In 2011, Taiwan remained the PLA’s most critical potential mission, and the PLA continued to build the capabilities and develop the doctrine necessary to deter the island from asserting its sovereignty; deter, disrupt, or deny effective third-party (including U.S.) intervention in a potential cross-Strait conflict; and defeat Taiwan forces in the event of hostilities.
This is important to remember when you hear people say our military is far more powerful than China's and that China has weaknesses in training and doctrine that make them less than their hardware makes it appear. These are true statements yet irrelevant to China's most critical potential mission.
China just needs to defeat Taiwan to carry out their most critical potential mission. China needs only to deny effective American intervention until China can defeat Taiwan. That's something altogether different from needing to defeat us, isn't it? Just in case you missed the importance of that distinction, the report repeats that truth a bit later on:
Since the early 1980s, China’s leaders have sustained an ambitious and broad-based military modernization program intended to transform the PLA into a modern force. Throughout this modernization drive, Taiwan contingency planning has dominated the agenda. Even though cross-Strait tensions have subsided since 2008, Taiwan remains a critical mission, and the PLA continues building capabilities aimed at Taiwan and at deterring, delaying, or denying possible third party intervention in a cross-Strait conflict.
Once again, let's be clear: China does not see the need (or just figures it is way too soon to plan on the ability) to defeat us--just deter, delay, or deny timely intervention on behalf of Taiwan.
Is this clear? No?
The PLA Navy primarily focuses on improving anti-air and anti-surface warfare capabilities, as well as developing a credible at-sea nuclear deterrent. The additional attack submarines, multi-mission surface combatants, and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve sea superiority within the first island chain and counter any potential third party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.
Hmm. This is starting to sound like a message.
And this is before we get to the section on China's approach to Taiwan, which starts:
Since the election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008 (Ma was re-elected in January 2012), the PRC and Taiwan have significantly improved cross-Strait relations. The two sides have strengthened trade relations and initiated direct links for shipping, passenger flights, and mail delivery across the Taiwan Strait. These links have reduced tension and built momentum for a positive cross-Strait atmosphere. The PRC has made clear that it intends cross-Strait economic and cultural ties
to promote progress toward eventual unification. Simultaneously, the PRC is developing military capabilities to give it the ability to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms. However, Beijing still lacks these capabilities and recognizes the costs and risks associated with a decision to escalate the dispute to the point of conflict.
I find this interesting. Past reports--before the balance in the Taiwan Strait deteriorated more with Chinese advances and stalled Taiwanese modernization--had stated that China could defeat Taiwan in a one-on-one fight if the Chinese were willing to risk the political fallout and endure the casualties needed to prevail. But now the Chinese lack the resources to invade? Why the change? Even though this report confirms that the military balance "continues to trend in Beijing’s favor" in all relevant areas?
Yet despite that minimization of China's invasion capacity, the other military means explored lack the ability to quickly settle the fight before we can intervene, which is a goal that the report calls part of China's assumptions about conflict with China. So central is this Chinese goal for a fight that the report actually says that one alternative "[i]f a quick resolution is not possible" is for China to "delay [American] intervention and seek victory in an overpowering, limited, quick war." Another alternative is to achieve a limited objective short of victory that can be portrayed as victory, assuming China can "fight to a standstill."
Yet despite the claim that Chinese leaders know that they lack the capabilities to invade, echoes of past reports live:
Operationally, large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated maneuvers a military can execute. An attempt to invade Taiwan would strain China’s untested armed forces and invite international condemnation. These stresses, combined with the PRC’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency (assuming a successful landing and breakout), make amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk.
The counter-insurgency angle may be one that deters us these days, but the key for China is taking Taiwan. If they spend two generations after that subduing Taiwan by deporting suspect Taiwanese and importing loyal mainland citizens, they won't care--and we won't be able to interfere while they do it. Or have "Free Tibet" bumper stickers had any effect on Chinese behavior?
And all the other military options described lack the ability to be either decisive or quick. Whatever the difficulties and risks, invasion is the only option that can achieve a victory for China. As a core interest of China and the focus of Chinese military developments, it just might be prudent to assume China will try to invade Taiwan if they decide to use force to settle the Taiwan question.
As an aside, I protest counting Taiwan's sub inventory as 4 boats. Two are so ancient that they are used only for training and I cannot imagine them being capable of operational missions.
