Monday, October 17, 2022

The Winter War of 2022 Quantifies the Unquantifiable

There is still resistance to the evidence that Russia's military is over-rated as some Western commentary insist Ukrainian successes are transitory, doomed to fall to Russia's mobilization of its hordes of men and equipment.

As Russia starts to visibly lose their war against Ukraine, there is more talk about how blind Western analysts were to the real situation of Russia's vaunted military (via Instapundit):

But the Russian plan—to seize Kiev with thunderclap suddenness, deposing the Ukrainian government and replacing it with a puppet regime—misfired. And as the weeks passed with Russian troops bogged down north of Kiev, it came to be realized that Putin’s legions were far less battleworthy than previously supposed. Confronted with the spirited resistance of the Ukrainian Army and people, the invaders faltered and recoiled. There were episodes of panic and rout. The Ukrainian countryside became littered with abandoned, burned-out tanks and vehicles: tangible, humiliating evidence of the Russian Army’s surprising incompetence.

It was tangible evidence as well of the faulty judgement of the aforementioned Western observers, many of whom lay a claim to military expertise. In the six months since the Russian Army’s defeat in the battle of Kiev became obvious, that evidence has continued to pile up. Stubborn resistance to the idea that Russia is losing the war may reflect a natural reluctance to admit that one’s judgement was at fault.

And there is a nice call back to Russia's 1914 Tannenberg disaster as precedent for image versus reality. 

As for Russia's military, I was not deluded:

I worry about Russia. But I have never inflated their strength. Blogging in Michigan where my income and status doesn't rely on what I write perhaps made me immune to the pressure to conform to conventional wisdom. ...

But Russia has a geographic advantage over NATO by being able to generate a high level of superiority over our NATO allies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (and old NATO state Norway for that matter in their far north)--and against neutral but NATO-friendly Sweden and Finland--that will last for many months before America and the rest of NATO can send troops to the east through the logistics infrastructure-poor new NATO states.

So Russia is a danger to NATO territorial integrity. Especially if the Russians talk themselves into the notion that NATO is too "soft" to fight tough Russian fighters in a lengthy fight. Russia might believe they can use their initial advantage to take territory, dig in, wave their nukes around, and scare the decadent NATO nations into giving in to Russian aggression.

My view of their flaws goes way back, even when Western analysts were flinging their panties at Russia's so-called "hybrid warfare" after the 2014 Crimea operation

I knew Russia's military was overrated in 2022. But I thought they'd do better than they have. In my defense, I didn't imagine that Russia would persist with a parade invasion of Ukraine that wrecked and stunned the Russian ground forces rather than seriously pounding Ukraine with firepower from the start. Russia's initial failure at least muted the panty flingers

Hell, 1.5 million Russian military uniforms are missing (via Instapundit). Russia paid for those uniforms. Lord knows if any were delivered. Yet despite seeing Russia's military flail we're to believe Russia's nukes are uniquely immune to the effects of corruption. Does Russia dare fire nuclear weapons at Ukraine and risk losing the last deterrent to invasion if they don't work and the world sees that?

And don't get me started on the past swooning over Russian battalion tactical groups

But I digress.

I also didn't anticipate the level of Western support Ukraine has gotten, which has served to blunt the Russian invasion on top of Russian errors and weaknesses. But grant me that overrating an army is something I identified as a problem more than 25 years ago

The critical advantages provided by highly trained soldiers with good morale are not easily quantifiable in peacetime. The lack of quality becomes quantifiable, indirectly, when one counts the bumed-out armored vehicles of an army whose troops did not know how to use their equipment and who lacked the will to fight on in adversity.

We've been counting those burned-out Russian vehicles inside Ukraine. And counting captured ones, too. 

But until we can quantify quality reliably, after-the-fact blazing and abandoned data is the only way to really know. Whether it is Tannenberg or the lunge toward Kiev. Maybe Russia can recover. But for now the math indicates Ukraine has the advantage.

UPDATE: ISW notes the Russian training ground incident where Moslem recruits fired on non-Moslems:

ISW also previously noted that the asymmetric distribution of mobilization responsibilities along ethnic lines led to the creation of localized and ethnically based resistance movements, which ISW forecasted could cause domestic ramifications as the war continues.[14] The Belgorod shooting is likely a manifestation of exactly such domestic ramifications. Ethnic minorities that have been targeted and forced into fighting a war defined by Russian imperial goals and shaped by Russian Orthodox nationalism will likely continue to feel alienation, which will create feed-back loops of discontent leading to resistance followed by crackdowns on minority enclaves.

I noted that relying on minorities to die exacerbates Russia's policy of draining the provinces to support Moscow. Putin may want to rebuild the USSR. He may be recreating the break up of the USSR.

