must cope with, but it is not a reason to throw up our hands in disgust and retreat from Afghanistan. The vast majority of Afghan forces fight at our side.
Much of the issue is anger management in a very violent population. Press attention obviously gives the Taliban an incentive to both take credit for any incident and try to exploit our evident near-panic over the problem by contributing to it.
Even if the Taliban can't provoke us to retreat, stoking mistrust between American/Coalition forces and Afghan forces will reduce our effectiveness in fighting the Taliban.
This article addresses the issue pretty well, although it tends to pessimism more than I think is justified. There is a perception among Afghan troops that American troops are arrogant. For violence-prone Afghans, that is potentially deadly.
I don't quite understand this view:
I certainly don't remember having this level of "green-on blue" attacks in Iraq. So it isn't just a religious thing. But whether or not there is an exact comparison in history, the broader problem is not unusual.
For example, communist infiltration of South Vietnam's armed forces was pretty high. And troops would desert sometimes rather than fight the enemy. In Afghanistan Islam seems to provide incentive to sacrifice their lives to take down an Infidel, but the problem of loyalty of local allies is a common feature of counter-insurgency.
On the other hand, Islam does not prevent the vast majority of Afghan forces from fighting the Taliban. So the idea that the violent nature of Afghans is the real underlying cause is most persuasive to me.
Further, I can think of one fight that was defined by local indigenous forces turning violently on the colonial power's troops.
For me, this may highlight the fact that we once had our Special Forces take the lead in training local forces. These guys have the local knowledge to be effective. But with their other job of direct action attacks in high demand, the Army has tasked non-special forces to more jobs training Afghans. Could the lack of sensitivity by these non-special forces troops be the reason for sparking an increase in attacks on our troops (above what might be expected from the simple expansion of Afghan forces the last several years)?
Regulars may just not be skilled enough to accommodate the underlying cause (violence-prone allies) of these "green on blue" incidents. Perhaps we've gone too far in taking away the training role of special forces and handing off the job to regulars. Perhaps we need to restrict the regular alternative to non-war situations. Or make sure special forces troops supervise the regulars in their training missions.
This a a problem like any other that we should solve rather than just the latest excuse to retreat from Afghanistan before we win. Work the problem.
Much of the issue is anger management in a very violent population. Press attention obviously gives the Taliban an incentive to both take credit for any incident and try to exploit our evident near-panic over the problem by contributing to it.
Even if the Taliban can't provoke us to retreat, stoking mistrust between American/Coalition forces and Afghan forces will reduce our effectiveness in fighting the Taliban.
This article addresses the issue pretty well, although it tends to pessimism more than I think is justified. There is a perception among Afghan troops that American troops are arrogant. For violence-prone Afghans, that is potentially deadly.
I don't quite understand this view:
"I have never heard of anything in Vietnam comparable to what we have recently experienced in Afghanistan," said James McAllister, a political science professor at Williams College in Massachusetts who has written extensively about the Vietnam War. A British military expert on colonial wars, Martin Windrow, said the level of these types of attacks were "almost unheard of" in any conflict he'd studied.
I certainly don't remember having this level of "green-on blue" attacks in Iraq. So it isn't just a religious thing. But whether or not there is an exact comparison in history, the broader problem is not unusual.
For example, communist infiltration of South Vietnam's armed forces was pretty high. And troops would desert sometimes rather than fight the enemy. In Afghanistan Islam seems to provide incentive to sacrifice their lives to take down an Infidel, but the problem of loyalty of local allies is a common feature of counter-insurgency.
On the other hand, Islam does not prevent the vast majority of Afghan forces from fighting the Taliban. So the idea that the violent nature of Afghans is the real underlying cause is most persuasive to me.
Further, I can think of one fight that was defined by local indigenous forces turning violently on the colonial power's troops.
