Thursday, January 16, 2003

Speed Bumps

Countdown to Invasion: 15 Days.

Lest anyone think we aren't serious about invading Iraq soon, check out the statements by Rumsfeld and Myers at this press conference. Note that we will not let a dying UN stop us; note the refusal to play by Saddam's rules (and France's and Sheryl Crow's rules that say we must find what he has hidden); note that acceptance that the anti-war crowd cannot be convinced that war is just and necessary; note the quoting of the President that we will not be stalled; note that he says the choice for war has essentially been made by Saddam; note the dismissal of any bluffing; and note the proper placing of blame for harm to any of the so-called 'human shields' lies with the Iraqis, showing that they are no shields at all. But read for yourself:

Rumsfeld: Good afternoon. After United Nations (U.N.) inspectors briefed the Security Council last week, a number of the observers seemed to seize on the inspectors' statement that they found "no smoking gun" as yet. Conversely, if the inspectors had found new evidence, the argument might then have been that inspections were in fact working and, therefore, they should be given more time to work. I guess for any who are unalterably opposed to military action, no matter what Iraq may do, there will be some sort of an argument.

Another way to look at it is this; that the fact that the inspectors have not yet come up with new evidence of Iraq's WMD program could be evidence in and of itself of Iraq's non-cooperation. We do know that Iraq has designed its programs in a way that they can proceed in an environment of inspections, and that they are skilled at denial and deception.

The president has repeatedly made clear -- and it bears repeating -- that the burden of proof is not on the United States, it's not on the United Nations or the international community to prove that Iraq has these weapons. The burden of proof is on the Iraqi regime to prove that it is disarming, and to show the inspectors where the weapons are.

As the president said, "The inspectors do not have the duty or the ability to uncover weapons hidden in a vast country. The responsibility of inspectors can only be to confirm the evidence of voluntary and total disarmament by a cooperative country. It is Saddam Hussein who has the responsibility to provide that evidence, as directed and in full." Unquote.

Thus far, he has been unwilling to do so. We continue to hope that the regime will change course and that Iraq will disarm peacefully and voluntarily. No one wants war. The choice between war and peace will not be made in Washington or, indeed, in New York; it will be made in Baghdad. And the decision is facing the Iraqi regime.

This is a test for them, to be sure, but it is also a test for the U.N.. The credibility of that institution is important. Iraq has defied some 16 U.N. resolutions without cost or consequence. The Security Council unanimously approved a new resolution, which required that Iraq, quote, "provide a currently accurate, full and complete declaration," unquote, of its WMD programs, which asserted that any false statement or omissions in the declaration submitted by Iraq shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations, and which declared that this was Iraq's final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations, unquote. That is what the resolution said.

When the U.N, makes a statement like that, it puts its credibility on the line. To understand what's at stake, it's worth recalling the history of the U.N.'s predecessor, the League of Nations. The league collapsed because member states were not willing to back up their declarations with consequences. When the league failed to act after the invasion of Abyssinia, it was discredited. And the lesson of that experience was summed up by Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who declared at that time, quote: "Collective bluffing cannot bring about collective security," unquote. The lesson is as true today as it was at the start -- as it was back in the 20th century. The question is the -- whether or not the world has learned that lesson.

General Myers?

Myers: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And good afternoon.

I'd like to begin by speaking briefly of Iraq's recruitment of human shields and the International Law of Armed Conflict.

As many of you know from news reports in Reuters and AFP, the London Observer, and in many other newspapers around the world, Iraq announced in late December that it will recruit and receive volunteers from Arab and Western countries to serve as human shields who would be deployed to protect sensitive sites. This is a deliberate recruitment of innocent civilians for the purpose of putting them in harm's way should a conflict occur. The last time Iraq used people as human shields was in December of 1998, when Iraq failed to comply with U.N. arms experts and coalition forces began Operation Desert Fox. A year earlier, the Iraqi encouraged hundreds of Iraqi families to put themselves at risk as voluntary human shields at palaces and strategic facilities in Iraq when Iraq refused to allow U.N. inspectors access to government sites.

I'd like to note that it is illegal under the international law of armed conflict to use non-combatants as a means of shielding potential targets. And Iraq action to do so would not only violate this law, but also be considered a war crime in any conflict. Therefore, if death or serious injury to a non-combatant resulted from these efforts, the individuals responsible for deploying any innocent civilians as human shields would be guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention.


We are going to invade, let there be no doubt.

On to Baghdad.

Let Them Rant

First of all, let me say that it is dismaying to hear some say that the Axis of Evil speech provoked North Korea to go nuclear yet so many say that North Korea’s repeated threats to start World War III or turn Seoul into a sea of fire are just their quirky way of saying “let’s talk.”

There, I feel better.

So what if Pyongyang threatens us? What are they going to do, nuke us?

I really think we can contain them and squeeze them until they collapse. Look at the collection of states of NATO that we had to herd during the Cold War. There combined military might was never enough to halt a conventional invasion by the Soviets. Even with our aid, only during the 1980s did our conventional capabilities provide the edge to probably defeat them. And the Soviets had industrial capacity and thousands of nuclear weapons to back their threats. What do we face on the Korean peninsula? A broken state whose military has one shot at attacking a far stronger South Korea. We must work with one state that matters to organize the defense of the south—South Korea itself. And our threat may gain a handful of missiles with nukes. Plus we will have effective missile defenses in time. There are also powerful states in the region with every reason to oppose North Korean nukes regardless of what they think of us. As an added bonus, we don't even need to keep our troops as hostages to our intervention by keeping them on the front line facing the North Koreans since South Korea can hold the line. Will North Korea really launch a war to protest our sanctions?

We’ve faced worse threats. Are we not the nation that went “toe to toe with the Russkies” (with thanks to Slim Pickens) and broke them? We easily forget those days but North Korea really is a blast from the past, its Stalinist rhetoric unchanged from the days when they learned at the feet of Stalin himself. We can do it again against this pipsqueak tyrant.

Contain him. Squeeze him. And make sure he knows we will obliterate every damn bunker he has so that he knows he cannot burrow deep enough to escape nuclear retribution.

His thug regime will collapse if we push it.

What If Saddam Does Flee?”

So what if Saddam does go into exile as this article says? Do we pack up our troops, declare victory, and go home?

Of course not. We’d still need to occupy the country. Our troops would need to go in in force just as if we were invading, with combat aircraft ranging across the country in a show of power prior to settling in for a good round of trials and purges and ripping out the roots of Saddam’s WMD programs.

And if he goes, we should still kill him or try him. Should we really be in the business of protecting war criminals? What kind of message does this send to future dictators who would kill their people, invade their neighbors, plot to assassinate our past president, incite terror, plot terror, and pursue nuclear and biological weapons to protect his horrible regime? It tells them, you can do all this and if America decides it has had enough, you call “time” and head for easy retirement with the loot of your reign of terror.

That is not exactly the kind of message I want to send. Send the message that if you do these things, you will die in prison or be executed.

Wednesday, January 15, 2003

Timing

Well now, the Blix report on the 27th, State of the Union on the 28th, and a Bush-Blair meeting at Camp David on the 31st. Could the attack be that night? It has seemed to make sense to me that the attack begin Friday evening after office buildings are emptied at the end of the work week and children are home away from vulnerable schools should wackos decide in the heat of the moment (and before the devastating effectiveness of our war machine is evident) to strike a blow for Saddam by hitting civilians here. And you know, February 1 is a new moon. We own the night. I’ve been hesitant to pick a date for war since my botched December 27 prediction, but what the heck,it’s been a couple weeks since I admitted failure—January 31 or February 1 at the latest, we invade. Finally.

Oh, and globalsecurity.org says a brigade of 82nd Airborne received orders to head out that way. Iraq or relieve units in Afghanistan?

North Korean Diplomacy

Orson Scott Card (Ender’s Game fame and other good stuff) has a nice piece on North Korea. Andrewsullivan.com highlighted it.

Ah, That’s Why

The reason it is unlikely that 1st Infantry will deploy despite reports that it will go to war is that it is otherwise occupied in Kosovo. In addition to the fact that I think we will have plenty of armor to smash any Iraqi attempt to stop us in the open, it makes sense to keep 1st Infantry unengaged so the balance of the division in Europe may act as a relief force for the Balkans. Plus, with one brigade’s units just having left duty there and one just arriving, the unit is way too peacekeeping oriented to fight a war. Peacekeeping is akin to police work and unlike combat where you toss a grenade into a room before entering just in case, police knock on the door so you can put your robe on first. Big difference. It will take a while for the exiting unit to become a fully capable combat unit again. It makes sense that 1st Infantry’s role in this month’s command post exercise with 1st Armored, 1st Cavalry, and 101st Airborne, is meant to simulate 3rd Infantry which is deploying to Kuwait. Of course, since the division was reportedly alerted, component units of the division not needed for peacekeeping such as artillery, or air defense, or signal, or other support units could be sent to bolster other divisions.

Tuesday, January 14, 2003

War Imminent

I know my credibility is poor since I thought the war would have started by the end of last year, but I think war is waiting only for the troops and once they are ready, we will go. I know that lots of pundits worry that the President is losing his nerve or that the UN or our allies are successfully derailing us, but I don't think so. Oh, sure, their hand wringing gets me to worry a bit, but I believe we will invade. No question. Troops are seriously moving and I don't think we would be deploying troops if we were not ready to invade. It is too tough to ramp up the readiness for war like this only to back down or go into a holding pattern and wait. Nor do I think the president would dangle troops out as VX bait sitting in desert kabals tempting the Iraqis to launch a chemical first strike to disrupt our plans.

