So it is nice to read this in the paper:
The Afghan insurgency has no broad popular base and doesn't mirror an obvious religious or ethnic fault line. It is also far more linked with Pakistani support than the Iraqi insurgency or militias were with Iran. Afghanistan needs a better president, judiciary and police force -- and a Pakistani government that is not playing footsie with the Taliban.
In Afghanistan, the situation can differ radically in provinces just a half-hour helicopter ride away. There has been much recent hysteria about an incident on July 13 when nine American soldiers were killed in an insurgent assault on a combat outpost in Want, in Nuristan (mistakenly reported as taking place in Wanat in neighboring Kunar Province). This was the deadliest attack on American soldiers since 16 troops were killed in Kunar in 2005. It was a tragic event, but does not demonstrate that the American effort in Afghanistan is on the brink of disaster, as some commentators have risibly argued.
Afghanistan does not need a surge, the author states. I agree. I can be persuaded that a brigade or three can accomplish some particular mission, but Afghanistan and Pakistan have too many people to attempt an Iraq-style pacification campaign.
Further, even if appropriate to mirror Iraq, we simply can't supply that many troops in Afghanistan. I'd be wary of risking more than ten percent of our active brigades in that potential Stalingrad pocket.
Besides, other than keeping the country from becoming a training area for al Qaeda, our interests in Afghanistan are more humanitarian than strategic these days. I simply don't aspire to very much out there.
Now, what we do need to do is address Pakistan where the enemy masses, rests, trains, and strikes from. The Pakistanis seem worried that we might invade to knock out the Taliban and al Qaeda:
Over the last week, the Pakistani press has been filled with commentaries warning that American attacks without Pakistan’s permission would further inflame anti-American sentiment, drive more people into the camp of the militants and fatally undermine the already fragile civilian government. Privately, one senior government official said American strikes would produce “chaos.”
But the English-language newspapers have also stressed that the Pakistani government has failed to deal with the Islamic militants, and they have made repeated pleas in recent days for the government and the military to take on the militants before Washington does the job, uninvited.
I, too, would like the Pakistanis to act. And I think it is in their long-term interest to defeat jihadis who would just as readily plant bombs in Pakistani cities as in Afghanistan. But Pakistan does not seem to have the will to act.
So we will act. But not an invasion. Even three more brigades would be swallowed in the vastness of Pakistan's tribal areas. Talk of invading Pakistan is stupid.
But we will act. With a new style of campaign if my hunch is correct, using the concept of the Anbar Awakening within Pakistan's frontier are itself:
Pakistan's refusal to take responsibility for their frontier areas while refusing to let us violate their so-called sovereignty isn't going to last much longer in the face of bin Laden rebuilding his terrorist organization there. ...
It is about more than bin Laden. But without routinely violating the border to attack targets inside Pakistan and without accepting perpetual defense as we do in Iraq in the face of Syrian and Iranian aggression, we may have an opportunity to use a post-Westphalian Lexington Rule to fight al Qaeda in Pakistan.
If we can't get Islamabad to control the frontier area, it is time to bypass Islamabad and deal directly with the tribes who don't recognize the control of Islamabad in the first place. We cannot allow the fictions of sovereignty to keep us from defending ourselves from fanatics who straddle the gray boundary that lies between reality and international law.
Using limited military assets such as special forces and drones to back civilian armed assets such as the CIA or contract personnel (with either former or seconded special forces from Western countries, or perhaps even hiring security companies to provide the personnel) or even Arab special forces that would live and work inside the frontier areas, we may be able to turn the frontier tribes against the jihadis who target us.
Several more brigades would make sure that success in a Pushtun Awakening does not lead to jihadis fleeing freely to Afghanistan. With our increased presence on the Afghan-Pakistan border, the jihadis will be killed if they head west into our blocking positions, hammered by our air power, artillery, and damned fine soldiers and Marines.
We won't be foolish enough to invade Pakistan to get at bin Laden and the Taliban. But we will undertake a campaign in Pakistan. The only question is when we go. I'd prefer a winter campaign that makes enemy movement difficult since if we force them to move from their winter encampments they will die even without fighting. But it will be a year before we get three more brigades in place, I'd think.
So perhaps in fall 2009, we begin the Lexington Campaign.
We aren't losing in Afghanistan--we're about to attempt to win in Pakistan.
UPDATE: Related thoughts by Ralph Peters.