For me, this may highlight the fact that we once had our Special Forces take the lead in training local forces. These guys have the local knowledge to be effective. But with their other job of direct action attacks in high demand, the Army has tasked non-special forces to more jobs training Afghans. Could the lack of sensitivity by these non-special forces troops be the reason for sparking an increase in attacks on our troops (above what might be expected from the simple expansion of Afghan forces the last several years)?
Regulars may just not be skilled enough to accommodate the underlying cause (violence-prone allies) of these "green on blue" incidents. Perhaps we've gone too far in taking away the training role of special forces and handing off the job to regulars. Perhaps we need to restrict the regular alternative to non-war situations. Or make sure special forces troops supervise the regulars in their training missions.
This a a problem like any other that we should solve rather than just the latest excuse to retreat from Afghanistan before we win. Work the problem.
Ready, Aim
Did North Korean units just get a warning order to prepare to bombard South Korea in the next couple weeks?
I've had more comforting news:
These are the same units that bombarded a South Korean island back in 2010.
This is hardly reassuring under the circumstances, either:
I find it hard to believe that The Un believes that expanding a clash to a general war along the DMZ achieves more than him being strung by his heels from a lamp post when the dust settles, but you never know.
I suspect that given the consensus that any further North Korean aggression will be met with a big South Korean retaliation on the offending units, that Kim is just trying to bolster the resolve of the units that would be ordered to strike South Korean territory by making them think they won't be hung out all by their lonesome to face massive retaliation.
If I was in the South Korean military and was stationed near North Korean forces, I'd make sure my shelter was dug deep with solid overhead cover--and nearby. Just in case.
Hell, If I was in the North Korean military based in their southwest, I'd do the same, I suppose.
I've had more comforting news:
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has visited a frontline military detachment, state media reported, and reminded troops of their duty to fight a "sacred war" against any provocation by South Korea. ...
"He ordered the servicepersons ... not to miss their golden chance to deal at once deadly counter-blows at the enemy if even a single shell is dropped on the waters or in the area where the sovereignty of the DPRK is exercised," KCNA said of Kim's guidance to his Democratic People's Republic of Korea troops.
Kim also said the Korean People's Army should then "lead the battle to a sacred war for national reunification, not confining it to a local war on the southwest region", KCNA reported.
These are the same units that bombarded a South Korean island back in 2010.
This is hardly reassuring under the circumstances, either:
China's President Hu Jintao on Friday met the powerful uncle of North Korea's young leader Kim Jong-un, in a clear show of support for the impoverished ally as it takes tentative steps to rebuild its shattered economy.
I find it hard to believe that The Un believes that expanding a clash to a general war along the DMZ achieves more than him being strung by his heels from a lamp post when the dust settles, but you never know.
I suspect that given the consensus that any further North Korean aggression will be met with a big South Korean retaliation on the offending units, that Kim is just trying to bolster the resolve of the units that would be ordered to strike South Korean territory by making them think they won't be hung out all by their lonesome to face massive retaliation.
If I was in the South Korean military and was stationed near North Korean forces, I'd make sure my shelter was dug deep with solid overhead cover--and nearby. Just in case.
Hell, If I was in the North Korean military based in their southwest, I'd do the same, I suppose.
Huh
At this rate, I'm assuming Chutzpah will soon be a cabinet-level position in the Obama administration.
Tip to Mad Minerva.
Tip to Mad Minerva.
The Invisible Troops
During the Iraq War, I consistently judged that we were winning the war. Except for a couple periods when we had to react to major enemy initiatives (the spring 2004 joint Sunni and Sadrist offensive and the post Samarra mosque bombing that culminated in the fall 2006 Sunni-Sadrist slaughter of civilians), we made progress in knocking down insurgents and terrorists on the one hand and building up Iraqi forces to fight the common enemy on the other. As critics said he had too few troops to win, I looked for ways to judge that question in light of my perception that we must have enough because we were winning.
One method I used was to distinguish between the higher levels needed to pacify hostile Sunnis and the lower levels needed in either the more friendly Shia areas or the relatively calm Kurdish areas. This lowered the number of troops needed.
