Is the West German model appropriate for Ukraine? Of course, that model didn't end a war as much as it defined a new (cold) war.
The White House reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia until Russia agrees to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts to deflect blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's rejection of such a ceasefire.
Russia demonstrates that it wants to conquer Ukraine by reigniting a long-quiet front:
Russian forces have launched what could be the vanguard of a new offensive in southern Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Oblast, according to the Ukrainian and Russian militaries. While the success of this operation is in dispute, it marks an expansion of Moscow’s effort to stretch out Kyiv’s already-besieged forces.Even as the war rages, a West German model for Ukraine after the war ends has been suggested:
No matter how Trump approaches the end of the war, the major concerns behind it—U.S.-Ukraine relations, Kyiv’s ambitions to join NATO, and the geopolitical struggle between the West and Russia—will long outlast his administration. In this new era, post-war Ukraine could emerge as a successor to Cold War-era West Germany: a frontline state whose strategic significance in the decades to come may ultimately prove as consequential as its current wartime struggle.
Before Russia invaded I said I wouldn't be shocked if that happens, but it isn't ideal.
But that model requires many orders of magnitude more NATO troops than a token "reassurance force" that Europeans have proposed scraping up to send to Ukraine after a ceasefire.
Also, I don't assume Russia can't be made to fear China more than it says it fears NATO.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Ukraine's Kursk salient inside Russia is essentially gone. It was a good test for achieving movement on the battlefield. And if Ukraine maintained a good kill ratio and distracted Russia from the rest of the front, it was a success. Also, a quick initial victory and very slow eventually defeat surely had a good effect on Ukrainian morale.
UPDATE (Wednesday): How easily could Russia resume the war?
The Kremlin appears to be increasingly concerned with the Russian military's ability to retain forces in the event of demobilization following a ceasefire or a negotiated peace.
Interesting.
UPDATE (Saturday): The European proposal to end the war is perfectly reasonable if the assumption is that Russia will invade again the first chance it gets. Which right now is the way to bet.
But if the American plan is to "flip" Russia into an ally against China, the rival assumptions doom the European plan for now.
Russia should want the American plan. But Russia has fallen so far because it didn't get a short and glorious victory over Ukraine that I fear Russia sees no alternative to full vassal status under China.
So keep that European plan handy.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: Map from my college bible on the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1960-1980.
