Wednesday, July 23, 2008

This Will Leave a Mark

Lileks is back.

Now this is a screed.

I almost felt sorry for Garrison Keillor.

Almost.

OK. Not at all.

Alright, I'm disappointed that the pen isn't as physically damaging as the sword.

The Blonde Leading the Blind

As an example of both how bad much of our elite press is and how divorced from reality our "reality-based community" is, this is amazing. First, the question by Katie Couric:

But talking microcosmically, did the surge, the addition of 30,000 additional troops ... help the situation in Iraq?


I thoroughly checked my DOD dictionary (danger: 780 pages of PDF), but could find nothing about "microcosmically" analyzing military campaigns. I am at a total loss to even understand the question. Still, I should at least give credit for the surprising line of questioning that Couric made to actually get an answer. An incoherent answer, to be sure, but an answer that well reflects his hard core base.

Of course, being thrown off by that word might excuse the response, I suppose, that denied any success for our surge in Iraq:

Katie, I have no idea what would have happened had we applied my approach, which was to put more pressure on the Iraqis to arrive at a political reconciliation. So this is all hypotheticals. What I can say is that there's no doubt that our U.S. troops have contributed to a reduction of violence in Iraq. I said that-- not just today, not just yesterday, but I've said that-- previously. What that doesn't change is that we've got to have a different strategic approach if we're going to make America as safe as possible.


So microcosmically, the issue of the surge is hypothetical. Except that without the money, troops, and strategy applied to Iraq for the surge strategy, Iraq could be much better today.

I've said it before and I'll say it again, few on the Left understand anything about the military. They may be good and decent people. They may have well-grounded and thought out positions on a variety of domestic and foreign policy areas (though I may disagree with those positions). But when it comes to military matters, most on the Left simply have opinions based on virtually no knowledge at all on the subject matter.

Wait, I think I understand "microcosmically" now: tiny brain off in its own universe. That explains the press aristocracy, anyway! Now can we research the certitude of our Left on war?

We are Not Losing in Afghanistan

I get tired of reading the comments of our Panicky American community every few months that we are losing in Afghansitan. They've been shrieking this prediction for nearly seven years now, beginning in the first week of Operation Enduring Freedom.

So it is nice to read this in the paper:


The Afghan insurgency has no broad popular base and doesn't mirror an obvious religious or ethnic fault line. It is also far more linked with Pakistani support than the Iraqi insurgency or militias were with Iran. Afghanistan needs a better president, judiciary and police force -- and a Pakistani government that is not playing footsie with the Taliban.

In Afghanistan, the situation can differ radically in provinces just a half-hour helicopter ride away. There has been much recent hysteria about an incident on July 13 when nine American soldiers were killed in an insurgent assault on a combat outpost in Want, in Nuristan (mistakenly reported as taking place in Wanat in neighboring Kunar Province). This was the deadliest attack on American soldiers since 16 troops were killed in Kunar in 2005. It was a tragic event, but does not demonstrate that the American effort in Afghanistan is on the brink of disaster, as some commentators have risibly argued.


Afghanistan does not need a surge, the author states. I agree. I can be persuaded that a brigade or three can accomplish some particular mission, but Afghanistan and Pakistan have too many people to attempt an Iraq-style pacification campaign.

Further, even if appropriate to mirror Iraq, we simply can't supply that many troops in Afghanistan. I'd be wary of risking more than ten percent of our active brigades in that potential Stalingrad pocket.

Besides, other than keeping the country from becoming a training area for al Qaeda, our interests in Afghanistan are more humanitarian than strategic these days. I simply don't aspire to very much out there.

Now, what we do need to do is address Pakistan where the enemy masses, rests, trains, and strikes from. The Pakistanis seem worried that we might invade to knock out the Taliban and al Qaeda:


Over the last week, the Pakistani press has been filled with commentaries warning that American attacks without Pakistan’s permission would further inflame anti-American sentiment, drive more people into the camp of the militants and fatally undermine the already fragile civilian government. Privately, one senior government official said American strikes would produce “chaos.”

But the English-language newspapers have also stressed that the Pakistani government has failed to deal with the Islamic militants, and they have made repeated pleas in recent days for the government and the military to take on the militants before Washington does the job, uninvited.


