Wednesday, June 19, 2013

Second Battle of Aleppo

The First Battle of Aleppo didn't work out well for Assad. It was a bridge too far, as far as I was concerned. The Second Battle of Aleppo is under way.

Game on:

Rebels attacked a main highway in northern Syria on Wednesday, opposition groups said, to try to choke off a major supply line for President Bashar al-Assad's forces in the region.

Assad's troops, backed by battle-hardened Lebanese Hezbollah fighters and emboldened by their capture of a strategic border town, are starting an offensive to regain the rebel-dominated north and remaining rebel strongholds around Damascus.

We shall see. Even if Assad's forces can take all of Aleppo--and whether they have enough Hezbollah and Iranian troops to spearhead that is uncertain--I still don't think that Assad has enough troops to garrison the 2.3 million people in that city.

The Institute for the Study of War looks at the ongoing battle.

First, the Assad regime captured Qusayr and rather than moving out to secure that area, they shifted forces north to Aleppo. So right off the bat the rebels were allowed to fight another day and a buffer around Qusayr was not created. The rebels in that area have an opportunity to loosen Assad's control of Qusayr and reassert control, and even drive the government forces out.

Assad may believe that a ceasefire will be imposed and that he needs to grab Aleppo now, and count on holding Qusayr long enough to keep that in his column, too.

Second, the Syrians have reinforced the air base north of Aleppo near the Turkish border. Assad would like to break out of that siege and move out to isolate rebels in Aleppo. Of course, while Assad did this around Qusayr, that was a small town and not the largest city in Syria. Scaling up to city size is a challenge, to say the least.

Third, the rebels aren't geared to fight a ground war around Aleppo after a year of relative quiet.

Fourth, the operation could "culminate" before capturing Aleppo and hammering the rebels. By "culminating," they mean that the offensive could run out of steam before reaching its objective. Men, supplies, or morale could run out first.

ISW notes that Assad doesn't have the manpower to retake all rebel areas. They note that Hezbollah's ability to commit forces is limited. And Assad could lose other areas that have drawn Assad's forces for the Aleppo operation. Despite new government militias and Hezbollah forces, Assad does not have enough forces to garrison what he has and scrape together enough forces for local superiority around Aleppo.

Fifth, Kurds nearby are effectively siding with the regime.

Sixth, the rebels need external support to successfully defend Aleppo.

Fair enough. But if the rebels scatter if unable to hold Aleppo, the government has the problem of holding the large city while the rebels wage insurgency rather than trying to hold the city. In the face of superior government firepower and numbers, the rebels should cede the city--for now. Then start killing those militias who will garrison the city. The rebels will get the city back.

And I cringe when I hear that rebel supply lines are being cut at Qusayr or Aleppo. Have we learned nothing from the Ho Chi Minh Trail and our massive efforts to bomb it to a screeching standstill? Rebels don't need that many supplies. And the Vietnamese in South Vietnam had far larger supply needs than Syria's rebels--even those trying tohold Aleppo let alone those that are fighting as insurgents or terrorists. This isn't a 24/7 conveyor belt whose interruption starves the rebels.

And supply lines can be moved. Supply lines for rebels can even go through government-held territory. The government isn't everywhere. And guards at checkpoints can be bribed.

I have no idea if the rebels can hold Aleppo. But there is no reason that the insurgency must be broken if the Assad forces retake it.

But you have to hand it to Assad, he's fighting when people say he must lose. He's added militias and brought in Hezbollah gunmen and Iranian advisers. And he's abandoned the outer realms of his empire. These adaptations have changed the direction of the war [within that smaller theater, I should add] that existed 6 months ago.

If we don't help his opponents fight back, the war will be decided by the side that makes an effort to fight and win. Assad should be doomed. But we have to do something to doom him, no?

UPDATE: Supplying the rebels:

Away from the battlefield, some Syrian rebels are doing business with the same government they are trying to topple.

Both sides want to keep providing basics like bread, fuel and water in the areas they control. When shifting front lines split up supply chains, they started to trade.

In the northwestern Idlib province, rebels control most of the wheat fields but have no way to grind the grain into flour. The government has the flour mill, but can't get enough wheat to supply it.

The two worked out a deal. Every week, the rebels deliver tens of thousands of tons of wheat to the mill in Idlib city. The government grinds it down, takes a cut, and sends it back.

Civil wars are funny that way.

UPDATE: Stratfor addresses Assad's problems in getting mechanized forces to Aleppo and supplying them.

Also note that Assad is attacking on many fronts, chewing up his trigger pullers. How long can that last? How long can Hezbollah endure losses for Assad?