The trouble is that the U.S. is only starting to realize how much it would actually take to deter China from attacking Taiwan, or defeat any assault.
The essay goes over a lot of ground that I've gone over on TDR since the beginning.
The issue is more than a question about Taiwan's fate.
A break in our commitment to defend allies could be catastrophic over time. As long as we have allies, China has to measure itself to that loose alliance rather than just compare itself to America.
Taiwan needs to spend much more to fight tooth and nail.
Free Taiwan is a potential threat to the CCP--and should act on it.
And obviously, America needs much more anti-ship power--and must fix the Navy surface warfare "community"--and do it loudly so that China doesn't think they can easily win, as I worried in a recent data dump:
If our Navy leadership is the problem, our naval superiority might be illusory. But I fear it is given SEAL, shipbuilding, collision, and the Roosevelt fiascos. Let's hope this isn't correct or if it is right--and certainly blaming sailors is wrong--that we can fix the leadership problem. And while we do that let's hope the Chinese don't believe our Navy is already defeated and put that theory to the test. And for added fun, the Chinese leadership could very well over-estimate their strength. Have a super sparkly day.
And so far I'm not comforted.
Although part of that effort to overcome China's ability to control the seas should be to make China divert resources from their sea control push by making China worry about our land power--and worry about inland problems in general.
One thing that sets it apart is that it does not dismiss China's ability to invade as so many writers seem to do. I've long felt China has the ability. And don't doubt the intent.
Will the free West (that now includes Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, to be sure) stand with Taiwan despite the odds as the free West once guarded West Berlin from the USSR despite the odds?
Anyway, do read all of that first article.