I, too, would like the Pakistanis to act. And I think it is in their long-term interest to defeat jihadis who would just as readily plant bombs in Pakistani cities as in Afghanistan. But Pakistan does not seem to have the will to act.

So we will act. But not an invasion. Even three more brigades would be swallowed in the vastness of Pakistan's tribal areas. Talk of invading Pakistan is stupid.

But we will act. With a new style of campaign if my hunch is correct, using the concept of the Anbar Awakening within Pakistan's frontier are itself:


Pakistan's refusal to take responsibility for their frontier areas while refusing to let us violate their so-called sovereignty isn't going to last much longer in the face of bin Laden rebuilding his terrorist organization there. ...

It is about more than bin Laden. But without routinely violating the border to attack targets inside Pakistan and without accepting perpetual defense as we do in Iraq in the face of Syrian and Iranian aggression, we may have an opportunity to use a post-Westphalian Lexington Rule to fight al Qaeda in Pakistan.

If we can't get Islamabad to control the frontier area, it is time to bypass Islamabad and deal directly with the tribes who don't recognize the control of Islamabad in the first place. We cannot allow the fictions of sovereignty to keep us from defending ourselves from fanatics who straddle the gray boundary that lies between reality and international law.

Using limited military assets such as special forces and drones to back civilian armed assets such as the CIA or contract personnel (with either former or seconded special forces from Western countries, or perhaps even hiring security companies to provide the personnel) or even Arab special forces that would live and work inside the frontier areas, we may be able to turn the frontier tribes against the jihadis who target us.


Several more brigades would make sure that success in a Pushtun Awakening does not lead to jihadis fleeing freely to Afghanistan. With our increased presence on the Afghan-Pakistan border, the jihadis will be killed if they head west into our blocking positions, hammered by our air power, artillery, and damned fine soldiers and Marines.

We won't be foolish enough to invade Pakistan to get at bin Laden and the Taliban. But we will undertake a campaign in Pakistan. The only question is when we go. I'd prefer a winter campaign that makes enemy movement difficult since if we force them to move from their winter encampments they will die even without fighting. But it will be a year before we get three more brigades in place, I'd think.

So perhaps in fall 2009, we begin the Lexington Campaign.

We aren't losing in Afghanistan--we're about to attempt to win in Pakistan.

UPDATE: Related thoughts by Ralph Peters.

Talking Has Worked Out Well for Iran

The Iranians are apparently planning for years of talks in multiple stages regarding the nuclear issue:

"The paper calls for a huge exercise in talking," the Times quoted an unnamed senior European official as saying. "If you were to try to implement it, it would take a minimum of several years."

The newspaper said it obtained a copy but did not say how, and added that Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Kisliak, "could not suppress a laugh when he read it, according to one participant."


I thought the mere mention of hope and change would have convinced the Iranians to settle the issue early next year.

But talks with the EU have bought Iran five years so far. Why shouldn't the Iranians think they can string things out for years longer if America--thinking like proper Europeans--joins the talks next year in earnest?

It should be long enough for Iran to go nuclear, eh?

Tuesday, July 22, 2008

So They Hate Pakistanis and Cartoons, Too

Please, after more than six years at war against crazed Islamo-fascist nutballs, can we finally stop worrying about what we do or don't do to inspire them to fits of beheading orgies?

A senior al-Qaida leader has urged Pakistanis to help Afghans fight U.S.-led coalition forces and condemned President Pervez Musharraf for arresting Arab and Afghan fighters and handing them over to Washington.

In a rare on-camera interview given to Pakistan's Geo TV and broadcast late Monday, Mustafa Abu al-Yazeed reiterated al-Qaida's claim of responsibility for the June 2 suicide car bombing on the Danish embassy in Islamabad that killed six people.


What doesn't set them off?

Just kill the bastards.

I Gotta Go Kill These Guys First

The details of the battle in Wanat are so confusing that it may not even have been at Wanat but in Want in another province altogether:

There has been much recent hysteria about an incident on July 13 when nine American soldiers were killed in an insurgent assault on a combat outpost in Want, in Nuristan (mistakenly reported as taking place in Wanat in neighboring Kunar Province).


One thing that was not confusing to me, however, was that our troops must have put up one hell of a fight in very desperate conditions. A lot of well-earned medals for heroism will come out of this fight, I figured.

