Oh, triggering snapback sanctions should be fun to watch unfold:
Further, and uniqeuely in the context of UN traditions, neither Russia nor Communist China nor any other Iran-friendly permanent member of the Security Council would be able to veto the snapback clauses, we were told.
Indeed, according to resolution 2231, the original parties to the JCPOA — Russia, Communist China, France, Britain, Germany, and America (as well as the European Union and Iran) — can unilaterally launch a process leading to reimposition of prior strict Security Council sanctions.
But can we still claim that right at the Security Council even after leaving the JCPOA?
The US “will get tremendous pushback, because the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement,” one of Mr. Obama’s top JCPOA negotiators, Wendy Sherman, told the Times. Yet even she acknowledges the move may succeed.
Obama administration officials may cavill, but America “has the legal right to snapback UN sanctions pursuant to a binding Security Council Resolution,” says Richard Goldberg, a former Trump administration official, now with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “It's time to exercise that right to defend American national security.”
"Fun" in the sense that I sincerely doubt it is legal or possible to carry out snapback sanctions in the face of Chinese and Russian (and possibly French) opposition to the Security Council veto power:
Because my view is that sanctions can't be snapped back in place absent an affirmative vote of the UN Security Council, including no veto by a permanent member (coughrussiaandchinacough):
Can the United Nations charter be amended by this deal to carve out an exception to the veto power of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council?
Here's what the Chapter V, Article 27 of the UN charter says about the veto:
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
Because I can see the Russians or Chinese objecting to the whole notion that UNSC resolutions can be reimposed after 30 days of inaction by the Security Council. What do we do when the Russians and Chinese (probably correctly, but it has been a long time since I had an international law class) argue that this deal provision is invalid and that no sanctions resolutions can go into effect without 9 votes, including the concurrence of the five permanent members, and they will not go along with it?
But it will be an interesting test of the UN Charter, no? I say we try it just to confirm that Russia and China don't want to stop Iran from getting nukes and that the Obama administration was criminally negligent in peddling this line.
Let the games begin.
