Is mobilization of often unwilling recruits and annexation of resisting Ukrainian territory Putin's last throw of the dice to win his war special military operation in Ukraine?
The frontlines are mostly unchanged. Russian forces continue to batter Ukrainian defenses on the Donetsk front. But without much to show for it. Ukrainian forces continue to gain ground slowly in the Kharkov-Luhansk region; while seemingly pausing after dramatic advances on the Kherson front. Ukraine continues interdicting Russian supplies with firepower on the Kherson front. This seemingly includes damaging the Kerch Strait bridge--coinciding with Putin's birthday the previous day--with an assumed special forces operation. Is there time--and units--for another Ukrainian operation on the southern front before fall mud makes off-road operations too difficult?
The financial, logistical, and political challenges of supporting the Russian mobilization process continue to fuel societal division within Russia and criticism of the government. The Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) risk alienating core supporters including those supportive of mobilization by failing to address inconsistencies and inadequacies in the implementation of mobilization.
The large-scale removal of Russian men of working age (either through mobilization or through their flight) has left holes in the positions they formerly filled.
Russia isn't getting much love from his hoped-for rescuers abroad:
The war isn’t over in Ukraine but it is going against the Russians and, despite Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Russia will never leave all Russian occupied territory, a growing number of Russian officials, including some who work closely with Putin, believe there does not appear to be any way to avoid a Ukrainian victory. Putin threatens to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, which risks nuclear retaliation by the Americans and other NATO countries with nukes. Putin met with Chinese and Indian officials recently and was told that using nukes was a bad idea and the Ukraine War and the sanctions on Russia was interfering with economic and other relations with China and India. Putin told his two trading partners that he understood their concerns but no other details were made public. Putin risks losing his position as Russian leader. He has held that job for two decades and success in Ukraine was supposed to help him keep that job. [emphasis added]
Neither nukes, India, nor China will be of much help to Putin. All he has are the lives of newly conscripted Russians rushed to the front. He seemingly stares into the abyss with few good options.
The fact that Russia is sending at least some of the new cannon fodder to the front now rather than training and equipping them for battles in 2023 is pretty damning of Putin's confidence in holding his ground until the spring, isn't it?
I've long--since Kiev was successfully defended--seen Kherson as the key front. Push there to seal off Crimea and advance east to reach Melitopol and then eventually Mariupol, ideally. Ukraine needs its Black Sea coast.
Ukraine has finally made some sizable gains on the Kherson front despite Russian reinforcements to hold the region. Although the Russian ground forces seem thin enough that Ukraine could stop in Kherson at the Dniepr River--rather than try to advance across it against Russian opposition--and instead mount the next stage by driving south to Melitopol from Zaporizhzhya. We'll see how that front develops.
Is the talk of the war going on well into 2023 missing signs that Russia is closer to decisive battlefield defeat than it appears? After failing to conquer Ukraine, seeing Ukraine rally and recapture land, and enduring near-catastrophic personnel and material losses, can Russia's ground forces endure shivering and going hungry in trenches this winter? With reinforcements more bitter than trained? Is the abyss staring back at Putin?
And after my presumed autumn attack, can Ukraine conduct enough of a winter offensive after the autumn mud freezes to shove Putin into the abyss to avoid a longer war?
UPDATE: Russia responded to the apparent Ukrainian attack on the key logistics link, the Kerch Strait bridge--which is a legal target--with a flurry of attacks on Ukrainian cities.
In the Battle of Britain after British bomber attacks on Germany, Hitler ordered his aircraft to switch from military targets to British cities. The shift relieved the growing strains on the British air defense effort. I wonder if Putin has made a similar mistake?
[And not long after, I see someone else had the same thought.]
And this:
Given the unstable situation with Russian forces in Ukraine and the government in Russia, the crisis will be resolved, one way or another, before the end of 2022.
Ukrainian winter offensive, anyone?
UPDATE: Logistics:
Months of crippling economic sanctions may be eroding Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine, with stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and heavy ordnance like the cruise missiles that hit Kyiv Monday running low.
Russian units will respond by lowering rates of fire for the most important missions until they can restore supplies. Nobody expends ammo lemming-like at full rate until their entire army runs out for good. But Ukraine must exploit that for it to make a difference.
UPDATE (Friday): Interesting:
Ukraine will remain on the offensive through the winter, retaking more ground lost to the Russian invasion, the U.S. secretary of defense predicted on Wednesday[.]
I have been wondering about a Ukrainian winter offensive. This would help exploit this Russian problem:
The Kremlin’s rapid deployment of mobilized servicemen to the Kreminna-Svatove line may also indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to throw away the lives of mobilized men in a desperate effort to preserve a collapsing frontline.
Don't assume Russia is inherently capable of letting General Winter win the war for them.
UPDATE: Is it just me or are the Russians primed to flee on the Kherson front?
The Russian-appointed head of the Kherson Occupation Administration, Vladimir Saldo, asked Russian officials on October 13 to support a widescale evacuation of civilians from Kherson to occupied Crimea and neighboring Russian oblasts to “protect” Kherson civilians from missile strikes.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