The second was to include all security forces rather than just American forces as many backers of the too-few troops side assumed. So Iraqi army, police, pipeline guards, and even militias (when they battled Sunni insurgents and terrorists) were put in the mix. I even tried to estimate private military contractors in this.
I also assumed that some fraction of our troops in Kuwait should be counted since they performed tasks that they'd otherwise perform while in Iraq if they didn't have Kuwait to operate from. If those troops were in Iraq, we'd have counted every one of them as being part of the troop-to-population ratio needed to win.
I even tried to estimate private military contractors in this. I mostly just looked for numbers on those directly involved in providing security, but I also mentioned that with support contractors doing jobs that in the past would have been done by troops in uniform--and thus counted toward the troop-to-people ratio--that some of those contractors should be counted.
Other than in the immediate post-major combat operations period before we could recruit Iraqis and in the immediate aftermath of the spring 2004 offensives when so many Iraqi security units collapsed, I judged we had the troops required to win.
In the end, we did win even though many critics of the surge said even that provided too few troops to make a difference. So we clearly had enough troops to win.
This analysis of post-war operations validates my feelings on counting contractors:
This goes farther than I am comfortable by assuming a 1:1 effectiveness of contractors compared to uniformed troops doing the same jobs. I assume it must be some fraction because even uniformed cooks, typists, radio operators, and truck drivers would be expected to pick up a rifle and sit in a bunker to defend a base. Civilian contractors would not have that reserve role. But the contractors do represent numbers that if in uniform would be fully counted as part of the occupation force.
As I always reminded readers, when judging whether we had enough troops (aside from judging how we used them) count all the security forces. This use of private security contractors is just a fact of life today and represents the norm over the long history of warfare.
And now that you ask, yes I do have a collection of essays from this blog on privatized warfare.
One method I used was to distinguish between the higher levels needed to pacify hostile Sunnis and the lower levels needed in either the more friendly Shia areas or the relatively calm Kurdish areas. This lowered the number of troops needed.
The second was to include all security forces rather than just American forces as many backers of the too-few troops side assumed. So Iraqi army, police, pipeline guards, and even militias (when they battled Sunni insurgents and terrorists) were put in the mix. I even tried to estimate private military contractors in this.
I also assumed that some fraction of our troops in Kuwait should be counted since they performed tasks that they'd otherwise perform while in Iraq if they didn't have Kuwait to operate from. If those troops were in Iraq, we'd have counted every one of them as being part of the troop-to-population ratio needed to win.
I even tried to estimate private military contractors in this. I mostly just looked for numbers on those directly involved in providing security, but I also mentioned that with support contractors doing jobs that in the past would have been done by troops in uniform--and thus counted toward the troop-to-people ratio--that some of those contractors should be counted.
Other than in the immediate post-major combat operations period before we could recruit Iraqis and in the immediate aftermath of the spring 2004 offensives when so many Iraqi security units collapsed, I judged we had the troops required to win.
In the end, we did win even though many critics of the surge said even that provided too few troops to make a difference. So we clearly had enough troops to win.
This analysis of post-war operations validates my feelings on counting contractors:
Assumptions on the number of soldiers required to provide post-conflict security were largely based on a study conducted by the Rand Corporation. It concluded that the security requirement was 20 soldiers for every 1,000 residents, or a ratio of 1 to 50, which concurs with the latest army counterinsurgency (COIN) manual. With nearly 25 million Iraqis, this put the troop level requirement at 500,000. In the period just after major combat operations, there were approximately 160,000 Coalition soldiers in Iraq. Not accounted for in the Rand study however, were the contributions of contractors, which in effect boosted troop strength. Although the exact number is not known, according to the Congressional Budget Office, there was approximately one contractor for every soldier, with 78 percent of them operating on Department of Defense (DoD) contracts as opposed to State Department or U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) missions. This placed the number of contractors performing soldiers’ jobs at approximately 125,000, giving a total of approximately 285,000 personnel, of the 500,000 calculated by Rand to be required.
