This is a good summary of Taiwan's fleet of small anti-ship vessels and traditional longer-endurance ships [link and quote formatting fixed]:
In this new era of great power competition the ROCN is designed to maximize utility with a small budget while facing a much wealthier and larger adversary. The small surface fleet patrols and guards the island’s territorial waters, while the anti-invasion force is designed to ensure that the PLA will not be able to land troops on the beach without paying a heavy toll.
The future of the ROCN is likely one of further bifurcation, with the anti-invasion fleet continuing to dwarf the surface fleet. Pursuant to its hedgehog strategy, the ROCN will concentrate on raising the cost of conflict with China in the years to come in an attempt to prevent Chinese aggression, while the surface fleet will conduct goodwill tours and conduct joint operations with allies to build relationships and raise Taiwan’s image abroad.Yes, the Taiwan Strait is no place for the bigger ships and the small missile boats operating with shore-based missiles, guns, and aircraft to hit the invasion force are the way to go.
But I'll add one more reason to keep the bigger ships. Taiwan's bigger ships for sea control are needed on the east coast to hold the sea lines of communication open:
Taiwan will need boats like this to deter or defeat an invasion. Taiwan's bigger ships are too vulnerable in the narrow straits exposed to Chinese fast attack boats, submarines, and aircraft. The bigger Taiwanese ships with air defense and anti-submarine capabilities are safer east of Taiwan where they can keep Taiwan's sea lines of communication open. Together with mine countermeasures vessels and helicopters, that's where these ships belong. Also, operating at the northern and southern tips of Taiwan, the bigger ships could use anti-ship missiles to strike into the strait area before retiring behind the shield of the home island.
I don't assume that right now the Chinese could sustain a naval effort east of Taiwan to blockade Taiwan. Certainly not with surface ships. Subs would be safer from Taiwanese counter-measures and a sudden American intervention. But subs alone are a problem for a blockade as the Germans demonstrated in two world wars. With no ability to inspect a ship by boarding, a sub can only sink a suspect ship, potentially angering neutrals.
In that situation, America will be happy to have ROCN help to maintain lines of communication to Taiwan. And Taiwan needs those LOCs open to receive American resupply and reinforcements--the latter especially might be essential to eject the PLA from Taiwan, as I wrote in Military Review recently.
Eventually China's skill in sustaining a fleet away from China will allow China to operate east of Taiwan. Carriers will provide naval aviation that will help defend the blockade ships and delay or distract a U.S. Navy effort to break the blockade. Then America and other allies will be needed to break China's sea grip and intervene ashore. But short of that worst case situation, Taiwan's surface fleet has roles in peace and conflict.
