After nearly a decade in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Marine Corps wants to get away from being a U.S. Army auxiliary and back to being an amphibious strike force. Talk in Congress about "what do we need to two ground combat forces for?" adds to the urgency. The marines have always been sensitive about criticism that they are a second army, a second ground combat force that simply duplicates what the U.S. Army dies. ...
The marines can perform the same jobs as the army, but consider themselves mainly an amphibious force trained for assaults and other difficult special operations. ...
With all this in mind, in the last decade, the navy and marines have sought to reorganize into 12 ESGs (Expeditionary Strike Groups; i.e., a reinforced battalion of marines and their amphibious ships, including a smaller amphibious aircraft carrier). ...
The marines see the Pacific as their main area of concentration. China, and smaller crises in Asia, the Persian Gulf and Africa, is now the future of the marines. This will kill all that talk of a "second, unneeded, army."
I recently mentioned that I worry that the Army's most important ally on the ground is saying "Hell no, they won't go (to war)." I stand by my view that the Marine Corps should try to complement the Army rather than withdraw from serving with the Army out of fear that they will be seen as just soldiers with spiffier dress uniforms.
The ESG fits with my MEBF concept and the idea that while battalion-sized ESGs (with a MEU as the land component) are great for many missions requiring a quick response, it isn't enough to win a real battle. I'd like to see the ESG work with prepositioned equipment on ships so that an ESG embarked MEU can be rapidly expanded to a full brigade on the ground.
After all, ESGs can't be everywhere so if it is speed you want, we could airlift a paratrooper battalion-sized task force pretty much anywhere more rapidly than an ESG can sail there. And the paratroopers would have the remainder of their parent brigade getting ready to follow if necessary. There are those Army Stryker brigades too, with medium mechanized forces that could be airlifted.
Having the Marines focus on battle rather than just one narrow mission or one part of the globe is safer for them and more useful to the joint fight. Broadening their focus from small amphibious operations would support the old saying that "Marines fight battles and the Army fights wars." Amphibious operations would be just one way this approach would let the Marines be part of the transition from battles to wars as Army units flow into the lodgement that a Marine force has carved out by winning that first battle.
I also think that the Marines could complement the Army by being the service with the primary responsibility for urban warfare expertise. Taking a city held by a conventional defender is going to share a lot of tactics with assaulting an enemy defended coast--just without that water-crossing portion. Marines could then even attach Marine brigades to an Army division that envelops the city in mobile warfare (or an Army heavy brigade could be attached to a Marine division for a really big city assault). This city capability would be useful in both conventional combat and counter-insurgencies. The Army could remain the primary force for conventional combat and for general counter-insurgency.
I just don't see how the Marines can hope to survive by being the ground force against China, when we hope war with China won't happen--and when war against China would require more ground troops than the Marines can muster. If being just a second army is risky, how is being a mostly irrelevant Marine Corps more secure?