The enemy pressed the attack with exceptional vigor. I didn't know the half of it:

Outnumbered but not outgunned, a platoon-plus element of soldiers with 2nd Platoon, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team accompanied by Afghan soldiers engaged in a fistfight of a firefight.


I can't do justice to all that the article describes without just copying the entire piece. The enemy clearly wanted a massacre of an entire American unit and persisted in their attack instead of running. So read the conclusion and then read the details:

"It was some of the bravest stuff I’ve ever seen in my life, and I will never see it again because those guys," Stafford said, then paused. "Normal humans wouldn’t do that. You’re not supposed to do that — getting up and firing back when everything around you is popping and whizzing and trees, branches coming down and sandbags exploding and RPGs coming in over your head … It was a fistfight then, and those guys held ’ em off."

Stafford offered a guess as to why his fellow soldiers fought so hard.

"Just hardcoreness I guess," he said. "Just guys kicking ass, basically. Just making sure that we look scary enough that you don’t want to come in and try to get us."


Far more of the enemy are dead rather than scared, but point taken. It has been years since our jihadi enemies derided us as 15,000-foot warriors and invited us to close quarter combat.

Lesser troops would have folded and been slaughtered or led off to be tortured and killed on video. The paratroopers of 173rd Airborne Brigade held a hasty position against high odds and denied our enemies a victory that they very clearly desperately wanted.

Shifting

As I suspected, we will probably draw down our combat brigades in Iraq by one this year:

Iraq's security has improved so much, even as US troop levels have dropped, that President Bush seems likely to order thousands more soldiers home by year's end.

That was not the widespread view only three months ago when Bush announced there would be a temporary halt to troop reductions once the last of five "surge" brigades left Iraq this month. Many believed the country would remain too fragile to justify thinning American combat lines before 2009.

However, two weeks of observing US and Iraqi troops in and around Baghdad, coupled with Associated Press interviews with commanders and planners, suggest a likelihood that Bush will move to reduce the US force by perhaps another combat brigade, or roughly 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers, toward the end of the year. More cuts seem possible next year, but the scale and timing will depend on who replaces Bush in the White House.


As a further guess, I'd say that early in the new year, we draw down an additional Army brigade and a Marine regimental combat team. The replacement Marine unit will go to Afghanistan.

If present trends continue, of course.

Monday, July 21, 2008

Same Debate. Different Subject

Remember the Iraqi political benchmarks of early last year? The ones that Iraq has largely met?

Iraq missed the original Congressional deadline and the anti-war leadership in Congress tried to use the failure to fully meet those goals as an excuse to abandon Iraqis to their jihadi and militia enemies.

I argued they were useful as goals to push the Iraqis to meet, but that deadlines were not a tactic to ensure victory.

But however late, the benchmarks were reached and Iraq is emerging as a victory in the war on terror, with al Qaeda and Iran's proxies down and out.

So now, anti-war advocates want a hard deadline while war supporters want no such thing. The Iraqis won't insist on hard deadlines and we don't want them:

The White House said Monday that a planned US-Iraq long-term strategic agreement will not include a specific date for a withdrawal of US combat troops.

"What it will not do is have any sort date tied to combat troops, like how many American troops would be in Iraq at X date. That would not be included," spokeswoman Dana Perino told reporters.

But the pact is expected to include an "aspirational date" for Iraqis to take over security for all of the war-torn country's provinces, she said amid a confused back and forth between Baghdad and Washington on the issue.

"It might be something along the lines of 'we think that Iraq would be able to take over its security for all of its provinces by this aspirational date,'" Perino said.

"But I don't know exactly how it's going to read, but it would not include anything about troop levels," she said amid a bitter back and forth on the issue between the leading US presidential hopefuls ahead of November elections.


So, if these aspirational goals are met by various dates, we could then--based on the conditions on the ground--pull troops back to bases inside Iraq or pull them out completely.

If the goals are not met, we keep working the problem so the Iraqis can meet the goals without pulling troops back or out.

Always remember, the "pro-war" side wants to end the war by winning. The anti-war side just wants out and they don't have any particular investment in winning. Indeed, some on the Left hope to ride our defeat to political victory at home. That didn't work so well in the long run after Vietnam, but who said our Left was historically minded?

What Diminished Threat?

