So I was gratitifed to hear this briefing mention them:
First of all, the security infrastructure battalions really did not have dedicated mobile training teams to them -- to work with them. I put additional teams out of my own organization with those security infrastructure battalions to begin professional training and oversight. Since that time, they've gotten much better.
But to be frank with you, we've had a problem because of the tribal nature of some of those battalions, and we have had to weed out some of the bad eggs, if you will, those that are cooperating with both the insurgents, but also people that are just trying to steal the oil. We have seen the pipelines that run between Kirkuk and Baiji -- increased effectiveness against the interdiction of those pipelines. And we are also doing major operations inside the refinery in Baiji to enhance security and to provide security to the tankers that are hauling a lot of the fuel.
I thought they were called the Facility Protection Force, but no matter. My terminology may be old. General Mixom may have misspoke. He may be speaking about a different force or a distinct portion of the larger force. The point is that these forces exist and carry out an important role that Iraqi or US forces would have to do if these security forces didn't function. They must count in the total of government forces arrayed against the enemies. I'd sure like them to be higher quality, but we aren't fighting Prussians either, remember. And we are addressing their quality. But they never have to be as good as the police or troops out in the field since they have a far more limited and straightforward role.
We have enought to beat the Baathists, jihadis, criminals and Iran's Sadr puppets. It will just take time against a ruthless, well-financed, and well-armed enemy.
