Monday, August 31, 2020

A More Obvious Mission

Israel is reorganizing some of their special operations units, including the ability to land and set up a temporary airbase behind enemy lines. This can be used to rescue downed pilots or extract agents (think how America tried to do that in 1980 when trying to rescue hostages held by Iran). But there is another type of mission:

A more obvious mission for the 7th Wing is establishing temporary airfields in the Syrian or Lebanese country side to support major special operations efforts or a deep incursion by ground forces.

I've been predicting exactly that kind of deep ground force incursion in Lebanon for at least a decade:

I assume that any war will be a multi-division push north of the Litani that will take advantage of the fact that Hezbollah, after 2006, wrongly believes it can go toe-to-toe with Israeli troops and so will fight as light infantry rather than as insurgents. For a while, Israel will be able to really pound Hizbollah ground forces as the Israelis take over rocket-launch sites and armories with troops.

Further, I'd guess the Israelis will push rapidly into the Bekaa Valley as far as Baalbek to tear up Hezbollah's rear area to slow down rearmament after the war is over. Air strikes would take place north of that, if necessary, I'd guess.

And a good portion of Israeli mechanized forces will stand ready to deter the Syrians from jumping in. The threat to drive on Damascus should be a powerful inducement to stay quiet even if Iran wants Assad to fight to the last Arab.

The long and grueling multi-war that began after I wrote that pretty much destroyed the ability of Syria to intervene. And Hezbollah lost a lot of men fighting for Assad.

Although Iran is in a better position to lash out from their Syria foothold.

One day the dots I keep seeing that indicate such an operation might actually connect.

UPDATE: Hmmm:

Gaza’s Hamas rulers said Monday they have reached an agreement through international mediators to end the latest round of cross-border violence with Israel.

Under the deal, Hamas is to halt the launches of explosives-laden balloons and rocket fire into Israel, while Israel said it will ease a blockade that has been tightened in recent weeks.

If that's a dot in the picture, it would protect Israel's left flank as the Israeli army drives into Lebanon to hammer Hezbollah.

Or it is unrelated.

UPDATE: Here's a dot on Israel's right flank:

In southern Syria, on the Israeli border (Golan Heights) a Russia-backed Syrian militia has been taking control of the Syrian side of the border. Called the “Huran Army”, the militia contains many former rebels who are hostile to Iranian influence in Syria but willing to cooperate with the Assads.

Russia is no friend of Iran or its Hezbollah proxy force. If Israel ripped apart Hezbollah, Iran might find the cost of rebuilding Hezbollah too much and scale back its forces in Syria. Which would have the effect of making Russia more important to Assad than Iran.

Would Russia prevent Iranian-controlled forces from operating against Israel from there?

It's a dot. Does it form my picture?