Shock and Awe

I think that most proponents of a no-fly zone pretty much finally admit what I've been arguing: it will have no material effect on the ground campaign. Armor and artillery have had more impact than air power, and low-flying helicopters probably couldn't be stopped from operating, which could replace airplanes for close air support.

But the proponents still want it for the psychological effects, saying that the sign of Western resolve will convince Khaddafi to halt operations and maybe run away.

Perhaps this would have been true in the first week of revolt when the loyalists were on their heels and the rebels were believed by many to be on the verge of victory. Of course, had we imposed a no-fly zone and the rebels had won, we'd have been accused of needless intervention. But that's another story altogether.

But I don't find the psychological argument compelling now. During the 1990s, Serb militias managed to slaughter enemy civilians quite nicely under our aerial umbrellas. And in the same decade, Saddam managed to slaughter his way to subduing the Shias of the south under our no-fly zone. Saddam even managed a sizable punitive mission against the Kurds despite our no-fly zone (but the Kurds on the ground managed to hold the Iraqis off).

Khaddafi could beat the rebels under the noses of a no-fly zone and I bet he knows it. He has problems that could yet keep him from winning this civil war, but NATO planes grounding his fixed wing combat aircraft is not one of them.