Chapman pulls out some quotes from the past to bolster his point that our generals are optimistic despite failure:
In November 2003, Gen. John Abizaid, head of U.S. Central Command, said achieving victory would require hard work but said "it will be done." In November 2004, Marine Lt. Gen. John Sattler said we had "broken the back of the insurgency." In March 2006, Abizaid assured us, "We are winning." Three years ago, Petraeus himself said that "18 months after entering Iraq, I see tangible progress."
Despite all these cheery soundings, things didn't improve. That's why this year, the administration was forced to increase our troop strength in Iraq by nearly 25 percent in a desperate attempt to reverse the debacle. If the generals had been right about trends in the past, the surge would not have been needed.
Let's examine these statements:
"In November 2003, Gen. John Abizaid, head of U.S. Central Command, said achieving victory would require hard work but said 'it will be done.' "
Is this proof of false optimism? On its own it is simply a statement of eventual victory after hard work. Who could argue that this is wrong? Only if you assume that the Baathists were destined to win back then. But just focused on Iraq in November 2003, we were making headway against the Baathist resistance. The next month we'd capture Saddam. By February 2004, our losses that month dropped to 20 dead. The Baathist insurgency was dying. It had certainly been turned back from its effort to reclaim control of Iraq.
What of this by Petraeus himself?
"Three years ago, Petraeus himself said that '18 months after entering Iraq, I see tangible progress.'"
This would be September 2004. This would be after we stopped the jihadi-Sadr offensives that began in spring and finished up in August with the suppression of the second Sadr revolt. We had turned back this combination's attempt to seize power in the face of a passive Shia majority suspicious of our motives and inflicted heavy casualties on those enemies.
What about three months later?
"In November 2004, Marine Lt. Gen. John Sattler said we had 'broken the back of the insurgency.'"
I am fairly certain that Sattler was discussing the capture of Fallujah and the killing and dispersal of al Qaeda and related jihadis. We did break the back of the jihadis there. This was their so-called liberated zone, and we crushed them in direct battle despite their boasts that we would not dare challenge them in the streets of their fortress.
Coming after the previous eight months of jihadi offensives and killing which succeeded only in turning the Shias away from the jihadis, the conquest of Fallujah punctuated the end of the jihadi threat to take over Iraq.
During 2005 and 2006, the jihadis fell back and tried to carve out a state in Sunni Anbar province. This was an enemy success but it was a success in a smaller objective. In a deadlocked fight with our Marine-led force out there, we demonstrated our mettle and made progress in Ramadi which the jihadis had infiltrated and dominated. And the jihadis proceeded to outrage and persecute the local Sunni Arabs enough to spark the Anbar Awakening which led to the Sunni Arabs turning on al Qaeda in Iraq and siding with our forces.
And there's this:
"In March 2006, Abizaid assured us, 'We are winning.'"
An Iraqi government was beginning to grow under a new constitution. Although the bombing of the Golden Dome mosque the previous month had raised civilian deaths and inpsired the fear of a civil war, by March there was a (temporary) dip in civilian casualties. It looked like we'd dodged this bullet. The Baathists were defeated. The jihadis were defeated. And the Sadrists were defeated. All still fought on and killed but they'd taken their shots at seizing control and lost them. It looked like we'd be able to phase out our combat role while the new Iraqi government dealt with Sadr as an internal political problem.
So with these explanations in mind, is Chapman correct when he says this:
"Despite all these cheery soundings, things didn't improve. That's why this year, the administration was forced to increase our troop strength in Iraq by nearly 25 percent in a desperate attempt to reverse the debacle. If the generals had been right about trends in the past, the surge would not have been needed."
These statements by our generals in my mind were not cheery, but they were accurate. The trend has been to turn back attempts by Baathists and related nationalist Sunnis, al Qaeda and domestic jihadis, and Shia Sadrists to seize power. All the while the Iraqi government and security forces got bigger and better. This is not the record of a debacle. So the surge is not a desperate measure.
The reason the surge is needed is not because past statements of success were wrong, but because we don't face one single enemy in Iraq. After each success by our forces against the primary military threat, another threat has taken the lead.
Sadr and his Shia militias were supposed to be a political problem by 2006. Unfortunately, Iran then increased their support and direct control of Shia death squads. The increased death toll by Iranian-supplied EFPs has masked the decline of our military deaths from declining enemies. And the defeated but still murderous jihadis and other Sunnis backed by Syria and Iran add to the death toll caused by the Iranian-backed Shia death squads.
So our current surge aims to cut down the al Qaeda in Iraq forces to halt their attacks on Shias, take down Sadr's death squads to keep them from killing Sunnis, cut up Iranian agents who fuel the death toll, block the movement of insurgent and terrorist weapons to Baghdad from the Baghdad Belts, and so calm things so the Sunni Arabs will in essence surrender and the Shias will accept that surrender without wiping the Sunni Arabs out in revenge.
We have gone through a number of phases in this war. Beginning in the fall we will start to draw down the surge forces and the last phase of American combat dominance will come to an end. The next phase starting in the latter half of 2008 will see us begin the transition to Iraqis. And then Iraq will fight on its own with only our combat support elements filling in gaps in Iraqi capabilites for logistics and firepower. Hopefully all the Iraqis will unite to fight and defeat the Persian invaders and solidify a single though non-unitary Iraqi state.
The gangs of Iraq will then remain to be defeated. And corruption remains to be defeated to promote a real democracy.
And at this point, I can't rule out another battlefield enemy rising up. Though given who we've fought and beaten, I don't know what it could be other than an invasion by Turkish, Iranian, or Syrian conventional forces.
But that doesn't mean that our successes up to now are false or any less significant. Our generals have told the truth within acceptable parameters (with allowances made for slanting it to help encourage victory, which is their job).
We are winning. We have not yet won. We just need time to finish the job. So surge patience and we will win.
