“Party authorities have come to realize that the military is encroaching on political affairs,” said one political scientist with high-level party ties. “Although the party controls the gun, the expression of viewpoints from within the military on political issues has aroused a high level of alarm.” He, like others who agreed to discuss internal party affairs, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of fear of reprisals.
Some generals and admirals have loudly called for the government to assert control over the South China Sea, the focus of increasingly rancorous territorial disputes between several Southeast Asian countries and China, where nationalist spirits are on the rise among the public and politicians as well. And earlier this year, leaders in Beijing became alarmed over ties between generals and the disgraced Politburo member Bo Xilai.
The party’s need to maintain stable rule over an increasingly vocal military is one reason Mr. Hu, its top civilian leader, is expected to hold on to his position as chairman of the Central Military Commission for up to two years after he gives up his party chief title in the fall, according to people briefed on political discussions. His anointed successor, Xi Jinping, would still take over Mr.
We listen to the party leaders, reassure ourselves that they won't risk economic growth, and think that they are the only people who might order the PLA into action. I don't assume that.
UPDATE: Strategypage has more:
Disgraced (for being corrupt, popular and overly ambitious) politician Bo left quite a mess behind. In addition to illegal deals worth billions, Bo had used his connections, charisma and cash to befriend dozens of senior generals and admirals. Some of these officers have been heard muttering (or shouting, while drunk, at political or military gatherings) that the military should have more say in how the country is run. The military is also behind the effort to claim all of the South China Sea, and the huge oil and gas deposits believed to exist there. Some officers see that offshore oil bonanza as the path to huge personal wealth.
This also touches on a subject that annoys me. The idea that China's long history has led the Chinese to make policy based on long-rang planning rather than our supposedly inferior focus on next quarter's bottom line.
I tend to think that Western observers confuse caution and lack of transparency with long-range thinking. The Chinese are quiet and silent--they must be patiently waiting for cunning, long-range plans to unfold!
How are these Chinese generals exhibiting long-range thinking by wanting to change Chinese foreign policy to get rich?
On the bright side, China's generals have more interest in getting rich than in getting good at leading troops. This will always be a drag on Chinese military performance. It doesn't mean that it will be a crucial drag that leads to their defeat, but it will be a factor.