The real clincher is what President Bush said today, "I'm sick and tired of games and deception. I haven't seen any evidence that he has disarmed. Time is running out on Saddam Hussein. He must disarm." I don't think he said that lightly. I think war is coming far sooner than March. And talk of the fall is just crazy. We may go this month or very early in February, but it will be far earlier than the press is reporting. But that is fine, I'd rather we gain tactical surprise by fooling the Iraqis than have explicit reassurances that we will invade.

On to Baghdad.

Hogwash

Carpenter’s piece is more of the ‘America caused the problem’ hogwash that seems to crop up whenever we face a foreign problem. He says our military record since the end of the Cold War caused the proliferation that we now desperately seek to curtail. He lists American attacks as if they were bolts from the blue, with no justification at all. He acts like this is even new behavior in the real world. Is the fact that a great power will wage war in its interests new? In a sense it is, we have mostly attacked for reasons pure and not for empire. Sure, taking down Noriega and ejecting Saddam from Kuwait were done purely in the interests of national security, but we did at least fight despicable creatures. His naming of “invading and occupying Afghanistan” in his list of invasions that ‘caused’ proliferation is particularly absurd given the 3,000 dead we suffered on September 11. Would bin Laden and his Taliban hosts really have retained nukes for deterrence if they had gotten them? Really now.

It is all such nonsense. As if states that are now on the verge of gaining, or have acquired, nuclear weapons, began to do so since the fall of the Berlin Wall. States that consider us the enemy have long tried to obtain sufficient military power to deter us. Witness Iran’s purchase of Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missiles in the 1980s to deter us from sending our Navy into the Gulf. Witness the pursuit of chemical weapons that many countries now have. Indeed, nuclear proliferation has long been a concern of ours. What has changed is that nuclear weapons are now old technology and hence are within reach of even the poorest country. Thug regimes want insurance that they can continue their thuggery without interference from the only country that can stop them. Nuclear arms are merely the latest means and are not the result of our post-Cold War policies.

And what about the track record of states that have not gone nuclear: namely Japan and Germany? Or the states that have abandoned nuclear programs such as Brazil and Argentina? Or the states that have abandoned nuclear weapons such as South Africa (which developed them in secrecy), Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelorussia (which inherited them from the Soviet Union)? Are these states more at risk from America now that they have no nukes?

Indeed, if the track record of the Soviet Union collapsing trying to maintain military might superior to America’s hasn’t convinced poverty-stricken states that nukes are the road to economic and moral collapse, I doubt our wars against threats and sickos are particularly significant in prompting a decision to go nuclear. Unless Carpenter thinks we should launch a preventative nuclear strike on North Korea and Iran as a lesson to nuclear aspirants that the nuclear road will result in their destruction rather than our deterrence.

We are so big, that even a foreign policy on the level of Iceland would cause thug regimes to worry about our capabilities. We are too big to ignore regardless of what we do. If Islamist hostility in the face of our repeated efforts to protect and aid Moslems can gain traction in the world, what on earth could we do to lessen the fears of thug regimes that their days are numbered? The key to regime survival is not being a bloodthirsty dictatorship. You’d think that would be the lesson.

Carpenter may not want America to do anything militarily more strenuous than patrol the Mexican and Canadian borders, but he shouldn’t blame us for what states would do anyway in pursuit of his isolationist policy.

Carter

Carter speaks. I shudder. Pyongyang gains hope.

Why the architect of the sham ’94 agreement thinks he has anything useful to offer is beyond me. Listen to his description of North Korea:

As now, the isolated and economically troubled nation was focused on resolving basic differences with the United States. Deeply suspicious and perhaps paranoid, the North Koreans were demanding assurances against a nuclear attack and opportunities for normal bilateral relations.


You’d think he was talking about a troubled youth who keeps getting in trouble with the local sheriff. He seems to feel sorry for the most brutal and bankrupt regime on earth (sorry Saddam, you try, but oil revenue at least keeps your people from starving despite your claims; and your minority Sunnis have not crushed all spirit of resistance as effectively as the pudgy freak from Pyongyang—and how does he gain weight in that starving land?) and thinks we need to give reassurances to them!! How can we have normal relations with such an awful regime?

Tyrants have no better friend in the West than former President Carter. And that’s saying a lot. Lordy, Lord, won’t he go to Baghdad as a human shield or something? Shoot, the Iraqis tried to kill the senior President Bush; instead of killing an American president, maybe they’ll really appreciate having one of their own to dress up and haul around to chat with activists and Hollywood types. Heck, Carter won’t even know he left home.

Not Shields After All

I guess those brave souls who claim they will be human shields won’t be shielding anything after all. According to the article, “Although most said they plan to leave by this weekend, others claiming to represent several hundred protesters from Europe, the United States and neighboring Arab nations said they intend to arrive later in the month to engage in a far riskier form of activism: They plan to act as human shields, hunkering down in hospitals, water-treatment plants and other civilian installations to dissuade U.S. commanders from targeting those facilities.”

How risky is it to hunker down in a hospital? Against American forces which, almost uniquely in the world, are both capable of and eager to avoid striking civilian targets? Park their sorry butts on the roof of an Iraqi intelligence post or something and then I’ll be impressed. With their stupidity but impressed nonetheless.

We’ll see how eager they are to camp out by a mosque when an Iraqi air defense unit snuggles up close to the civilian target.

And again, I am amazed that these people would choose Saddam Hussein’s bankrupt regime as uniquely suited to pledging their lives to defend. Are there no more worthy governments or people in the world? Apparently not, according to one: ‘"Not in Hanoi or Panama or Baghdad last time, or anywhere else for that matter, has there been this many people coming to a city that probably will be bombed to bits saying, 'Don't do it. It doesn't make sense. There are other ways to resolve this disagreement,' " said James Jennings, the president of Conscience International, an anti-war group based in Atlanta.’

The Iraqi Baathistss are delighted, of course. And behind closed doors, I’m sure they are amazed at the idiots who would do their dirty work.

Some of the activists are at least honest when they avoid that whole ‘we hate Saddam too, but…’ routine when they proudly proclaim their intention to hinder the American-led war: “Several activists said that even if they fail to sway the White House, they hope their efforts will complicate the Pentagon's war plans and lead European nations to sit out the action, spoiling the Bush administration's hope for an international coalition against Hussein.

“Peace” activists, indeed. What can I say about the foreigners there? They aren’t Americans. But my fellow citizens? They disgust me. They would hinder our war, knowing that they could cause additional American soldiers to die. And for what? Saddam’s brutal regime. That is what inspires their ‘activism.’

On to Baghdad.

Monday, January 13, 2003

Protesters

Our domestic Stalinists of ANSWER are revving up another weekend of protests. Many will answer the call, including one quoted Texas attorney. So the attorney doesn’t care who organizes the rally? Nazis, or League of Women Voters, or the American Legion, it just doesn’t matter to him. He values the Stalinist ANSWER’s ability to organize. Well, that’s what Stalinist do, being the vanguard of the proletariat and all. They organize the useful dunderheads and lead them to storm the parliament. While the communists of ANSWER will never shoot their way to power—I don’t mean to imply that—that is their goal, albeit a hopelessly unrealistic one. But that ability to hope against reality is consistent with their economic, political, and social ideas.

This ability to ignore who you side with is consistent with that mentality that leads to human shields in the service of Saddam Hussein. I don’t care how much I disapproved of the actions of our government on a particular subject, I could not march, and chant, and hoist a sign condemning our government in the service of some organization that advocates the violent overthrow of our democratic government.

And it is funny, too. These protesters demonize our government yet freely speak to reporters and mass in our capital, unafraid of being whisked away, tortured for the names of their friends, and executed in the public square as a warning to others. American bombers will not wreak vengeance on their home towns as pay back. They will not lose their jobs as the government seeks to silence them. They live in a free country where they can vent their anger even on the eve of war without fear of reprisal.

How they fail to see how this reality of tolerance and freedom contradicts their fevered image of an American dictatorship is beyond me.

On to Baghdad. The protesters have my scorn and disgust for their display of Saddam solidarity.

Not Shields

So American and other westerners will stand as human shields to ward off our invasion? When we send off our best young men and women to risk their lives defending us by bringing down that tyrant Saddam, how could anybody even pause when pulling the trigger to save one of them? I say, use the presence of human shields as the prime indicator that something that Saddam wants to preserve is right there. This might be the low tech alternative to GPS-guided bombs if Saddam’s minions have acquired effective jammers. (Hey, ‘Gullible Peace Shield’ works just fine)

This is war, not theater; and we are going to fight this war even if a bunch of stagnant corners of the gene pool decide to cause our bombs to detonate a nano-second earlier than they would otherwise. Saddam must marvel that such idiots are available to him. The funny thing is, even if we did go out of our way to avoid killing these people, Saddam will probably blow some up just so Tariq Aziz can get all weepy on CNN during a eulogy to these ‘martyrs.’

But really, what an opportunity. Ours is a free country so we must tolerate them when they spout off from our campuses; but once they travel to the enemy country and side with the enemy, they are fair game. I mean, I certainly wouldn’t deliberately target them if it would interfere with the mission, but I hope nobody loses any sleep at night worrying that any of them might die.

Mission for Tenth Mountain

I dare say we have a real mission for the 10th Mountain Division and the British Air Assault Brigade in northern Iraq. With a very strong assist from special forces who will be embedded within Kurdish units, of course. Not just a protective force for the Kurds or a political blanket to smother Kurdish independence as the price for Turkish assistance, the force has a real role and real point of leverage for gaining the cooperation of the Kurds—destroying Ansar al Islam, the 600+ Islamists who have set up their own little corner of Taliban heaven on earth near the Iranian border inside Kurdish Iraq. I’ve heard some say we should bomb them even now, but that makes little sense. We can’t destroy them from the air, and if we disperse them now by trying, they can adapt and still harm us when we invade. If they stay happy, contented, and concentrated until we invade Iraq, we can kill and disrupt them to provide maximum effect just when we need the Islamists suppressed and on the run the most.

