Strategypage has the story:
This incident explains a lot about what is going on in Syria at the moment. While the Syrian Army has been on the offensive for several years now it has relied on Iranian (mainly Shia Afghans) and Russian (Russian contractors) mercenaries along with some Russian army special operations troops to carry out the most difficult ground combat tasks. Russia also supplies lots of air support and heavy artillery while the Syrian army now has a rebuilt (by Russia) air force and artillery to also supply firepower. Syrian troops have been fighting for nine years now and most of the remaining veterans have moved over to artillery and support units or local defense forces plus training new recruits. There are few new recruits and they are not enthusiastic. Apparently the crew of the T-72 was inexperienced because any well trained tank crew would have had the commander with his head and shoulders out of the turret observing and supervising the operations of a lone tank. But that 125mm gun is loud and the tank commander stayed inside the tank because he thought he could get away with it. The tank commander may have panicked as well as the Turk APC outmaneuvered and rammed his tank. Since the APC was apparently not armed with ATGM (anti-tank-guided missiles) it was safe for the tank to just run away.I've written about the state of the Syrian army after years of bleeding. It isn't really a proper army anymore. It is a firepower and logistics service at one end and local defense forces at the other. In between for mobile operations, the Syrian government relies on imported troops provided by Iran and to a much smaller extent Russia.
I called the Syrian army a "zombie army" after noticing how the force had deteriorated:
I termed the transformation as one of the Syrian army becoming fiefdoms that in many ways resembled an advise and assist force with a backbone of logistics and heavy weapons fleshed out by militias--both domestic and foreign:
The Syrian army has collapsed. In a way it is like an advise and support force of firepower, armor, and logistics backed by air power sent in to help poorly trained local forces fight their war. And without local forces--whether Syrian or imported militias--the Syrian army would be unable to fight the war.
Without an army as we understand it, Assad does not truly control Syria. Regional entities based on the army divisions run their areas as sub-state sovereigns.
The lack of actual Syrian close combat formations is pretty amazing.
The collapse of the Syrian army into a core capability is matched by the collapse of the central state.
Assad won this war. Syria lost.