This goes farther than I am comfortable by assuming a 1:1 effectiveness of contractors compared to uniformed troops doing the same jobs. I assume it must be some fraction because even uniformed cooks, typists, radio operators, and truck drivers would be expected to pick up a rifle and sit in a bunker to defend a base. Civilian contractors would not have that reserve role. But the contractors do represent numbers that if in uniform would be fully counted as part of the occupation force.
As I always reminded readers, when judging whether we had enough troops (aside from judging how we used them) count all the security forces. This use of private security contractors is just a fact of life today and represents the norm over the long history of warfare.
And now that you ask, yes I do have a collection of essays from this blog on privatized warfare.
Do Killers of Androids Dream of Electric Paradise?
Dipping their hands in a pool of oil spilled by a destroyed robot is likely to be less than satisfying to our Islamist enemies. We might be able to nullify our biggest perceived weakness--sensitivity to casualties--when fighting wars.
In addition to the advantages of having largely crewless supply convoys, this Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) initiative has an interesting combat aspect that could apply to the entire Army and Marine Corps:
I mentioned this concept as a source of firepower for new combat vehicles:
It seems my notion wasn't as speculative as I thought back then.
One advantage of this capability is that it has the potential to really screw with the minds of jihadis who believe that their own death is wonderful if they can kill even one Infidel. Does dying while killing a robot operated by an Infidel far away get you into Paradise?
In addition to the advantages of having largely crewless supply convoys, this Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) initiative has an interesting combat aspect that could apply to the entire Army and Marine Corps:
Some of these vehicles could have remotely controlled gun turrets, with the operators back at some base, ready to go into action. A few human gun turret operators could be on duty for several convoys. The U.S. has already developed predictive analysis systems that determine the probability of attacks on convoys, and more gun turret operators could be on call, since anyone who has played video games can quickly learn how to operate one of these turrets.
I mentioned this concept as a source of firepower for new combat vehicles:
I have to wonder if there will be a cavalry scout vehicle that carries just a couple dismounts instead of the nine-man squad? The Bradley has a cavalry version like that.
If so, could you up the firepower with a pair of CROWS-like weapons stations where the extra seven men would go that are remotely controlled by soldiers back at a higher headquarters? Or even back in CONUS?
It seems my notion wasn't as speculative as I thought back then.
One advantage of this capability is that it has the potential to really screw with the minds of jihadis who believe that their own death is wonderful if they can kill even one Infidel. Does dying while killing a robot operated by an Infidel far away get you into Paradise?
The Ultimate Air Superiority
If Hezbollah stands by Iran and carries out its threat to bombard Israel after Israel attacks Iran's nuclear facilities, I think Israeli forces will push deep into Lebanon to tear up Hezbollah.
Whether it was Allied forces taking over V-1 launching sites along the Channel or Japanese forces taking over airfields in China, the best way to stop attacks from the air is to take over the enemy launching areas. So Hezbollah should be careful making threats like this:
One Israeli official said that he thinks that an Israeli attack on Iran would result in a month-long war. This clearly means a month of enduring Hezbollah rocket attacks, for the most part, rather than a month-long Israeli campaign against Iranian targets.
Yet this doesn't mean that after a month that Hezbollah tires of killing Jews or runs out of rockets. I think it means that Israel anticipates it will need a month to occupy southern Lebanon to eliminate the launching points for Hezbollah's rocket arsenal.
Indeed, I think that Israel goes north in a deep penetration to really tear up Hezbollah's infrastructure and to kill or capture their leaders and important personnel. The Israelis won't stop until they hold Baalbek.
Hezbollah may be operating under a couple delusions. One, they may think that their credible performance in 2006 was caused by their own skills in ground fighting rather than Israel's poor decisions about how to fight that war.
Two, Hezbollah may be forgetting that reinforcements will not be coming from Syria when the Israelis move. Even if Assad wanted to send troops to help Hezbollah, he can't. Assad is having trouble slowing down his rate of defeat in his own fight.
So Hezbollah is on its own.
