This should not be a shock. Iraq killed enough Iranian jihadis to make Iran's morale break in the 1980s Iran-Iraq War (the First Gulf War, as far as I'm concerned). And our surge offensive against al Qaeda in Iraq led to lots of the less-committed jihadis surrendering in Iraq in the late summer of 2007. We also pounded the Mahdi Army into submission.
Yes, in the long run, we need to undermine the ideology that allows for recruiting to make up losses (that's what our democracy promotion is all about), but never underestimate the value of killing the jihadis who are out there killing right now. It is good to kill jihadis. The more the better. Only ineffective application of military force encourages them. Effective military force kills enough so that the discouragement factor on jihadi corpses becomes rather moot, and the survivors are happy enought to skulk off and restrict their jihad to private boasting--at least for a while anyway.
Even though I think Israel blew their opportunity to smash up Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, the Israelis still inflicted great harm on that terrorist organization. They certainly don't seem eager to join the fight this round.
So if Israel is smart, they'll ignore the calls for a ceasefire and pursue victory. Krauthammer speaks of this victory objective:
The fall of Hamas rule in Gaza is within reach, but only if Israel does not cave in to pressure to stop now. Overthrowing Hamas would not require a permanent Israeli reoccupation. A transitional international force would be brought in to immediately make way for the return of the Palestinian Authority, the legitimate government whose forces would be far less squeamish than the Europeans in establishing order in Gaza.
The disintegration of Hamas rule in Gaza would be a devastating blow to Palestinian rejectionists, who since the Hamas takeover of Gaza have been the ascendant "strong horse" in Palestinian politics. It would be a devastating blow to Iran as patron of radical Islamist movements throughout the region, particularly after the defeat and marginalization of Iran's Sadrist client in Iraq. It would encourage the moderate Arab states to continue their U.S.-allied confrontation of Iran and its proxies. And it would demonstrate Israel's irreplaceable strategic value to the United States in curbing and containing Iran's regional ambitions.
Olmert had such an opportunity in Lebanon. He blew it. He now has a rare second chance. The one-step-from-madness gangster theocracy in Gaza -- just four days before the fighting, the Hamas parliament passed a sharia criminal code, legalizing, among other niceties, crucifixion -- is teetering on the brink. It can be brought down, but only if Israel is prepared -- and allowed -- to complete the real mission of this war. For the Bush State Department, in its last significant act, to prevent that with the premature imposition of a cease-fire would be not just self-defeating but shameful.
When you go to war, the objective isn't to craft a ceasefire as soon as you can. The objective should be to win the war. And when Arab governments would be happy enough (if quietly) for Israel to smash Iran's proxy Hamas, when will Israel get a better opportunity to crush Hamas? Remember, this isn't the Cold War when any war involving Israel threatened to escalate into a general war between NATO and the Soviet Union. Ceasefires then made sense since the risks of pursuing victory were too great. Will it be easier for Israel to win when Iran has nuclear missiles? Will it be easier when President Bush leaves office?
Anything less than victory as an objective is just idiotic. Leave the hope and change nonsense to others. Israel needs to keep killing Hamas gunmen until they publicly break Hamas. If Israel does that, I'll believe they've learned the lesson of the 2006 Hezbollah War.
