With the Iraq war ending and an Afghanistan exit in sight, the Marine Corps is beginning a historic shift — a return to its roots as a seafaring force that will get smaller, lighter and, it hopes, less bogged down in land wars.
Great. With no disrespect to our allies who have fought at our side from Korea to Afghanistan, their contributions have paled next to the Marine Corps' addition to the Army. Only the countries we directly supported provided more troops.
But the Marines are worried about being "just" a second Army and vulnerable to budget cuts.
I have my doubts that a return to amphibious roots is the best option for the Marines. That option has its origins in World War II. As glorious as that chapter is for the Corps, it is not their entire history. Shoot, you want to talk historic roots? If so, our Marines should be posted on merchant ships to shoot at pirate boarders. Or waging thankless nation-building in Godforsaken Third World countries. Those are the roots of the Marine Corps. Amphibious warfare is the root of Marine recruiting campaigns.
I'm prepared to walk back my views that amphibious operations should be downgraded--but not by much. Expeditionary does not necessarily mean amphibious assault in this day and age of long range firepower and surveillance. Not on a large-scale. We may yet have to find a way to deal with China's bases on Hainan Island, but Guadalcanal and Tarawa--no matter how much you want to update technology to adapt--do not provide the template.
I still think that adapting the Marines to support the Army makes them more relevant across a wider spectrum of fighting than hitching their star to images of the Sands of Iwo Jima. What happened to thinking joint? Will they really try to be an entire force to itself?
Further, if the Marines think taking on China's land forces can be done without the Army, guess again. Sure, by focusing on amphibious warfare, they may find that they are called to be the first to fight in the Pacific. But that only gets you as far as winning the first battle. Marines may get there first--but they won't get there with much. And you don't win a war with the few, no matter how proud.
No good can come of this shift of focus by the Marines. If the Army finds itself in a new land war, do the Marines really think they can avoid helping the Army?
And if they can avoid helping the Army, do the Marines think they can avoid budget cuts when they just aren't relevant to the war we are fighting? Ask the Air Force how they've fared the last decade on appropriations. Would the Marines have gotten the V-22 if they weren't bleeding on our battlefields with the Army?
As an aside, noting that Marine casualties are endured at a higher percent than the Army's sacrifice neglects that the Marines rely on Army "tail" to supply their "teeth." Army combat support and combat service support troops behind the wire on forward operating bases--supporting both Army and Marine line units--dilute the Army casualties in comparison to the Marine Corps.
No man is an island. And neither is it the Marine Corps' primary objective. The bell will toll for the Marines, if they believe that is true.
