With the West's temporary advantage in economic power because of the industrial revolution ending as productivity expands in the non-Western world, sheer population begins to weigh power balances back to pre-industrial times. And the old empires--with critical weaknesses that threaten their cohesion--endure to contest for the world.
This long article is quite interesting. I've touched on its aspects of geography and empires over the years. So it appeals to me on that basis alone. But it is pointless to try to pull out points and quote them.
Although being a product of the Center for No American Security makes me suspicious of it, for any policy recommendations that flow from it.
One thing I really contest is the idea that America can deny a single power or grouping of allied powers from controlling the Eurasian land mass with only American air and naval power.
Ultimately, local allies who might resist the dominance of a power or group of powers will not accept as an ally a power that provides sea and air power alone while expecting the local ally to die in combat in muddy countrysides or urban slums.
Balancing continental powers will require the ability to project significant ground power ashore to bolster local allies in holding or taking ground.
Independent American land operations on the continent could only be in the form of large raids, in essence.
But in either case, land power backed by air and sea power will be necessary to keep America from being shoved into a Western Hemisphere defensive crouch, waiting for an enemy to project power to the Americas.
And other means of picking apart the cohesion of the opposing continental empires to contract them to their cores will be the main efforts that military strength buys time to achieve.
Also, I hope the author isn't being too optimistic in assuming that America is immune to the cohesion problems of the empires.
Anyway, it is worth your time to read.