Boy are we sending mixed messages:


The U.S. has turned down a Taiwan attempt to buy 66 late model F-16 fighters. These would have cost about $75 million each. The deal was strongly opposed by China, and the U.S. justified its refusal to sell the jets by pointing out that a newly elected, more pro-China government, in Taiwan, diminished the threat of a Chinese invasion. It's also possible that the U.S. is rewarding China for help in negotiations with North Korea over the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Then again, whoever really knows, isn't talking.


So we are telling Taiwan that if they "increase tensions" by hinting at independence we will sell arms to them? But if Taiwan makes nice with Peking, we won't sell arms because lower tensions mean less likelihood of war?

Even though China seems to be no less intent on conquering Taiwan despite their charm offensive?

In the short run, this arms refusal doesn't matter. No new arms purchases can have any effect on a near-term conflict. It takes too long to integrate them into Taiwanese forces. (Now maybe if we'd sold them all this stuff back in 2001 ... But then Ma's KMT was blocking arms sales.) Maybe we are really thinking about all the angles and just want to get Taiwan through a danger period until we are better able to fend off China.

Or maybe we're just making a mistake thinking that we can trade away degrees of safety for a democratic ally on Taiwan for the hope of progress on North Korea's nuclear programs.

Of course, the only ones talking are those like me who really don't know what is going on.

Standard Operating Procedures

I have expressed confusion over the battle at Wanat, Afghanistan, where we lost 9 soldiers. Where were the troops killed? Why was the base so poorly situated? Why abandon the base and give the enemy a victory?

Well, as it turns out the press got the story wrong and our military actually just did what it was supposed to do. From Strategypage:

American troops in Afghanistan are not happy with how a July 13th battle with the Taliban was reported. In that action, some 200 Taliban attacked a U.S. “base” and killed or wounded more than half the 50 or so U.S. and Afghan troops found there. Actual U.S. casualties were nine dead and fifteen wounded (including walking wounded).

U.S. troops were irked that, once again, the mass media got lazy and didn’t bother to report the action accurately. For one thing, there was no “base”. What the Taliban attacked was a temporary parking area for vehicles used to conduct patrols of the area. These are set up regularly, and have been used for years. These are secure areas, but basically a parking lot surrounded by barbed wire and several sandbagged observation posts. This one was set a few days before the attack, and was due to be taken down soon, as the patrol activity moved to another area.


The "base" was no base at all. Which is why we "abandoned" it. We "abandon" "bases" all the time, I imagine, as we move around.

Perhaps reporters thought it was a base because, like the Romans, we dig in whenever we stop moving. Other armies break out the cigarettes and rations when they stop, so when an enemy attacks, the troops get overrun and killed. We prepared and so saved the unit. The press does not understand what we do and so thought our temporary preparations amounted to a "base."

Which makes holding that position all the more impressive.

So really, our military peformed as professionals as they were trained; and our professional press corps doesn't understand what it is reporting on.

Standard operating procedures, all around.

Sunday, July 20, 2008

Just What is the Point?

China is engaged in a charm offensive toward the Taiwanese people. Tourism, sympathy for China's earthquake victims, business ties. Taiwan's Ma Ying-jeou campaigned on better relations with China, but what is the point?

Taiwan's president isn't satisfied with the military and diplomatic status quo despite the Chinese charm offensive:


Ma said China must address the issue of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the World Health Organisation, and must remove the missiles deployed in recent years on China’s Fujian coast facing Taiwan. “There are more than 1,000 missiles targeting Taiwan. We cannot negotiate with China under military threat,” Ma said.


Ma will find that China is not interested in any steps that imply Chinese recognition of Taiwan or reduce the threat that China's military can pose to Taiwanese independence.

Missiles will remain pointed at Taiwan. And China will constrict Taiwan's international space as much as possible to deny Taiwan any semblance of internaional recognition.

So who exactly is being charmed by the Chinese?

And why are the Chinese bothering to charm the Taiwanese when Peking will not address Ma's concerns?

It is very odd.

Ready to Lose the Only War We Have

I can only assume that the recent panic focused on Afghanistan is based on the ongoing success in Iraq. The domestic urge to panic is constant, so when you squeeze the balloon in Iraq it comes out in Afghanistan.

The overall level of violence in Afghanistan is down, as far as I can tell. Although civilian casualties are up as the enemy targets civilians instead of our troops. And with more of our troops in Afghanistan acting more aggressively along the border with Pakistan, it is natural that there will be more combat and more US casualties. Remember that the enemy is suffering heavily, too. Pakistan's failure to police their side of the border plus al Qaeda's decision to focus on Afghanistan after losing in Iraq make the border area more dangerous.

