China’s and Russia’s spheres of influence overlap a bit as well. In November 2010, Tang Yongsheng, deputy director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at China’s National Defense University, penned an article in the State Council’s journal Xiandai Guoji Guanxi arguing that as both a Pacific nation and a nation in the heartland of Asia, China needs to pursue a western landward strategy across Eurasia as well as an eastern seaward strategy in the Pacific.
Let the Great Game begin.
We can only hope this is the case. Many years ago I figured we needed to push Chinese attention inland and away from Taiwan and our forces, noting that such a split of interest would compel China to become both a strong land power and a strong sea power, increasing the chance they'd fail at both.
And maybe--just maybe--the thought of Chinese spheres encroaching on Russian spheres will get Russia to stop painting NATO as the threat to Russia. The Russians will beg to join NATO on any terms we want, then.
Of course, I'd still suggest looking at a map and asking if we really want NATO's front line on the Ussuri River facing China.
UPDATE: The just-released Department of Defense report on Chinese military capabilities has a great map of Chinese alternatives to their vulnerable sea lines of communication.
These alternates push China into potential conflict with India in the south (through Burma) and against Russia should there be a dispute over access, plus puts China in the position of needing to deploy significant ground and air power into central Asia to safeguard that route--which also puts them into a potential clash with Russia which also wants influence in that former Soviet area.
See page 41 of the report (or p. 48 of the PDF count).