They are most certainly a target in the war on terror and a potential terror threat to our invasion force in the Iraq campaign and occupation. I am confident they have a big target on their base.

Truman

Sounds like the Mediterranean front is going to center around Truman. This carrier is digitized and will be great for going after elusive targets trying to lob chemicals from western Iraq. The carrier can receive digital images from recon aircraft and not rely on the Fotomat film delivery method. With overflight rights across Israel and Jordan, this will work just fine. And with Army and Marine equipment already stored in Jordan, the carrier probably won’t need to carry out this role for very long. I expect at least a couple brigades to roll out of Jordan to provide some heavier ground forces that link up with airborne and airmobile forces that seize airfields in western Iraq.

On to Baghdad.

Sunday, January 12, 2003

Ground Forces-Again

Interestingly enough, this report says that ships carrying heavy armor have not yet started sailing to the Gulf. I could have sworn ships had started rolling already but I guess not (I think I should look back at my archives). It looks like non-brigade equipment will sail from Texas for 1st Cavalry Division.

Anyway, this article says that possibly only part of 1st Infantry will go to war. With only two brigades in Germany (like 1st Armored) does this mean only a brigade of the division will go or perhaps only certain combat support elements? 1st Armored, 1st Infantry, and 1st Cavalry will be in a computer exercise ("Victory Scrimmage") with 101st Airborne. Perhaps 1st Infantry is representing 3rd Infantry Division in the exercise, leaving the divisional flag in Germany? (Where it could command a rescue force into the Balkans if necessary to guard against some unpleasant event there directed against our troops) This is clearly the main effort. 10th Mountain and the Marines and British aren't part of the exercise because they probably have separate mission: our mountain division in the north with a brigade of British in support; and the bulk of the Marines and remainder of British in the south. Maybe one Marine brigade-the Atlantic one sailing-will be attached to 1st Armored to give it three maneuver brigades.

This actually fits in well with the heavy armor stockpiled out there. We have five brigades worth of heavy armor out there plus a brigade of 3rd Infantry. Add the rest of 3rd Infantry's equipment going by sea and you can fly in the personnel of 1st Cavalry (3 brigades) and 1st Armored (2 brigades in Germany) relatively easily. We will ship in the divisional equipment for 1st Cav and I believe we have a division base in the Gulf already that could be used for 1st Armored. The article says we will have enough to invade by late January to mid February. Will we really leave our stuff out there for weeks tempting Saddam to strike first with chemicals? Our allies may balk (or pretend to) but we are going to war soon. Talk of second thoughts is ridiculous. We've pulled the trigger and the round is heading down range. Even if Saddam slipped in the bathtub in the next three weeks, we'd go in. There is no way we cannot occupy Iraq to insure we rip out the WMD infrastructure and the Baathist thug regime.

Also note that the article says that the invasion will start with only 500 aircraft. The quantum leap in our capabilities over 1991 is tremendous. Now, for example, the Navy can take a really significant role because now they have precision abilities. We and our allies had nearly 2,000 combat aircraft committed to Desert Storm. With a bigger theater and more ambitious objectives (but with a weaker opponent), we will nonetheless have superior capability in 2003. Fairly amazing, actually.

Let's move.

Saturday, January 11, 2003

What?!"

Please tell me that this is all to throw the Iraqis off. Our allies are asking us to put off the war a little longer because they think that eleven years of inconclusive inspections have not given them enough time to figure out if they work? When the only time inspectors found something was just before they were about to certify Iraq as WMD-free and a defector said, hey, look in the basement at this chicken farm? Given the track record of our allies, they will always think the inspectors will need more time.

Oh, they have the nerve. Our troops will die if the Iraqis get more time to prepare but what do they care? If our government actually listens to these pleas, for shame on the administration. I never thought we needed UN approval to gain allied help, but I did not oppose going the UN route as long as it did not delay our invasion. I'm starting to worry this is happening. Mostly, I think we are letting these possibilities float around to hide the fact that we have decided on war and already have a D-Day set (although what that is I don't know-hopefully this month), it is possible that the reports are accurate. I sure hope the Europeans are simply pretending to be 'very European' to help us deceive the Iraqis.

Also, it is inconceivable to me that we do not have our war plans set. Hogwash. We've had well over a year to plan this and troops are on the move.

Interesting

One thing I've kind of vaguely noticed on Globalsecurity.org is that it lists no separate Army artillery brigades as either in the Gulf or alerted to go. It lists separate air defense, military police, and other brigades and smaller units, but no artillery.

Given the refusal to commit artillery to the Taliban campaign (I think there is one battery in the whole country now in support of our troops) and the cancellation of Crusader, I wonder if this is a deliberate decision to rely on air power and just use the organic divisional artillery. In Desert Storm, we had lots of separate artillery brigades to support the offensive. This might be part of the trade offs we are making to get a force to the theater fast. But artillery is accurate, capable of firing in all weather, and it sure isn't going to suffer from GPS jamming (if the Iraqis can do that, of course). I understand and accept that we need lighter artillery, but we still need it.

Friday, January 10, 2003

Ground Force Summary

Let's see, so far, the following major ground units have been mentioned as earmarked for war against Iraq:


  • 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized): 3 brigades.
  • 1st Cavalry Division (a heavy division): 3 brigades.
  • 1st Armored Division: 2 brigades.
  • 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized): 2 brigades.
  • 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile): 3 brigades.
  • 10th Mountain Division (Light): 2 brigades.
  • 173rd Airborne Brigade.
  • I Marine Expeditionary Force: 3 'brigades.'
  • 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade
  • 16th Air Assault Brigade (British)
  • 3rd Commando Brigade (British)
  • Elements of 1st Armoured Division (British): 1 brigade.


That's a total of 23 brigades or nearly eight divisions. U.S. Rangers and special forces from our allies to aid our special forces will go in too. Separate Marine Expeditionary Units (battalions) have been mentioned too although I do not know if they are separate from the division and brigade mentioned.

To me, this is overkill. I'm all in favor of smashing our enemy, but we can do so with less than this level of force. Especially when we have to look over our shoulder at North Korea I believe this list is designed to allow us to go in earlier than observers think. We will have enough long before all these units can be deployed and so will gain tactical surprise.

This also doesn't mention Air Force or Navy units. I don't focus on them not because I don't think that they are important but because they will be supreme at sea and in the air. They will be in the theater in sufficient numbers to crush opposition and support the war without any trouble.

My evolving scenario, based on what I have read about deployments and what I would do, would essentially have the air and ground offensive start simultaneously. Conventional ground units might even precede the air offensive to get a jump on the offensive:
  • Marine Expeditionary Force, 3rd Commando Brigade, and British 1st Armoured Division units seize Basra region and then press north to support the crossing of the Euphrates River.
  • A heavy brigade with lots of artillery and attack helicopters in support under V Corps headquarters simulate the main effort driving north out of Kuwait heading for the Euphrates River, advancing on the left of the drive on Basra.
  • 10th Mountain and 16th Air Assault Brigade advance out of Turkey into the Kurdish areas, perhaps with the aim of destroying al Qaeda-affiliated groups in the area.
  • One or two Turkish corps advance into the Mosul area, probably not really seeking to fight but to keep refugees out of Turkey and to distract the Iraqis.
  • The main effort under XVIII Airborne Corps aims to occupy western Iraq and approach Baghdad from the west. This would have six heavy brigades, the 101st Airborne Division, and a Marine Brigade. Perhaps a heavy Army brigade and a Marine Brigade advance out of Jordan. The airborne brigade and Rangers grab airfields to airlift the 101st directly into Iraq. Or perhaps it will base out of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and make a big jump (with a refueling stop) all the way to the Baghdad region. Five heavy brigades link up with the Jordan thrust by advancing north out of Saudi Arabia and northwest out of Kuwait. It is possible that special forces will have staked out the routes so that the heavy armor can basically do a two-day road march to the western Baghdad suburbs. It could take a week if we advance in combat formation.

Now the only question is how fast we can airlift what we need into the theater or adjoining areas. I really hope we are going before the Blix report is made. What more do we reasonably need to do to satisfy our so-called allies? I say we've done enough and it is about time to take care of business.

On to Baghdad.

The Supremacy of Hope Over Experience

I suppose it says a lot about us that we and others are shocked that North Korea has announced that it is withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Said the article:

In a statement released by North Korea's official news agency this afternoon, the insular communist country claimed "freedom from the binding force of the safeguards accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency," the U.N. watchdog that monitors the 1970 treaty, which has more than 180 countries as signatories.


Well, duh.

What was the first clue that North Korea was out of the NPT? Their one or two nukes that they already have? Or was it the clear pursuit of nuclear material that even the North Korean apologists can’t ignore? (though they can blame it on the United States, saying we ‘provoked’ them into going nuclear) What exactly was “binding” about their paper adherence to the NPT?

Honestly, only the most densely hopeful could be actually shocked at this announcement. What has changed by this development? Both before and after, the North Koreans have made it clear that they want nukes. For those who cover their eyes with treaties, soothed by the words and able to ignore the actions of North Korea, this statement is shocking. But that says more about them than the North Koreans. The shocked westerners (and I include the South Koreans and Japanese here—they are part of the West) want to be fooled. Life is easier then. Then they can hurl insults at America, blaming us for disturbing their afternoon tea.

