Russia portrays its military effort as a relentless but slow and costly bludgeoning of Ukraine's outnumbered ground forces. The hammer blows will eventually break Ukraine, Moscow insists, making negotiations unnecessary unless the West is willing to abandon Ukraine and just get this over with. I have strong doubts that Russia really is achieving what Moscow claims.
The war goes on. Russians seemingly die in large numbers to infiltrate the broad No-Man's Land and leverage the thin Ukrainian infantry line backwards. The latest change is sacrificing lots of precious armored combat vehicles to enable their advance. There are rumors of Russian economic difficulties (but those have been floated since Russia invaded).
Russia insists it will win it all:
The Kremlin is leaning into its cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as relentlessly advancing and a Russian victory as inevitable. This effort aims to obscure the reality that Russian forces are only making minimal gains at disproportionately high manpower costs and that Russia is unlikely to obtain its strategic objectives by force in the short- or medium-term.
How does that victory unfold? Where is the Russian big fall offensive I thought Moscow planned? The Big Push? The Final Offensive that will bulldoze all before it? The offensive that uses the strategic reserve of armored combat vehicles and troops that Russia has gathered after a 2025 of flinging infantry at Ukraine's lines in small numbers that have added up to lots of KIA but small territorial gains while inflicting far fewer casualties on the Ukrainians?
I wrote early in the year that I just wasn't seeing the evidence of Russia's massive army:
I've noted that I feel Russia is trying to create an image of overwhelming and relentless ground power to demoralize Ukraine and more importantly, the West. But since Russia has the initiative, it can hold sections with fewer troops to concentrate troops in certain sections of the front to maintain a sizable advantage in numbers in order to attack and grind forward. The August 2024 Ukrainian Kursk incursion demonstrates what can be achieved against those "quiet" Russian sectors.
... Russian ground formations have 615,000 men. Minus 21,000 in Armenia and the rest. So that's 594,000 men available. Minus 450,000 inside Ukraine. So 144,000 free troops left. Plus there are 40,000 inside Russia attacking the Ukrainian-held Kursk salient. So Russia has 104,000 troops for the rest of Russia. Unless Russia has managed to secretly gather and arm a secret strategic reserve--often claimed by some Westerners but never evident--that's a problem for Russia.
And here we are seven months later with Russia doing more of the same all spring and summer--dying in large numbers to claw forward at the pace of a lava flow--apparently losing more men per month than they have recruited. A month into the fall Russia is seemingly unable to mount a significant fall offensive that looks any different than the dull roar we are used to seeing. And Ukrainian forces seem to be much more active counter-attacking.
Mind you, I'm not claiming this situation can't change dramatically. It can. And while a Russian sector could be vulnerable, Ukraine might never notice before the units recover. Conversely, because the initiative is generally with the Russians, if the Ukrainian army breaks on one section of the front, Russia could march forward in a relatively fast pace until Ukraine can reform a defensive line. It may or may not be decisive, of course.
Yet my gut tells me that Trump has been playing nice with Putin to entice him like a hesitant squirrel uncertain of whether the offered walnut is a trap or a treat. And if Putin refuses, Trump will give Ukraine more tools to punish Putin for refusing to end the war he started. Not that I think Tomahawks will be a silver bullet on the military side. Like Abrams, F-16s, ATACMS, or any other weapon sent to Ukraine with great fanfare by commentators, new weapons add to what Ukraine can do. Every little bit helps.
And at some point, Putin may finally get the light bulb moment after yet another whack to the head with the clue bat. Putin may believe that Trump offers Putin a fig leaf of ending the war without rubbing Putin's nose in the mess of Putin's folly. The basis for an American-Russian rapprochement against a common enemy exists. Russia might prefer to have China and America wage war against each other. But Putin's Plan B after wrecking his ability to defend Russia's Far East may be having American help to resist China.
Heck, it may be his only chance to save his presidency if not his life.
Hey, only Nixon can go to China. And perhaps only Trump can go to Russia.
Under the circumstances, I have to ask again whether the massive Red Army is only a reality on reports that reach the Kremlin. Are Russia's extraordinary measures to entice/trick recruits into the war finally running out of targets?
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: I made the image with Bing.
