I'm calling BS on this:
The condition of Western strategic mastery [in the Cold War] was Sino-Soviet division, and this to a degree that triumphalist voices ignored in the 1990s. As a result, the key strategic disaster of the early 2000s was not al-Qaeda, but, rather the Sino-Russia reconciliation. That was the major Western failure of the 2000s, one that was neglected due to the particular focus on the conflicts of the period. [emphasis added]
The American-Chinese alliance was based on common fear of the USSR that overrode other differences. Once that alliance defeated the USSR, the reason for allying disappeared and the other difference returned. One can excuse dealing with China to defeat a greater threat capable of mass murder. How would you defend remaining an ally of China without that greater threat to fight?
And just what could America have done to preserve an alliance that was no longer needed even aside from the morality of maintaining it after 1991? Indeed, you could argue that America was very accommodating to Communist China despite those differences by carrying out a post-Cold War policy of strengthening China's economy hoping that economic progress would lead to liberalization and democracy in time.
China was quick to take the Western help without giving any ground on liberalization and democratization.
And Russia took advantage of China's renewed hostility toward America--already evident in the 1990s and illustrated by the 2001 EP-3 ramming incident, which had nothing to do with American wars in the 2000s--by essentially pointing China at America.
My view is that those Russian arms sales and toleration for Chinese theft of Russian military technology plus a broader policy of working with China are a form of appeasement that is disguised by Russian bluster against a non-threatening NATO.
But the author does seem to get that there really is no point to an America-China alliance against a weak Russia, and that ultimately Russia should be an ally of the West against a rising China:
In these circumstances, the prime strategic deterrent to China would be better relations between the West and Russia. That appears unlikely given the shared interests of China and Russia in revisionism, but, at the same time, there is an uneasiness in their relationship.
NATO is capable of helping America against China by countering Russia and cannot be expected to help America directly in Asia against China. I fully agree with that. I noted the futility of British military contributions east of Suez and into the Pacific at the expense of Europe, even though I appreciate the diplomatic outreach it will provide.
Russia is not blind to the threat from China. But will Russia reach out to the West before China doesn't need Russia and acts against Russia?
I'm not optimistic.