Clear the decks. Let’s take down Saddam already. Before more international surprises distract us or derail us from driving a stake through the heart of that madman.

Price of Delay

Is this a price we will pay for delaying war? Does Iraq have jammers that the Russians sold them that will throw off our GPS-guided bombs (JDAMs)? This is an example of the reason I have harped on going sooner rather than later. We did need some time to prepare but every day past mid-December has been a gift to the Iraqis. Giving your enemy time to prepare just means that they will prepare a surprise for us. Even if we do something to counter the Iraqi jammers, the Iraqis may come up with something else.

Obviously, we can defeat Iraq without JDAMs. We did it in 1991, after all. And JDAMs are not suited to mobile battles anyway against moving targets—the enemy probably won’t cooperate by keeping their armor stationary long enough to input a grid coordinate. Still, for fixed targets we will have problems if those jammers exist and work. Maybe we are lucky and some Russians scammed the Iraqis with Vietnamese FM radios labeled “GPS Jammer-O-Matic.”

Seriously, if we delay and invade and our enemy failed to come up with anything to thwart us, my worries will have been for nothing. But we aren’t there yet. And until we are, I will worry every day that the Iraqis are using this time to their advantage—and our disadvantage.

On to Baghdad already.

Thursday, January 09, 2003

The Greatest Danger

The repeated question, ‘Is Iraq or North Korea the greater danger?’ is misleading. The clear implication of those who ask the question is that if North Korea represents a greater threat to America right now, we should drop everything and take care of the North Korea problem. Oddly enough, these people were quick to cry out that we should not deal with Iraq before we mopped up Afghanistan. Since they now say, after the fact of course, that Afghanistan was a cakewalk and no real military challenge, they must have thought Iraq a stronger threat. Yet they did not advocate Baghdad First. Was it a mistake to take on the Taliban first? Was it an error to commit forces to the Philippines where they helped rip up some minor Taliban wannabees?

Anyway, what of the argument? First of all, this assumes we can take care of the greater problem. And since many who sing this tune oppose war with Iraq, will they really support a far more difficult, bloody, and dangerous war simply because North Korea has nukes now? Good Lord, the number of North and South Korean civilians who would die in a North Korea First strategy would dwarf the deaths of innocents in the Gulf! And if they don’t support war after North Korea says, no thank you, we’ll just keep our nukes, will they then say ‘Ok, we looked at it and it is too tough, we can go back to dealing with Iraq?’ (And hope Saddam didn’t use the months or years it takes the NK Firsters to recant in order to develop lots of nasty weapons to lob at us?)

And if we turn our attention to North Korea, what happens if the Chinese decide to lob some missiles at Taiwan and take a crack at invasion or, oh say, ram one of our unarmed reconnaissance planes over international waters? Do we then drop North Korea and turn to face the greater threat?

Or maybe we should be focused on making sure Pakistan is a nice stable, suburban democracy lest Islamists fling some A-bombs at us or their Indian neighbors? Or, what if Saddam explodes a nuclear device in his western desert while we focus on North Korea? Do we then get to consider Saddam the greater threat? Do we count the nukes and daily switch around who is number one and who is two?

Clearly—or at least it should be clear—we cannot scamper about the planet reacting to every threat, dropping a lesser one to focus on the new greater threat. Greater danger is not static or easily compartmentalized. Will the threat as a whole be diminished or increased by dealing with Iraq, Iran, or North Korea first? Clearly, if we take down one nuclear state while letting another go nuclear in that time frame, it is inferior to taking out the nuclear aspirant first and then turning to the existing nuclear state. We go from dealing with two nuclear-armed thugs to ‘only’ one. Indeed, if we are lucky, taking down nuclear aspirant Iraq will inspire a revolution in Iran, thus taking out another nuclear aspirant. Facing the last—nuclear-armed—member of the Axis of Evil will be far easier then. By whittling down the number of threats by taking out the relatively easiest first, we reduce the chance that we will be distracted or stymied in dealing with the next threat. Fewer psychos around with or without nukes is better.

Indeed, if we discovered that Bahrain had a nuke and Shia fanatics take over, it might be wise to drop Rangers and the Marines on that island ASAP, delaying a strike on Iraq for a couple weeks, in order to quickly reduce the population of mad mullahs with nukes.

Another problem with going after the strongest threat of the moment is that the price we pay to defeat that threat could exhaust us and prevent us from taking on other threats. If we invade North Korea, assuming we overcome all the obstacles to actually carrying one out, will we contemplate our 10,000 dead and say, ‘Ok boys, on to Iraq now! I’m just getting my second wind!’ Heck no, we’ll be grateful to have won at all and will lick our wounds and ponder how we got into that mess. I guarantee the NK Firsters won’t proclaim the wisdom of their strategy and demand action on the second-tier threat immediately—even if Iraq doesn’t get nukes in the meantime. It is a very real possibility that lesser threats will grow too strong while we go after the strongest.

No, the greatest threat is failing to take out who we can when the price is cheapest. Time is not on our side, and if we delay too much, we will simply have the choice of which nuclear armed despot we wish to confront first. Or we’ll learn to live in a hideous world where a nuclear-armed thug can do what he wishes short of nuking an American city, knowing that we are helpless to stop him at a price we are willing to pay.

On to Baghdad.

Further Material Breach

Come on, work it baby. Blix won’t say the Iraqis are in material breach but he has been forced to describe the less than cooperative posture of the Iraqis. With Blix providing that information, we are free to draw our own conclusions about Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 1441. "Anything less is not cooperation and will constitute further material breach," [U.S. Ambassador John ] Negroponte said, using diplomatic language that could pave the way for war.

Pave. Pave. Pave. And quickly now, on to Baghdad.

No Smoking Gun

Blix says he found nothing. Big surprise, there. But please boys and girls in the government, bring down the hammer. Haul out the evidence that shows what a farce UN inspections are, and that invasion is the only answer to Iraq’s odious regime.

I’ve been confident that we are pressing toward war and that we will not be turned back. But the delays give me cause to have a kernel of worry grow that we might be winging it.

Say it ain’t so.

Turkish Front?

We are asking Turkey to base 80,000 troops in Turkey? When the Turkish public opposes strongly letting us use their country as a launching pad? When most of the conscript regular Iraqi army is up there? When all of our heavy armor is stockpiled south of Iraq?

If we invade from Turkey, we will need to destroy many Iraqi regular divisions on the way to Baghdad. We will need to ship armor to Turkey. We will need a logistics system to rival what we are building in the south. We will have to deploy significant forces in Kuwait anyway to keep Saddam from lunging south in a desperation move to grab something of value—or at least destroy it.

We only need to invade northern Iraq with 10th Mountain and maybe the British air mobile brigade that is going to be sent to the war. That plus Turkish troops to occupy northern Iraq and keep the regular Iraqi army busy. Hey, maybe 10th Mountain (and special forces, of course) will be used against the al Qaeda remnants regrouping with Iranian help in Kurdish areas.

Our main effort will come from an arc ranging from Jordan in the west to Kuwait in the east, with the mission of bypassing the regular Iraqi army and hitting Baghdad from the west. It all depends on our diplomacy for where the bulk of the heavy armor will strike from: mostly Jordan or mostly Kuwait, with some from Saudi Arabia perhaps. We can avoid the Iraqi army so that we can risk accepting their defection and also avoid the burden of taking them prisoner in the advance on Baghdad. Otherwise we’d have to waste time and resources and lives destroying them just in case.

Plus, after turning down the American request for hosting 80,000 troops, the Turkish government will look good for paring it down to a single truncated division with a British addition and a relatively small amount of air power above what we already deploy there.

Finally, the ‘dispute’ keeps the Iraqis focused on the north and helps to freeze their troops in place.

On to Baghdad. Soon please. I start to worry about events and outside influences that could derail the invasion.

Wednesday, January 08, 2003

The Second Material Breach

The Europeans have claimed that they needed to see the Iraqis fail to cooperate with the UN inspectors before they would consider Iraq in material breach of the UN Security Council’s will and therefore justify a war. It looks like Blix will be able to report that on Thursday. Gaps in the Iraqi December declaration have not been closed despite UN requests for clarifying information. Iraq has not provided it. I imagine that is why even the French have warned their troops to prepare for war (and I’m not talking about bleaching and ironing their hankies, here).

A declaration of material breach that even the French and Russians will accept is near.

On to Baghdad.

Rolling Over

Senator Lieberman thinks the Bush administration is making the North Korean standoff worse because of its harsh actions:

Right now North Korea is rapidly accelerating its production of plutonium to fuel nuclear weapons, creating a direct threat to our nearly 40,000 troops there as well as destabilizing the entire Pacific Rim. In short, the Bush administration has bullied its way to the opposite result from what it presumably wanted -- a non-nuclear North Korea.

Indeed, one of our most vital security interests is to keep North Korea from developing into a nuclear power. This was the impetus behind the Agreed Framework, negotiated in 1994 by the Clinton administration in close partnership with our Asian allies, which closed off the most likely and dangerous road to a nuclear North Korea: the development of weapons-grade plutonium. And in fact, the North Koreans kept that central part of the 1994 agreement. The framework, in turn, opened the doors to improved relations between the Koreas and even between the North and the United States.


He asks, “Did anyone in the administration really believe that Kim's reaction to that act [withholding oil shipments in retaliation for North Korea’s violation of past agreements] would be to roll over?”

Apparently, the senator believes we should roll over at the first threat from the deranged Pillsbury Dough Boy. And why shouldn’t Senator Lieberman think that? Or North Korea for that matter? Every time the North has rattled nuclear or chemical sabers, the United States has handed out the goodies. And the senator should keep in mind that North Korea actually does have nuclear weapons now (or maybe just one nuclear weapon). That, and the ability to surge produce weapons once he gets the raw materials. Such is the glorious result of our past wiser policy of negotiating and giving.