As an aside, did anyone really believe that the United Nations would solve the problem of southern Lebanon being used by a sub-state actor to attack Israel in 2006?
Whether or not an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities works, Hezbollah is going to experience a month-long world of hurt if it carries through with its threat to fight at Iran's side.
UPDATE: Worse for Hezbollah, the Lebanese might not care if Hezbollah gets hammered:
Hezbollah might want to reconsider making threats.
UPDATE: More on why Iran's proxies might not really be too eager to go to bat for Iran in case Israel attacks Iran's nuclear facilities:
We've seen that Iranian attempts to strike back over cyber attacks and the killing of scientists related to their nuclear program have not been terribly professional or effective. Iran needs these proxies for a good terror counter-attack, and Iran doesn't have them now.
The article concludes with a warning to Israel:
True enough. Plans don't survive first contact with the enemy, and all.
But that warning applies to all the combatants. Let's remember Grant's frustration with his generals in the Army of the Potomac who feared General Lee's formidable skills:
And it applies to decisions that avoid the close war for the distant--and perhaps nuclear--war.
Whether it was Allied forces taking over V-1 launching sites along the Channel or Japanese forces taking over airfields in China, the best way to stop attacks from the air is to take over the enemy launching areas. So Hezbollah should be careful making threats like this:
The Iranian-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah said on Friday it possessed what it called precision rockets that could kill "tens of thousands" of Israelis in strikes on Israel.
One Israeli official said that he thinks that an Israeli attack on Iran would result in a month-long war. This clearly means a month of enduring Hezbollah rocket attacks, for the most part, rather than a month-long Israeli campaign against Iranian targets.
Yet this doesn't mean that after a month that Hezbollah tires of killing Jews or runs out of rockets. I think it means that Israel anticipates it will need a month to occupy southern Lebanon to eliminate the launching points for Hezbollah's rocket arsenal.
Indeed, I think that Israel goes north in a deep penetration to really tear up Hezbollah's infrastructure and to kill or capture their leaders and important personnel. The Israelis won't stop until they hold Baalbek.
Hezbollah may be operating under a couple delusions. One, they may think that their credible performance in 2006 was caused by their own skills in ground fighting rather than Israel's poor decisions about how to fight that war.
Two, Hezbollah may be forgetting that reinforcements will not be coming from Syria when the Israelis move. Even if Assad wanted to send troops to help Hezbollah, he can't. Assad is having trouble slowing down his rate of defeat in his own fight.
So Hezbollah is on its own.
As an aside, did anyone really believe that the United Nations would solve the problem of southern Lebanon being used by a sub-state actor to attack Israel in 2006?
Whether or not an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities works, Hezbollah is going to experience a month-long world of hurt if it carries through with its threat to fight at Iran's side.
UPDATE: Worse for Hezbollah, the Lebanese might not care if Hezbollah gets hammered:
Not long ago, Arabs everywhere listened when the leader of Hezbollah spoke. Sheik Hassan Nasrallah's prominence, bolstered by his Lebanese guerrilla force's battles against Israel, was a sign of the rising regional influence of Shiite Muslims and overwhelmingly Shiite Iran. Now, his speeches don't necessarily make front pages even in Lebanon.
Hezbollah might want to reconsider making threats.
UPDATE: More on why Iran's proxies might not really be too eager to go to bat for Iran in case Israel attacks Iran's nuclear facilities:
[The leader of Iran’s Supreme National Security Counci, Saeed] Jalili’s visit [to Lebanon and Syria] was meant to remind the Israelis that Iran’s proxies on Israel’s northern doorstep remain ready and willing to plunge the region into chaos if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities.
It appears however, that Iran’s allies in the eastern Mediterranean may not be as keen about going to war for the ayatollahs as Tehran would like – and the Israelis know it.
We've seen that Iranian attempts to strike back over cyber attacks and the killing of scientists related to their nuclear program have not been terribly professional or effective. Iran needs these proxies for a good terror counter-attack, and Iran doesn't have them now.