General Petraeus has noted signs of the al Qaeda shift:

He said there are signs that foreign fighters recruited by al-Qaida to do battle in Iraq are being diverted to the largely ungoverned areas in Pakistan from which the fighters can cross into Afghanistan. U.S. officials have pressed Pakistan for more than a year to halt the cross-border infiltration. It remains a major worry not only for the war in Afghanistan but also for Pakistan's stability.


And Ralph Peters comments on what I've been hammering at for a while now:

The partisan hacks who insisted that Iraq was a distraction from fighting al Qaeda have missed the situation's irony: Things are getting worse in Afghanistan and Pakistan not because our attention was elsewhere, but because al Qaeda has been driven from the Arab world, with nowhere else to go.

Al Qaeda isn't fighting to revive the Caliphate these days. It's fighting for its life.

Unwelcome even in Sudan or Syria, the Islamist fanatics have retreated to remote mountain villages and compounds on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border. That means Afghanistan's going to remain a difficult challenge for years to come - not a mission-impossible, but an aggravating one.


Pakistan is the problem now--not Afghanistan. Pakistan-based gunmen flow into Afghanistan where they kill and die, but the problem is not basically about Afghanistan. Which is the problem.

I once thought that the Pakistanis had finally figured out that they could not keep making deals with the jihadis. I thought that al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq and failure to gain traction anywhere else meant that we would witness a final jihad in Pakistan as the Pakistanis destroyed the jihadi sanctuary in the frontier areas:

If Pakistan may finally realize that they cannot make deals with jihadis, al Qaeda and their jihadi Taliban allies may be waging war on Pakistan because they have no choice.

If Pakistan will fight this war with no quarter, this could be the final jihad.


But sadly, the Pakistanis keep shrinking from this logical step and hope they can get the jihadis in Pakistan to leave the Pakistani cities alone and go and die in Afghanistan instead.

Not that we can't finally push Pakistan to waging a war without quarter against the jihadis. If we can engineer a Tribal Awakening movement in the frontier areas with a Lexington Campaign, we might defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban in the frontier areas:

If we can't get Islamabad to control the frontier area, it is time to bypass Islamabad and deal directly with the tribes who don't recognize the control of Islamabad in the first place. We cannot allow the fictions of sovereignty to keep us from defending ourselves from fanatics who straddle the gray boundary that lies between reality and international law.

Using limited military assets such as special forces and drones to back civilian armed assets such as the CIA or contract personnel (with either former or seconded special forces from Western countries, or perhaps even hiring security companies to provide the personnel) or even Arab special forces that would live and work inside the frontier areas, we may be able to turn the frontier tribes against the jihadis who target us.


This might have the effect of driving the jihadis into Pakistan's cities where the jihadis will naturally try to kill Pakistani civilians. Then, with the threat right in their faces, Pakistan's leaders may finally recognize that they have no choice but to fight the jihadis.

We have problems in the theater, but Afghanistan is not an imminent disaster. We need to work the problem and not get our panties in a twist.

Just remember, before our Left can turn on the Afghanistan War and attempt to lose this newly bad war, they have to portray it as unwinnable.

Please, don't tell me that you actually believed the anti-Iraq War side was really resolute in wanting to win in Afghanistan?

Saturday, July 19, 2008

Down and Out

Al Qaeda in Iraq is on the ropes with the home office in Pakistan refusing to return the calls of their Iraqi pals. Al Qaeda seems to be downgrading the Iraq Front:

"We do think that there is some assessment ongoing as to the continued viability of al-Qaida's fight in Iraq," Gen. David Petraeus told The Associated Press in an interview at his office at the U.S. Embassy.

Whatever the result, Petraeus said no one should expect al-Qaida to give up entirely in Iraq.

"They're not going to abandon Iraq. They're not going to write it off. None of that," he said. "But what they certainly may do is start to provide some of those resources that would have come to Iraq to Pakistan, possibly Afghanistan."


So we have to make sure the Iraqis can chase down al Qaeda thugs and provide whatever help we can. This will be more of a special forces-led operation as long as the Iraqis can keep al Qaeda from grouping in any geographic area.

