Although the article starts off with a list of Russian advances in influence in Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Latin America, I counter by asking what has that done for Russia other than alienate America and Europe and cost Russia money it doesn't have? Russian policy seems like an exercise in self esteem maintenance.
But the heart of the question in that first article is China:
When it comes to Russia’s relations with China, Putin has been remarkably deferential and respectful. Putin has even described Chinese President Xi Jinping as “a good and reliable friend.” ...
Putin, though, does not even seem to acknowledge the possibility that China could ever pose a threat to Russia. Why is this?
After raising the possibilities that Putin thinks NATO is a threat and doesn't even notice China; or that Putin thinks it is better to be subordinate to China than to the West, the author arrives at his preferred explanation:
Yet another possible explanation for Putin’s continuing deference to Xi is that he believes that China will never threaten Russia so long as Beijing regards Washington as its principal threat. Further, if and when China does pose a threat to Russia, it will also pose a threat to America and the West. And if and when that occurs, it will be very much in American and Western interests to ally with a weaker Russia against a stronger China — no matter how difficult Russian relations with America and the West may have been earlier.
I think that is close. And yeah, Russia likely believes if push comes to shove the West will choose to support even an a-hole Russia over the rising threat of China--but even I wonder how quickly we could flip that switch.
Russia could alienate the West enough to delay a flip to Russia. And even if the West decides Russia should be supported against China, what can anybody in NATO but America do to significantly help Russia? NATO is extending military protection to the new NATO states in the east with great reluctance and difficulty. NATO is not going to extend its reach to the Amur River in the Far East.
I recently addressed Russia's choice to side with China:
Russia would prefer to have America and China slug it out, leaving Russia to pick up the pieces.
It's one thing to pretend to be a friend of China until Russia can safely resist China without provoking a Chinese attack to liberate huge chunks of the Russian Far East from Russian control.
Being an actual ally of China in a struggle against America and the West is another thing altogether. Being Xi Jinping's sidekick just might mean hanging from a lamppost before Xi's final end in a bunker.
Of course, if China has to focus inland for trade instead of sea trade with a now-suspicious and angry world, that might not work out for Russia.
One thing for sure, by forfeiting ties with the West that the West wanted Russia to forge after winning the Cold War, Putin has chosen poorly.
So far all Putin has managed to do is alienate NATO while failing to build up the power to resist China.
Russia is appeasing China until Russia can hope to match Chinese power in the Far East. And until they do that they disguise their appeasement of China by pointless hostility to a non-threatening NATO.
We'll see how that works out.