Do we have a tougher option? Don’t know. We certainly don’t have a military option that avoids the likelihood of tremendous civilian casualties and the loss of many American soldiers. But then, we didn’t even before Pyongyang got nukes.

But certainly, it is foolish to blame the current standoff on the current administration. Many presidents and Congresses from both parties have let us get to this point. We may disagree on tactics, but let’s really absorb Lieberman’s caveat that the crisis is North Korea’s fault instead of reciting it rote prior to moving on and blaming the current administration for refusing to look away from what has been going on for decades.

Oh, and a cheap shot here—isn’t the good senator “inconsistent” for supporting harsh action against Iraq but not North Korea? I believe that is the standard charge from the anti-Iraq war side when noting we do not threaten to invade North Korea [No, he is not being inconsistent, for those who have not read this all along. I consider that charge to be ridiculous]

Tuesday, January 07, 2003

Clarification

Ok, part of the administration strategy is to seek UN sanctions on North Korea. I had a moment of forgetfulness there. Personally, I wouldn't go that route. Keep it quiet and avoid rubbing North Korea's face in official sanctions. We can do the same thing quietly with our own diplomacy. Shoot, how valuable are UN sanctions anyway?

North Korea Threatens War

So North Korea says sanctions means war? Hmm, and I thought they only wanted nukes to deter us from attacking? But if they attack now, they have maybe one or two nukes. Would they use them? One on South Korea and one on Japan for spite? And then we would have all the excuse we need to flatten the north’s military and nuclear infrastructure with nuclear retaliation?

Sounds to me like they are bluffing. And if not, better they should attack prematurely than when they have a lot more nukes.

And it does amaze me that they think have a right to have us give them stuff. And then do what they wanted to anyway. But I wasn’t aware that we were going to blockade them. I thought we were just going to stop helping them and pressure others to stop helping them. That’s a tad different from an act of war. Let them buy all the food and oil they want. We just shouldn’t be giving it away. Maybe that will cut into their military readiness.

Former Defense Secretary Cohen says correctly that this is a crisis regardless of what the administration says. He also believes that since war is not wise and withdrawal is not wise (I concur in both judgments), at some point concessions will be necessary. It depends on what he means by concessions. If he means pay the blackmail—heck no. If he means that we should be able to give something in return for something substantial and of higher value to us, then sure. But let’s remember who we are dealing with here. North Korea’s track record is awful.
Yet David Ignatius says that the president made a mistake calling North Korea evil because we cannot possibly negotiate with evil. He says, “It's time to choose. On Korea, Bush can't be a moralist and a pragmatist at the same time.”

As I like to say when I read something like this, huh?

North Korea is evil. From nukes, to hacking our unarmed soldiers to death with axes in the DMZ, to blowing up South Korean government officials, to kidnapping civilians, to digging tunnels under the DMZ, to wearing 1950s era bad guy uniforms, these thugs qualify as evil. Yet some would have us maintain some false sort of consistency and argue we cannot deem them evil while negotiating?

Ignatius says, “Bush may still talk about North Korean leader Kim Jong Il as someone he "loathes," who "starves his people." But meanwhile, Powell continues to insist that "nobody's going to attack North Korea" and that a diplomatic solution will be found. No wonder people are confused.”

Again, huh? Who is confused? This is nonsense. Why on earth is having the moral clarity to know that a country’s rulers are evil preclude one from negotiating? Why is it considered an impossibility to refrain from invading someone because we loathe their regime? It is a false choice that we must declare them evil and destroy them or accept them as a normal country and negotiate. Did not President Reagan famously call the Soviet Union an “evil empire?” (For which he was mercilessly attacked at the time) And did not that same president negotiate with that evil state’s rulers? And did we not in the end win? I’d rather talk to the North Koreans than unleash a nuclear war. Even one in which we don’t get hit. But there is a long way to go before talking becomes paying blackmail. I think we are better armed to avoid that slippery slope if we have no delusions about who we are dealing with—one hopes that Powell will never be seen dancing with those dictators as Albright did. Drag out the talks, make the squeezing so gradual that at no point will any incremental increase seem like a reason to Pyongyang for war. (I’ve read that if you put a frog in water and raise the temperature fast, it will jump out; but if you do it slowly, it will boil to death, unaware of the peril.)

Kristoff complains that the administration is making the situation worse. He may have a point (although part of making it worse is dragging out our invasion of Iraq, a point that Kristoff would surely disagree), but our harsher talk and refusal to pay while they play did not start this crisis of North Korean noncompliance. They have been at it for years—we just called them on it last year. But remember who we will talk to and what they are. Kristoff provides one chilling fact that just reeks of “1984” when he relates:

While in North Korea years ago, I barged into as many private homes as possible, and every single one had The Speaker.

The Speaker is like a radio, but permanently on and without a choice of stations. It's the electronic umbilical cord from the Great Leader, waking citizens up each morning and putting them to bed each evening with a mix of heroic songs, denunciations of "the American war-maniacs" and tributes to Kim Jong Il, "the greatest of great men produced by heaven."

(Oops. Now North Koreans are going to wake up to hear The Speaker declare that even the imperialist reactionary New York Times has hailed the Great Leader as, quote, the greatest of great men, unquote.)

The Speaker is a reminder that North Korea is like no other country in the world today. It was eerie to interview groups of North Koreans and then hear them praise Kim Jong Il in unison, like synchronized robots[.]


Oh, and one more painful description of that gulag with a UN seat.

And by all means, finish off Iraq already. We really need to clear the decks to deal with North Korea. It is a crisis.

Monday, January 06, 2003

Invasion and Victory

“The U.S. military is assembling a ground force for a possible invasion of Iraq that could exceed 100,000 troops and include three to four heavy Army divisions, an airborne division, a Marine division and an assortment of Special Operations forces, according to defense officials and analysts.” The Army has plans for a heavy invasion force, apparently (which is a relief). Toss in a British armored division and we have more than enough firepower to crush conventional Iraqi opposition in the open; and possibly fight off an Iranian intervention.

My relief that no “light” options are still on the table is balanced by the time it will take to get this force to the Gulf in order to invade. This size of a force seems to point to an invasion date well into February if not later. If Iraq is the only target, two heavy divisions are enough to destroy the Iraqi armor that might resist us and drive to Baghdad. If we are waiting for five American and British heavy divisions, we are either being overly cautious regarding Iraq or fearful of Iranian intervention.

Or, we are seeking tactical surprise by lining up a huge invasion force in a pipeline all the way back to Germany and then America, so that everybody will be waiting for the last troops shipping from America to arrive.

We could gain tactical surprise by attacking with what is at the front of the pipeline. What is at the back would be ready to roll either to the Gulf in case the war widens; or to South Korea much faster than we could otherwise accomplish if they sat in their bases.

North Korea is already trying to exploit our war with Iraq and it is possible that Iran will see a lesson in that and figure they can smother domestic unrest with a stab at the “Great Satan.”

It seems to me that we need more infantry rather than more armor if we are to fight our way into Baghdad. Maybe one or two of the heavy divisions cited will never go; but infantry units that nobody is mentioning will be airlifted in instead. Shoot, maybe everything is as the papers are reporting. Stranger things have happened, I suppose.

Iraq’s main hope is to prevent our war machine from rolling over them. Once we start, we won’t stop until we take Baghdad. We give our enemies too much time. Time to increase our casualties and time to distract us.

Assuming victory, it is good that we plan for an occupation of Iraq to purge it of Saddam’s thugs, uproot the WMD programs, and get the country on its feet. I don’t see what choice we have. Hopefully, we can draw down to minimal conventional forces in a relatively brief period of time.

One thought on invasion: Could reports of increased Saudi cooperation mean our heavy armor will make the main effort out of northern Saudi Arabia? A couple roads heading north out of Saudi Arabia toward Baghdad could be used for two heavy divisions. Equipment in Kuwait could be moved fairly quickly to jump off points there. A minor thrust out of Jordan could be all that is needed from that direction to open up that road as a supply line. The 101st might airlift from Germany right into captured airfields in the west seized either by the ground invasion, paratroopers, or the lead brigade of the 101st if it can make a long helicopter assault into western Iraq from Kuwait. The northern thrust with the Turks and 10th Mountain would not need to change, nor would the feint by a phantom V Corps out of Kuwait heading north via Nasiriyah or the Marine/British capture of Basra. I’m just speculating, but months ago some unnamed military official said our invasion plan was imaginative; and everything public seems to point to a relatively plain sledgehammer launched from Kuwait. That just can’t be right. We used a left hook to go around the Iraqis in 1991 to go right for the Republican Guards that were the Iraqi center of gravity. Now it makes more sense for an even wider left hook to bypass the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers valley to strike directly at Baghdad out of the west.

On to Baghdad, hopefully before the Blix report.

Sunday, January 05, 2003

Japan Nukes

Just one thing to say to those who think we should encourage Japan to get nukes to counter North Korea, and apparently to teach the Chinese a lesson for not restraining Pyongyang: are you nuts? If the Japanese start deploying nukes, the Chinese will end their restrained attitude toward nukes. They so far have appeared to follow a minimum deterrence posture and have not tried to mimic the Soviet attitude of more is always better. If the Japanese get nukes, the Chinese will start building them, and if they go to overtime on deploying these, I wouldn't count on the Chinese building only short-range nukes capable of reaching Japan. A Japanese-Chinese arms race would endanger us. If the North Koreans get nukes, we will need robust anti-missiles big time to keep the Japanese from arming and to keep a chain reaction from starting. If the Japanese ever think that they can't shoot down a North Korean nuclear strike, they will worry whether we can reliably defend them. If the North Koreans get nukes that can reach us and overwhelm our defenses, Japan will question our commitment to lose Seattle and San Fransisco for them. Indeed, with such a possibility facing us, it might be necessary to consider pre-emptive strikes using our nukes to disarm North Korea and destroy their armed forces. We'd be sacrificing Seoul but letting this spiral into an arms race in Asia will not be in our interest.