The article concludes with a warning to Israel:
Netanyahu seems willing to go down in history as the prime minister who saved [Israel] from a nuclear Iran. And he’s counting on minimal retaliation from Iran’s proxies if Israel strikes first. But as Barbara Tuchman, the World War I historian, once said, “war is the unfolding of miscalculations.”
True enough. Plans don't survive first contact with the enemy, and all.
But that warning applies to all the combatants. Let's remember Grant's frustration with his generals in the Army of the Potomac who feared General Lee's formidable skills:
Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what are we going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.
And it applies to decisions that avoid the close war for the distant--and perhaps nuclear--war.
Friday, August 17, 2012
Unity Theater
I've already doubted that we are actually prepared to use force to stop Iran from having a nuclear capability or that our sanctions will work. Talk that we must stick with the sanctions because the world is united with us is just a farce. The world is united in preventing a strike on Iran and they are willing to minimally harm Iran economically to get that.
This article challenges the idea that sanctions are working and that we even want to stop Iran from having nuclear weapons.
Further, so many of our allies have gotten exemptions from the sanctions that the idea that the world is united against Iran's nuclear program is farcical. If the world was truly united to stop Iran, they'd implement sanctions fully without our arm twisting and they'd side with us or Israel for attacking Iran as Iran continues to move forward to get nuclear weapons.
Or do you really believe that Iran is pressing ahead in defiance of the unified world in order to have cheap and clean nuclear energy (and locally produced radioisotopes to fight cancer)?
I have to say that I agree that the Obama administration will pretend not to see Iran's nuclear capabilities if Iran pretends not to have nuclear weapons. But I think Iran's rulers have such contempt for us that they won't go along with that charade. Feith puts it well:
Iran will detonate a nuclear weapon--perhaps in North Korea--and will show it off the same way they show off every pretend wonder weapon that they cobble together.
Unless Israel strikes first because all the worries about what might go wrong in an attack on Iran pale in comparison to all the problems that could unfold if Iran goes nuclear:
If the world is truly united over Iran's nuclear path, they'll understand the need to hammer Iran's nuclear program and breathe a sigh of relief if it succeeds.
This article challenges the idea that sanctions are working and that we even want to stop Iran from having nuclear weapons.
Further, so many of our allies have gotten exemptions from the sanctions that the idea that the world is united against Iran's nuclear program is farcical. If the world was truly united to stop Iran, they'd implement sanctions fully without our arm twisting and they'd side with us or Israel for attacking Iran as Iran continues to move forward to get nuclear weapons.
Or do you really believe that Iran is pressing ahead in defiance of the unified world in order to have cheap and clean nuclear energy (and locally produced radioisotopes to fight cancer)?
I have to say that I agree that the Obama administration will pretend not to see Iran's nuclear capabilities if Iran pretends not to have nuclear weapons. But I think Iran's rulers have such contempt for us that they won't go along with that charade. Feith puts it well:
Would this president, so dedicated to multilateralism (except where targeting al Qaeda is concerned), launch a major military campaign against Iran even without Russian and Chinese support at the U.N.? Do Iran's leaders think he would? Or have they noticed that American officials often repeat the "all-options-on-the-table" mantra as mere throat clearing before they list all the reasons why attacking Iran is a terrifying prospect?
Iran will detonate a nuclear weapon--perhaps in North Korea--and will show it off the same way they show off every pretend wonder weapon that they cobble together.
Unless Israel strikes first because all the worries about what might go wrong in an attack on Iran pale in comparison to all the problems that could unfold if Iran goes nuclear:
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said confronting Israel is an effort to "protect the dignity of all human beings."
"The existence of the Zionist regime is an insult to all humanity," Ahmadinejad said. He was addressing worshippers at Tehran University after nationwide pro-Palestinian rallies, an annual event marking Quds (Jerusalem) Day on the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan.
If the world is truly united over Iran's nuclear path, they'll understand the need to hammer Iran's nuclear program and breathe a sigh of relief if it succeeds.
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