North Korea says its troops fighting for Russia are for the purpose of learning how to fight a modern war. Would North Korea really wage a war if China tells it to fight?
Does the United States need a unified alliance command to deal with simultaneous invasions of Taiwan and South Korea?
NATO’s lesson is clear: deterrence is not created by defense spending alone. It depends on force structure coherence, shared priorities, and a division of labor among allies. If Japan fields Tomahawk cruise missiles and South Korea invests in submarine-launched cruise missiles and explores the development of a light aircraft carrier, who integrates and sustains these systems when crises erupt? Which ally reinforces which theater, and how quickly? Without institutional answers to these questions, military planning becomes guesswork.
Separate theaters of interest for South Korea and Japan will complicate using their forces as deployable assets. While the author's suggestion to set up a trilateral planning cell in INDOPACOM is decent because it avoids the issue of an Asian NATO. The situation of allied coordination is worse across INDOPACOM.
But the problem of diverting Japanese and South Korean assets away from self defense to help the other front will face tough obstacles. A planning cell would surely help define what is available and other what circumstances they would be released is a solid idea.
But I doubt North Korea would send its army across the DMZ to die rather than just bombard Seoul--requiring immediate South Korean attention.
But it might for reasons we can't fathom. And then rely on nukes to deter counter-invasion.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
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