Wily North Koreans, indeed. They may yet spark a war with their paranoid view of the world. We've been happy enough to let them starve in their Stalinist hell hole for fifty years without destroying them yet they think they are always outwitting us and stopping our imminent invasion. Nukes will finally stop us for good they think.

Nuclear-armed dumbasses who can't feed their people. Wonderful. Squeezing the North to try to force their collapse before they can build dozens of nuclear missiles may be risky, but it may be the least risky choice we have.

Inspections

On CNN tonight, people talking about Iraq seem to think the inspections will be going on for a while since we will not have anything conclusive from the January 27 Blix report.

How is this possible? The remainder of 3rd Infantry Division is deploying to the Gulf and will we really park troops in the desert for a significant period daring Iraq to unleash chemicals in a pre-emptive strike? And what would the inspectors possibly find in the weeks or months to follow? We simply cannot wait for the inspectors to find something--something that those opposed to invasion will argue is only a 'technical' violation and not worth war. Perhaps the fact that we are not sharing intelligence with the inspectors indicates we have what we want as far as evidence goes. If we do, letting the vaunted inspectors, upon whom anti-war types have invested so much, report nothing right before we haul out the damning evidence, will be all we need. Under these circumstances, waiting for the Blix report makes sense.

The alternative is that we are just going to wait until the inpsectors find something. That is unacceptable and an invitation to inaction and failure. The bin Laden wannabees will be jubilant and we will have thrown away the gains we made in Afghanistan.

I cannot believe that we will wait, yet it seemed unlikely to me that we would have waited until 2003. Even now, I don't know why we wait for the Blix report. If we are waiting for it, it better be a set up and trigger for war. I am not so much worried about the course of the war as I am concerned that outside events could intervene and make it dangerous to commit five of our thirteen active divisions (Army and Marines) to the Gulf with supporting air and naval power.

On to Baghdad. Time is not on our side.

Friday, January 03, 2003

Draft Note

Just a note with two U.S. Representatives calling for a draft because they believe African American military personnel will die in disproportionate numbers. Actually, they oppose war and hope that highlighting their belief will derail the war. Actually, as the article buries deep in the story, whites and Hispanics are clustered in combat units where the great majority of casualties will be endured. And even in Vietnam, based on simple percentages of the population, it was at most, 20% more than their percentage of the population. If I remember my demographics correctly, if you consider the draft-age population only (and counting white grandmothers to make it seem that young African American men were dying at higher rates does seem rather unfair), African Americans were actually “under-represented” in deaths during Vietnam.

Just writing that galls me. Especially now when the military is voluntary. I can’t imagine poring over demographics of dead soldiers and looking for slights: how many left-handers? How many Michiganians? Gee, did ‘too many’ whites die in Somalia? I can’t imagine anyone getting away with asserting they don’t want Irish soldiers dying for this or Italian soldiers dying for that. Sending our military to fight and die is a serious business and I value them all.

For those claiming that the Iraq war debate is ‘suppressed’ they sure have difficulty arguing against the war. If they are against liberating Iraq, they should say so. And stop hiding behind pacifying and rebuilding Afghanistan, or bin Laden, or Kim Jong Il, or the budget deficit, or the false prospect of their own community dying in disproportionate numbers in war.

Maybe a draft of some sort is needed. But it certainly isn’t needed to staff the military for the most part. This draft proposal is just the latest in the string of things we supposedly must do first before we strike Iraq.

I certainly hope that these two Representatives won’t be relieved that their concerns on race are false. I’m disturbed enough that it is a concern. Remember, our soldiers are all green. I value them for that color.

[NOTE: This is from the former Defense Issues category from my original blog. The link in the original post is dead so I did not indicate it here.]

Invasion When?

So now the news on MSNBC says we have 65,000 troops in the Gulf. That number has gone up dramatically even though all the deployment announcements seem to be for units yet to go.

Could the February invasion date be right?

Globalsecurity.org says 1st Cavalry (a heavy division) and 101st Airborne (Airmobile) will join 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Germany for maneuvers in mid-January. If they do exercise they would need some time to recover and be deployed to the Gulf. This makes it seem like a February date is more likely. Yet maybe it will only be a command post exercise that keeps the troops ready to roll. After all, I think it has been a long time since we've been able to do large scale exercises in Germany. I doubt four divisions will be tearing up the German countryside. The airlift would 'only' have to lift the equipment of the 101st since the heavy armor is either in the Gulf or on ships on the way.

Could we really be counting on a clean Blix report on January 27? I heard one report at the end of December that the "real" inspections going on in Iraq are being done by Special Forces personnel. Could we be waiting to contrast the UN report with what we find? As much as I hate delaying the invasion, such a move would jam the protests of the UN-fetishists back down their throats.

Mostly I have questions now with no real answers to reply to what the news stories imply and say-invasion in February.

But I still don't believe it. I'd still go sooner even though my guess on December 27 was wrong.

Getting the troops of four divisions (some ten brigades) gathered in Germany, where the Germans have already agreed that we can use our bases there, places them in quick shuttle range of the Gulf. They could go to Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait, depending on where the equipment is. It's supposed to be in Kuwait for the most part or on the way, so Turkey seems out except for the 101st. McCaffrey (who commanded 24th Infantry (now 3rd Infantry) in 1991) thinks the 101st will go to Turkey in order to protect the Kurds; but it makes no sense to me to task one of our most mobile divisions (and one very useful for river crossings) for an essentially defensive task. It must be in the main effort.

It just worries me that we are waiting. Stop giving our enemies time to counter our invasion.
Let's get on to Baghdad already!

The Street

According to this article, Pakistanis are outraged we will invade Iraq: “In the largest rallies, around 2,000 people gathered in the central city of Multan and in Quetta, close to the Afghan border, where opposition to U.S. action in Afghanistan is strongest.”

That is rage? My word, our local Stalinists can turn out a bigger crowd. San Francisco would be embarrassed by a turnout that low.

Yeah, I remember they were pretty outraged a year ago about Afghanistan. That Burt (of Burt and Ernie fame) image overlooking bin Laden in their posters made the protesters look foolish. Now they just look sad.

And of course, our enemies make our life easier: “Hafiz Saeed, leader of the outlawed Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group, earlier told worshippers attending Friday prayers in Multan that Muslims were being victimised. "Muslims if you do not open your eyes now, you will be overwhelmed by Jews, Christians and Indians," Saeed, freed from house arrest late last year, said.”

Yep, the Islamist fanatics are so pure that Jews, Christians, and Indians are enemies. And by implication, those Moslems who do not agree could fit in the enemy category too. So how did Buddhists get a pass?

Japanese Nukes

A nice article summarizing why China really should help us prevent North Korea from getting nukes. And as I earlier noted, the funny thing is, North Korea has a conventional deterrence against us. The idea of nuclear deterrence is that you can inflict unacceptable damage against your foe to stop them from attacking. Shoot, in Somalia, 18 dead was enough for the American government. The point is the damage, not the means of death. North Korea can already turn Seoul into a ‘sea of fire,’ as they so quaintly and often put it, with conventional artillery. They could withhold their chemical weapons for a really special occasion. North Korea is pushing us for a capability that does not enhance their security. This failure to appreciate reality is what makes dealing with them so dangerous. Lord knows what they will interpret as a threat that requires them to attack first.

Let’s finish off Iraq, already.

Afghanistan

You know, I count it a success simply to have Taliban-ruled Afghanistan out of the terrorism business and the parasitic al Qaeda severely hurt, knocked off balance, and denied a secure home to plot against us. This article argues that we really have accomplished much, though it warns we must stick to it. It is a good counter to those still claiming that Afghanistan is a disaster and that only massively expanding the UN troop presence in the countryside can save the country. I never was convinced of that since it would be putting sheep up against wolves. Had it come to a fight, the UN troops would have lost to the warlords.

We won a great victory just overthrowing the Taliban and al Qaeda regime—one that many said was impossible. I grant we haven’t created a new Switzerland, but we’ve done a whole lot more since we routed the Taliban and bin Laden’s thugs.

There is certainly no cause for hand wringing at this point.

Thursday, January 02, 2003

First Sergeant

Not long after the learned doctor of religion with a minor in sucking up to dictators spoke on MSNBC, the show went to a First Sergeant with 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) which is about to deploy to the Gulf. He stood with his wife of thirteen years. They have a six-year old and 3-year old twins. When the reporter asked him how he felt about going to the Gulf, he replied his troops were ready and well trained. No, the reporter asked, how do you feel personally, are you concerned about leaving your family. He replied that he had a 'little' concern about that.

A little.

Soldier that he is, he is setting an example for his troops. The mission comes first and though leaving his family to go fight Iraq-for the second time-was undoubtedly difficult, he stated publicly that it was only a little bit of a concern for him. He didn't get all weepy and give his younger troops the excuse to do likewise. He won't let them cry for their little ones at home while forgetting to identify and track the Iraqi T-72 in a swirling night fight that means he and his fellow tankers or the Iraqi crew dies.

He is a soldier. And his job is to keep his troops focused on fighting and winning, and living and getting home. Soldiers 100% on their jobs will fight and live. Some in our Oprah-fied, lip-biting culture will say he is cold.

