We will need to keep special forces to help kill al Qaeda. And we will need air power to support the Iraqis and logistics troops, too. And all the other combat support and combat service support functions that we are trying to build. Plus a cavalry regiment to screen the Iranian border and several brigade combat teams as a reserve and to deter the Iranians. Add a battalion task force in Kuwait, an afloat MEU, and several brigade sets of Army equipment and an afloat Marine set, and we'd have a potent force tethered to the defense of Iraq. Add, too, a parachute brigade in Italy and a Stryker brigade in Europe that can be flown into the area quickly. And yes, I've downgraded my assessment of what Congress will allow to remain in Iraq from a seven brigades to four with unit sets of prepositioned equipment to bring us up to seven or more by flying in troops. Oh, and add FBI help to fight corruption and other civilian assets to help the courts and the entire rule of law project.
I didn't mention trainers but I assumed this function.
If we can't maintain a long-term presence, we risk losing as we did in Vietnam when our home front refused to go the last few steps for victory after a long journey at high cost in blood and treasure. The surge cannot provide quick victory for a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaign.
General Petraeus knows well that the surge can't provide victory in a year or two let alone by September (though I believe we are winning and were winning, slowly, even before the surge. Our change in strategy is more significant than the extra troops)
Asserting steady, albeit slow, military and political progress, Petraeus said that the "many, many challenges" would not be resolved "in a year or even two years." Similar counterinsurgency operations, he said, citing Britain's experience in Northern Ireland, "have gone at least nine or 10 years." He said he and Crocker would make "some recommendations on the way ahead" to Congress, and that it was realistic to assume "some form of long-term security arrangement" with Iraq.
Our military is looking at the post-surge American military presence in Iraq.
Such a long-term presence would have four major components. The centerpiece would be a reinforced mechanized infantry division of around 20,000 soldiers assigned to guarantee the security of the Iraqi government and to assist Iraqi forces or their U.S. advisers if they get into fights they can't handle.The total would be about 50,000. The Army component looks to be 4-5 brigades. About what I assume right now for our long-term presence. This 50,000 doesn't include Air Force elements, it appears. Add this and we are getting close to the size of the force I assumed we'd need to protect Iraq when I looked ahead back in 2002, about 75,000 (with 7 old-style brigades of 5,000 troops each).
Second, a training and advisory force of close to 10,000 troops would work with Iraqi military and police units. "I think it would be very helpful to have a force here for a period of time to continue to help the Iraqis train and continue to build their capabilities," Odierno said.
In addition, officials envision a small but significant Special Operations unit focused on fighting the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq. "I think you'll retain a very robust counterterror capability in this country for a long, long time," a Pentagon official in Iraq said.
Finally, the headquarters and logistical elements to command and supply such a force would total more than 10,000 troops, plus some civilian contractors.
We've accomplished so much so far. The last 100 yards of any advance are the most dangerous. It would be a crime if we faltered in the last rush.
