When it comes to the fielded forces, those fielded forces that we can positively identify as a fielded force, as a tank, as an armored personnel carrier, as a treaded rocket launcher, that has the -- that the air crew are able to make a collateral damage estimate that does not put any of the people we are trying to protect at risk, then we are taking those targets under attack as well as the -- any command-and-control facility, any part of the integrated air and missile defense system that we discover up there -- those as well.
So, if the loyalists move around in something no easily identified as a military vehicle, they might get by. If I was in the Libyan military, I'd be installing those multiple rocket launchers on civilian vehicles every chance I got.
And I'd make sure the collateral damage estimate we do is really complicated. Move near or amidst civilians. Hug the enemy close. Hug targets--like mosques, schools, and hospitals--that we (or large parts of the coalition) won't risk hitting.
And disperse anything that can't be shielded with the above tactics, to make it more difficult for coalition forces to hit.
The enemy will adapt to our air power. Enemies always do adapt if they want to keep fighting. That's war--or whatever we're calling this operation. The key (actually, the most basic key is resolving that we want to fight and win) will be how we adapt to how the loyalists evolve their strategy and tactics. Will we?
Or will individual members of the coalition start opting to implement their own exit strategies? Once that starts happening, we can look forward to the day when the coalition of the willing proudly strips Libya of their seat on the UN human rights body and calls it a strong rebuke, reflecting Khaddafi's continued isolation by the world community.