Bullshit. The first sergeant's focus on the mission is true compassion because it represents concern for his soldiers and not a false warm and fuzzy that puts the attention on his own emotions. He is not, in short, being selfish. He was being a leader.

Way to go, Top. Rip their hearts out and come home safely. And kudos to his wife who put on a happy, confident face and did her job too.

And thank you. Both of you.

Idiots

On MSNBC, some learned idiot from the Council of Churches or some such organization, a Dr. Bob Edgars, is in Iraq urging 'peace.' Amazingly enough, he didn't speak to anybody who didn't want his wife and children to be disemboweled--I mean, who didn't want America to stand down. Yes, yes, Saddam is bad he said, but Heavens, we certainly shouldn't do anything about it.

How anybody could take moral or religious teachings from such a dense man of the cloth is beyond me.

In thinking about the coming war, I think my Red Team analysis of what Iraq would try to do still holds. I think basing the main effort out of Jordan will thwart Iraq's chemical weapons plans nicely.

Korea/Iraq

Safire has a good column regarding the faux concern for dealing with North Korea first. He also points out the interests of South Korea, China, and Russia in preventing North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Chinese, especially, should be the most concerned since they already have nuclear-armed India, Russia, and America as potential foes. Do they want to add Japan to that list? Or South Korea? (and what about Pakistan? Though China counts Islamabad as an ally, could Islamists there gain sudden concern for their repressed brethren in western China?) America is in the best position to ride out a nuclear build-up in Northeast Asia so nobody should be pinning sole responsibility for resolving this crisis on America.

I disagree that pulling our troops out completely would be a good idea. But when things die down sufficiently, we should pull 2nd Infantry Division south of Seoul. It makes no sense to have the best division on the peninsula exposed to the initial North Korean assault where it must basically hold and die to prevent Seoul from falling. Let the South Koreans bear that sacrifice and let our division play a mobile reserve role where our technology and mobility will be maximized.

The way critics of war on Iraq have seized on North Korea and its purported “gains” in the last few weeks astounds me. What has North Korea gained? They’ve spouted off without being nuked. This will be a long game unless the shrill North Korea-firsters succeed in calling our strategy a failure already and get their way on new and improved negotiations with the same old liars. Given the balance of power out there, even with no Iraq war pending, we’d be hard pressed to press home a military solution at an acceptable cost. But once Iraq is occupied, we will have more freedom of action and certainly more ability to back our diplomacy versus North Korea.

And by all means, let’s stop dawdling on Iraq. Even Tariq Aziz, displaying his stunning grasp of world affairs that makes him so valuable to Saddam, predicted America will invade. I am stopping my countdown to invasion post since it is abundantly clear that a period of obvious troop movement must precede an invasion. I had originally believed that but when my deadline approached, I speculated that maybe we had enough there to start the war just as the airlift started. I doubt we will need to reach the 250,000 number mentioned as necessary, but it shouldn’t take too long to airlift in the rest of the five-plus Army and Marine divisions and supporting arms and move in the Air Force and Navy assets needed to invade. Yet with Blix ready to go to Baghdad in mid-January, I am distressed to think we will actually wait for that January 27 Blix report that everyone says will be the trigger for war. That report will most likely say that Iraq is cooperating and that the inspections should continue—until Saddam kicks them out after weaponizing a WMD sufficiently scary to deter an American invasion. Annan has, after all, said that Iraq is cooperating so there is no reason for war prior to the Blix report. How likely is Annan to read that report and cry out, “No more! I will suffer the lies no longer!” I’m hoping that the Blix deadline is a ruse and that we will hit Iraq before then to at least try to get tactical surprise.

On to Baghdad. Squeeze Pyongyang. Disembowel Michael Bolton. (Hey, as long as I’m wishing…)

Wednesday, January 01, 2003

A New Draft?

I have not been terribly sympathetic to the idea of a new draft. Yes, I value my (limited) military experience. There is merit to having people of varying socio-economic groups get their lumps together in the cause of defending America. I'd say the most interesting example was me-the white Detroit "old man" of the platoon sparring with Frear-the son (or was it nephew) of a Motown star. For the life of me I can no longer remember who she is. He had graduated from Brown University. I was a University of Michigan graduate. We each claimed superiority and belittled the other's school. He carried his silver spoon in his mess kit! (I liked him, actually. I have to respect someone who had no reason to join, yet still did) A lot of people could benefit from Army Basic Training.


Yet our volunteer military does not need conscripts. We are an information age military and not an industrial age mass production military. Our military does not need massive numbers of cannon fodder.

Nor am I persuaded by our war on terror to support conscription for the sole reason of calling on our people for "sacrifice." If even the modest efforts our government has made thus far lead critics to cry "police state!" how would they react to a needless draft? I think we are fortunate to live in an age when going to war does not require us to eat beans and put off all major purchases until after the war because every factory has to produce war material. Why do advocates of sacrifice think we have to mimic World war II conditions in the twenty-first century?

Yet maybe conscription would be a good idea. Oh, not to staff our regular military-unless we must fight a peer competitor like China (if Chinese power and hostility grow over the decades-neither are guaranteed, however) or anything like that-we just don't need masses of infantry for our high tech wars against small powers.

But in a decades-long war on terror, mass conscription could serve valuable purposes. The fact that we do not need conscripts to wage the war actually makes it easier to start universal conscription. If we wanted to use a draft to man our actual fighting military, we would need to take only a small percentage and exemptions would undermine the leveling effect. Making a draft nearly universal is a key to providing the socializing aspect a reality.

So how would we use draftees in a Homeland Defense Corps?

We could train medics whose skills are obviously of use in coping with a terror attack even before they are mobilized. Such skills diffused throughout the population would save lives.

We could train security personnel who could augment military police type formations guarding our borders, bases, or civilian infrastructure in their communities during emergencies. This might be a pool of reservists available to the military services and the new Homeland Defense Department.

We could also train draftees in basic squad-level infantry skills so that there is always a pool of troops who may be mobilized for additional training should we need infantry for war or peace operations.

Recruits would need basic training, some advanced schooling for their skills, and civics education. This should take no more than four or five months. This will hardly be an onerous duty of citizenship. Of course, anybody could volunteer for any of the services as civilians do now for the higher pay and benefits of those services instead of doing the minimum draftee service.

Other skills might also be of use such as vehicle drivers, supply specialists, and other jobs that would allow individuals to fill out active units or augment them for war tasks.

For their term of Homeland Defense Corps reserve service, we could exploit online or distance learning for refresher training every three months to validate their training.

We could require two years duty maximum in the homeland defense reserves, or four or more for medic duty (if you get the easier, less dangerous duty, you should serve longer). Nor should such service be considered the equivalent of military service for benefits unless the troops are mobilized by a military service. We don't want this easier service to draw away recruits from the traditional services.

Establishing a new draft would mean we would have to gear up the training establishment to crank out graduates at a high rate without interfering with traditional force training. I don't know whether basic training should be integrated or done separately.

A draft with these attributes might have merit. It avoids foisting unwilling draftees on the military yet provides citizenship training with reasonable sacrifice and trains our people with actual useful skills should they be needed by the nation. Establishing such a draft-filled Homeland Defense Corps is worth a thought, anyway. And given that many of those calling for a draft are on the left, maybe it will silence those others on their side who bemoan the idea that our military recruiters visit high schools.

[NOTE: This is from the former Defense Issues category from my original blog.]

Second War

Countdown to Invasion: 5 days late.

For most of the 1990s and until 9/11, critics of the US military condemned our force structure as too large for the post-Cold War world. They thought it silly that anybody could possibly worry about the unlikely chance that we would face war with Iraq and North Korea simultaneously.

Indeed.

As we forcefully prepare to end the threat of Iraq's Saddam Hussein and free the Iraqi people, we must adopt a "European" management strategy for North Korea's latest threats. While this article notes that Rumsfeld says we could fight two wars, Cordesman says we would have problems. Which is true? The article misleads. Neither said anything contradictory. They merely emphasized two points of what is obviously true: fighting more than one major theater war (essentially a Desert Storm equivalent conflict) would entail risks because we do not have enough of our critical "low density" assets needed to maximize American technological prowess. That is why our "two-war" strategy is not a two-war strategy. To be fair, the military never claimed it had that capability-reporting on it has, however, called it a two war strategy. The military has always said it has the capability of fighting two wars "nearly simultaneously." The last QDR restated the capability as having the ability to decisively win in one war (marching on the enemy capital and imposing victory) while holding the enemy short of their objectives in the second war. Winning the second war must wait for the assets from the first war critical to victory to be moved to the second war.

But critics who decry our acquiescence to North Korea's nukes mistake a short term accommodation with our ultimate objective. I dare say that North Korea's short term "gains" in openly defying America will backfire. (And I'm not even clear how they have gained as some claim) Once our military is freed of the Iraq scenario, our tough diplomacy will have more force behind it. Our temporary "European" phase will end. I'm amazed critics are willing to call this tougher policy a failure after the several months since we called Pyongyang on their violations of the 1994 Agreed Framework, yet are all too happy to keep talking with North Korea despite the long history of failure on this track. Go figure.

We must destroy the Iraqi regime in January 2003 and clear the decks for addressing our other problems-including North Korea.

In the long run, we must expand our military. Our active/reserve structure is still based on the notion that there is a strong distinction between an extensive peace and short periods of war requiring large but infrequent mobilization. If we are to be engaged in a long-term low level war with occasional major theater wars, we must have more of our war assets in the active component.

Now that will be an interesting debate.

We have many problems. But for now, on to Baghdad.

Oh, and happy new year!

Tuesday, December 31, 2002

Leverage?

