The commander of U.S. Central Command confirmed that American special operators would serve as the main security force to combat terrorists and militants across Afghanistan as U.S. troops begin to draw down.
But losing American (and other NATO) forces is a problem:
[Marine Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., the commander of CENTCOM] explained that the principle driver to maintaining a smaller counterterrorism posture below 8,600 was a “far lower level” of violence across the country — something the Taliban has failed to deliver on despite their signed commitment with the U.S. to do so. ...
McKenzie explained that U.S. special operators in Afghanistan operate in a “conventional force structure.”
That means they require support from enablers like logistics, air power, intelligence and strike capabilities from both U.S. conventional troops and host nation partner forces.
It is very tough to conduct counter-terrorism without the network of information that counter-insurgency provides, as I have commented about during the Obama drawdown:
[There] seems to be stubborn thinking in our government that counter-terrorism is a job separate from counter-insurgency, so we can wage war with special forces and drones against terrorists who target us without paying attention to a wider war.
This is a mistake because counter-terrorism relies on counter-insurgency if we want more than a strategy of drive-by dronings, even though the special forces may kill disproportionately despite their small size compared to total forces involved[.]
I still think that is true. A change in administration doesn't change that reality. Our military clearly understands this. Do their civilian bosses?
Can the Afghan forces with reduced NATO help provide that support to the special forces?
