So, the more North Korea and Pakistan appear likely to become failed states, the more it becomes evident that the international response is constrained by the objective not to let them fail. The international approach toward them thus is to bark but not to bite.
In dealing with North Korea, China, Russia, the United States and Japan do not want to go so far as to cause the collapse of the regime. Although not necessarily motivated by the same interest, these powers are not geopolitically ready for Korean reunification, which will be a logical corollary to the regime collapse in Pyongyang. South Korea, too, is not prepared for that development because it would unleash a torrent of refugees and saddle Seoul with colossal reunification costs, as the continuing domestic costs of German reunification attest. So, not wanting the Stalinist North Korean state to unravel, the external players do little more than pass tough resolutions or statements.
Mostly, the author is wrong by conflating regime collapse with state collapse. They are different.
We all have an interest in promoting regime collapse, I think.
While I'm not so sure that America has an interest in preventing state collapse, South Korea and China certainly don't want state collapse. Japan and Russia are probably in the middle on this. But if state collapse is your worry, there is an alternative to propping up the odious Pyongyang regime under yet another generation of brutal Kims--partition.
[And the title is in reference to Clinton's 1992 campaign focus internal slogan, "it's the economy, stupid",and not a slam at the author. That isn't ancient history to me, but if might not be easily recognizable to many these days.]