Countdown to Invasion: 4 days late.

I don't know why I keep highlighting my missed invasion date.

On the other hand, thinking the invasion is late really does free me to write about other foreign affairs topics. Just a matter of when not whether.

Anyway, critics of isolating North Korea already decry our lack of leverage. What leverage did we have with the 1994 agreement which the North Koreans violated immediately? And why do the critics think we want leverage? Yes, North Korea is very isolated and very poor. They are so bad off that they are unable to feed their own people. I don't think leveraging a ten percent decrease in torture and repression is the proper strategy. Regime change is needed but we have no military option short of several hundred nukes targeting every nuclear site, missile site, major base, and combat unit headquarters. I personally think that is too awful an alternative to contemplate. The article quotes the new South Korean president:

For the Bush administration, simply intensifying economic and political pressure on the North involves enormous political obstacles. South Korea has embraced engagement and dialogue as the best way to address the reclusive country to its north. It appears committed to that course -- a fact underscored today as South Korea's president, Kim Dae Jung, rejected containment as a failed doctrine.

"Pressure and isolation have never been successful with communist countries," Kim told his cabinet, in remarks distributed by the presidential Blue House. "Cuba is one example."


Huh? First of all, Cuba has had to make many compromises with communist economic practice to survive the ending of Soviet aid and American pressure. Castro could maintain his communist system as long as he did only because of massive Soviet subsidies. Second, does Kim really forget the pressure and isolation of the Cold War and the Soviet empire's resulting collapse? I'd say this strategy has a pretty good record.

And I disagree that we have no leverage. A richer, or at least less desperately poor regime, might shrug off our cut off of aid and fuel. We'll see if they decide starvation and total collapse of their regime is truly superior to giving up nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. If Pyongyang wants to preserve their regime, they will find they undermine regime survival when confronted with the price of further isolation as the consequence of pursuing weapons of mass destruction. They really can count on aid from America and their allies to prevent starvation if they get rid of missiles and nukes. I'd say that is leverage.

But our aid should always be minimal. We have a humanitarian interest in preventing starvation (and a practical goal of making cooperation a better option for the North than rolling the dice and invading South Korea); but should not do so much that we solidify the regime. Just enough to string them along and give them false hope that riding out the poverty is superior to trying to knock off the rich South Koreans and looting them to bolster the North. And enough to keep the North Koreans from believing their ridiculous assertion that we plot war. Should they act on such a false belief, it will mean war.

Letting the North get away with acquiring nukes in the short run is disturbing. But more forceful options are not on the table right now.

The rest of the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) has orders to ship out to the Gulf. This used to be the 24th Division which set the Middle East land speed record during Desert Storm.

Monday, December 30, 2002

Interesting Map

I visit strategypage.com far too infrequently. Dunnigan is pretty good and goes way back in quantifying war as a game designer back in the 1970s. He has a good map of Iraqi deployments and estimated US/British invasion force. 2-1/3 heavy divisions (including a cavalry regiment?), 101st Airborne, and a Marine Expeditionary Force backed by three British brigades (a division). I assume 10th Mountain and a parachute brigade too, but we're in the ball park here.

The people at strategypage.com seem to assume a Kuwait springboard. Here I have to disagree. We'd have to cross rivers, advance through broken terrain through 2 regular corps (or take them prisoner-and guarding them might drain more of our power than killing them), watch a corps on the Iran border in case the commander gets delusions of counter-attack glory, smash a Republican Guard corps, and then battle the Special Republican Guards in Baghdad. All the while, being doused on the road north with chemicals.

Why do it the hard way?

We think the regular Iraqi army will defect or stay in the barracks so why go near it? If we get close to a regular force, we probably have to kill it just in case.

Why risk the chemical highway by advancing between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers? And if we go west of the Euphrates, can we supply the divisions as they work their way up to Baghdad if the supply line goes back to Kuwait?

Why do anything but feint out of Kuwait?

As I've mentioned before, were I God, I would base the invasion's main effort out of Jordan and head right for Baghdad down that very good highway from Jordan with two heavy divisions and the 101st. The British and Marines and one heavy brigade simulating all of V Corps advances out of Kuwait. With nothing down there, who would know it was not the main effort until XVIII Airborne Corps arrived in the western Baghdad suburbs? 10th Mountain out of Turkey. The parachute brigade to seize some important airfield. Rangers to drop on Saddam's caravan as he runs or to hit a WMD site if it looks like it is about to be used.

News tonight said we plan rolling start to invasion, attacking while we deploy. The way the Iraqis are pulled back out of fear of us, this might work. I am wary of dribbling in the troops piecemeal but it could work, especially since we have the heavy armor already out there.

If we are really lucky, defecting Iraqi units shepherded by our special forces will spearhead any assault on Baghdad should that be necessary to win the war.

But it appears that we really will need to see a big airlift prior to invasion. We did not manage to secretly deploy the troops to start the war on the 27th. How long must we airlift troops before we go? Don't know. But the air bridge should start before we go. I sure as heck hope we aren't truly going to wait until February. I'm not convinced we will wait, but my old timetable is shot.

Stop stalling. Our enemies prepare for us. Hit them before they figure out how to stop us.

Iraq in the 1980s

Countdown to Invasion: 3 days late.

This article’s headline seemed to hold promise of a hatchet job without historical context but the article itself did a good job of explaining the situation we found ourselves in during the 1980s regarding Iraq. Of course, this is all familiar territory for me (see my summary of the Iran-Iraq War) but for those not paying attention, it may seem a shock. The details are interesting but the key part is:

Opinions differ among Middle East experts and former government officials about the pre-Iraqi tilt, and whether Washington could have done more to stop the flow to Baghdad of technology for building weapons of mass destruction.

"It was a horrible mistake then, but we have got it right now," says Kenneth M. Pollack, a former CIA military analyst and author of "The Threatening Storm," which makes the case for war with Iraq. "My fellow [CIA] analysts and I were warning at the time that Hussein was a very nasty character. We were constantly fighting the State Department."

"Fundamentally, the policy was justified," argues David Newton, a former U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, who runs an anti-Hussein radio station in Prague. "We were concerned that Iraq should not lose the war with Iran, because that would have threatened Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Our long-term hope was that Hussein's government would become less repressive and more responsible."


When deciding what to do, sometimes options are not what one would like. In trying to halt expansionist Iranian Islamism, we ended up siding with Iraq. If we could have calibrated our aid with a level of knowledge about what exactly Iraq needed to do to prevail, we could have strongly resisted Iraqi use of chemical weapons. And would the people who today say we should talk have actually argued for tough measures then? Before Iraq invaded Kuwait? Before Saddam turned on us?

We sided with the Soviets to defeat Nazism and paid for that aid by enabling the Soviets to advance their border to the Elbe River in the heart of Europe. We paid for our aid in defeating Iran’s version of Islamofascism with a powerful, expansionist Iraq. And now we deal with that.

The world is a tough neighborhood. Get over it.

Correction. Please note: I double-counted some equipment being moved from Diego Garcia to Kuwait from globalsecurity.org’s web site, so reduce the number of heavy battalions in the region by six. I was shocked when I thought we had nearly enough equipment for nearly three full heavy divisions. I was surprised for good reason, they ain’t there. This still leaves us at enough for two heavy divisions, the minimum for a good solid offensive punch.

In looking back, I had assumed we would see mobilization and an intense airlift of troops in a flurry of activity before invasion. When that didn’t happen, I began to wonder if we had secretly moved the troops within striking range (perhaps my counting error contributed to this suspicion). Clearly, I was too tied to my target invasion date and toyed with the latter idea too strongly. It is unreasonable to think we could hide that many troops. The airlift surge really must happen, and though I expect war sooner rather than later, I just don’t know if we can start the war without the airlift surge or whether we must wait for those troops to arrive.

Any day now, people. Why are we giving our enemies time to prepare?

On to Baghdad.

Sunday, December 29, 2002

Why Not North Korea?

Countdown to Invasion: 2 days late.

I really get a little frustrated when I hear pundits who have wanted to avoid fighting Iraq to prevent Saddam from getting nukes, suddenly advocate taking on North Korea. Of course, they say, focusing on North Korea means we must drop all talk of war with Iraq. Until Iraq gets nukes, too; then Iraq is a threat in that view.

Yep, dealing with two nuclear armed thugs is far better.

It is far better to deal with the Iraqi threat, now; before the North Korean threat gets worse. Why?

First, we can stop a country from getting nukes rather than turning back the clock on two. That is easier.

Second, Iraq is sitting on oil and poised to threaten weak countries with lots of oil. No, this war is not primarily about oil but it is silly to pretend it is not a factor. If we had wanted the oil, we would have taken Baghdad in 1991.

Third, Iraq's military is vastly superior to the Gulf states. North Korea's neighbors can all stop the North's military without our help. The balance continues to develop in favor of South Korea (aside from nukes). In the Gulf, if we are busy elsewhere or caught unaware, Iraq can strike.
Fourth, the US military can, with little allied military assistance, destroy Iraq's military. North Korea's military strength requires us to get full enthusiastic South Korean assistance to invade the north.

Fifth, even if we eliminated the North's nuclear capability; the North could inflict tens of thousands of civilian casualties using artillery and rocket delivered chemicals on Seoul.

Sixth, Iraq has the financial resources based on oil and European collaboration to outlast containment and avoid isolation. North Korea is impoversished, starving, and its only export--cheap missiles--will likely be throttled by us (notwithstanding our letting the Yemen-bound shipment of missiles through).

All in all, plenty of reasons for an "Iraq-first" strategy. Face it, many advocating "North Korea" first really are aiming for "nobody at all."

On to Baghdad.