UPDATE: Is it my imagination or are the Ukrainians launching more strikes in Zaporizhia province now?

UPDATE (Tuesday): Ukraine has not liberated nearly as much territory on the Kherson front that I expected by now. Either the Russians are stronger than I think or the Ukrainians are weaker. Can the Ukrainians make one last big advance while the weather holds? Can the Ukrainians conduct a winter offensive somewhere? Or will Russia get the break it needs to restore its shaken ground forces for the spring?

UPDATE: Is Russia's new aerial drone campaign against Ukrainian civilian targets designed to provoke Ukraine into retaliating against Russian cities? If so, Ukraine should restrain the impulse to inflict revenge pain on Russians. The Russian people are already feeling the pain from body bags coming home and economic problems. Keep doing that. Don't push the Russian people to rally around Putin.

UPDATE (Wednesday): Is Russia's evacuation of some civilians from occupied Kherson telegraphing a potential Russian retreat from the city and possibly the entire western bank of the river?

Perhaps. If the civilians are mostly Russians and their local allies.

Or perhaps Russia just wants to clear the decks to defend the city without the burden of supplying civilians. Although Russia hasn't shown that kind of humanitarian compassion up until now. And the Russians seem likely to prefer human shields.

Interesting. I've worried Ukraine isn't getting more territory before bad weather shuts down cross country military movements. We'll see.

UPDATE (Thursday): Russian equipment losses and logistics problems. And is it really true that Russia has lost six times as many troops as Ukraine?

UPDATE: ISW: "Russian authorities are likely setting information conditions to justify planned Russian retreats and significant territorial losses in Kherson Oblast."  Also, Russia may wreck the Kakhovka dam to surge the Dnieper River to cover their retreat, while blaming Ukraine. Rule of thumb: If the dam is blown before Russia retreats, Ukraine did it; if the dam is blown after the Russians retreat across the river, Russia did it.

UPDATE: I suspect that Russia's new campaign against Ukrainian utilities is Russia's strategy to demoralize Ukrainians, rather than using nuclear or other WMD.

UPDATE: Is Ukraine's Kherson front shifting to a big push before the weather prevents movement?

UPDATE (Friday): Hmmm: "Russian and Ukrainian troops appeared Thursday to be girding for a major battle over the strategic southern industrial port city of Kherson[.]" I keep hearing that but see no evidence of anything that looks like a renewed offensive designed to take territory.

Of course, it would be actually funny if the Ukrainians pull off a Kherson feint again. Could Russia start pulling back to the east bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson province only to find that the Ukrainian main effort kicks off from Zaporizhzhya, driving south to Melitopol?

UPDATE: Are apparent Russian threats to blow up the Kakhovka dam on the Dniepr River just a threat to keep Ukraine from pursuing too closely Russians retreating across the river? Assuming Russia is going to retreat, of course. It's possible Russia is preparing to fight for Kherson city and the region.

UPDATE: ISW thinks Russia is essentially beginning the process to withdraw from west of the Dnieper River on the Kherson front over the next several weeks, likely planning to blow the dam to prevent Ukraine from pursuing across the river. The Russian goal will be too prepare for a long war with Ukraine after enduring a nadir of fortune.

If that's the Russian plan, I think Ukraine would be better off making the Zaporizhzhya front the main effort. Smaller Ukraine forces would deal with the flooded Dnieper on the Kharkov front while the main offensive drives south to take Melitopol and hit the withdrawing Russian forces from the east.

If Ukraine can yet score a major defeat of the Russians this year--capturing territory and destroying Russian units in large numbers--it may prevent Putin from surviving the short run to win in the long run. If not, who knows how the war will develop?

UPDATE (Saturday): The Russians have taken some ground in the east.

UPDATE: ISW reports that Russia is continuing to fall back in Kherson province; and that the Russians will blow the dam to cover their retreat. 

Questions: How many Russian troops will be stuck on the wrong side of the rising waters and get captured? Can Russia execute a phased retreat without it becoming a rout? Could Ukrainian air mobile or special forces take the dam and disable the explosives? Is it conceivable that the Ukrainians would try to partially destroy the dam to release some water to prevent a catastrophic big rush of water and so complicate Russia's withdrawal?

UPDATE (Sunday): ISW writes:

This report focuses on Russian Defense Minister Shoigu's several calls with his western counterparts and preposterous claims that Ukraine is preparing a false-flag “dirty bomb” attack against Russia, likely to pressure Ukraine into concessions and intimidate NATO. On the battlefield, Ukrainian forces conducted further offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine, and Russian forces continued to set conditions for a withdrawal from Kherson.

If Russia dirty bombs itself to blame Ukraine, will Russians rally around Putin, believing Ukraine is guilty; or get frightened that Putin will get them all killed?

NOTE: ISW war updates continue here.