The Iranians, who have been driven from Iraq in large measure, are still trying to push their people and weapons into Iraq. Major General Oates described how we will focus on the border with Iran to shut down this smuggling route to prevent Iran from having a free hand in restarting violence:

For much of the war, U.S. and Iraqi forces were focused mainly on al-Qaida and other insurgent forces that threatened to plunge the country into all-out civil war. Shiite extremist groups inside Iraq took advantage of that narrow focus to develop a network of weapons supply routes from Iran, he said.

"Now that al-Qaida is hurt very badly, we're able to shift our emphasis and take a look at this other threat — and this is a significant threat that these Iranian-based extremist groups are attempting" to carry out, he said, not only by killing American troops but also seeking to topple the Iraqi government.

Oates called the weapons smuggling from Iran "the last remaining major threat" to be handled for Iraq.


I'd be more specific and call them the last remaining armed major threat. We still have corruption to address as part of our effort to keep quarrels in Iraq limited to political means within a democratic system based on rule of law.

So just think of the defeat of this armed threat as a mission to be accomplished. We have more missions to go.

But even as the anti-war side claims Iraqis (or perhaps all Arabs--I'm not sure how their supposedly progressive nature judges this) are incapable of democracy, remember that they said that we were incapable of defeating the various enemies inside Iraq aided and paid for by Iran and Sunni Arabs.

At the end of the day, however, I'm sure all Americans can rejoice that we've defeated the killers inside Iraq and have them on the run. Surely no American would want to risk losing this accomplishment, right?

You Can't Say We Didn't Try

Well, those talks with Iran were fun:

A U.S. decision to bend policy and sit down with Iran at nuclear talks fizzled Saturday, with Iran stonewalling Washington and five other world powers on their call to freeze uranium enrichment.

In response, the six gave Iran two weeks to respond to their demand, setting the stage for a new round of U.N. sanctions.

Iran's refusal to consider suspending enrichment was an indirect slap at the United States, which had sent Undersecretary of State William Burns to the talks in hopes the first-time American presence would encourage Tehran into making concessions.


After five years of Europeans chatting with the Iranians, at least our involvement led to a time limit on Iran's reply. It's been one long "no" thus far, so I don't expect the Iranians to abandon their drive for nuclear weapons just because one of our diplomats was sitting there. I know our Left has said that our mere appearance would make Iranians melt and give up their nuclear ambitions, but were some of our diplomats that deluded? Sorry. Asked and answered.

So we talked. Or just listended, depending on who you believe. Nothing changed. I say we leave the talks to the Europeans who seem to enjoy that sort of thing and start preparing to destroy the mullah regime and actually do something about the gathering threat.

On the bright side, at least we're checking off those boxes on the "last resort" before going to war list.

Friday, July 18, 2008

A Dramatic Shift in ... Vocabulary

The United States and Iraq may have a rough framework to conclude a status of forces agreement by the end of the month to govern our forces in Iraq and their level over time:

President Bush and Iraq's prime minister have agreed to set a "general time horizon" for bringing more U.S. troops home from the war, a dramatic shift from the administration's once-ironclad unwillingness to talk about any kind of deadline or timetable.

The announcement Friday put Bush in the position of offering to talk with Iraqi leaders about a politically charged issue that he adamantly has refused to discuss with the Democratic-led Congress at home. It also could complicate the presidential campaign arguments of Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack Obama who have staked out starkly opposite stands about the unpopular war.


I don't think this is anywhere nearly as dramatic as the article makes out. A "general time horizon" sounds vague enough to allow Iraqi leaders to mollify domestic critics who worry that we won't leave when not needed and allow us to actually stay long enough to both nail down a battlefield victory and to help build an Iraqi democracy.

And if I may be so bold to point this out, there is no contradiction between talking to Iraqis about our forces leaving Iraq and refusing to talk to the Pelosi- and Reid-led Congress about the exact same topic. Quite simply, the difference is that Iraqis want to win the war and so have no reason to talk about a timetable as a means of losing the war. Look me in the eye and tell me Pelosi and Reid are committed to winning the war--or even vaguely interested in that result.

So what will the "time table" look like? Bush and Maliki set forth a general focus:

The two leaders agreed that improvements in security should allow for the negotiations "to include a general time horizon for meeting aspirational goals, such as the resumption of Iraqi security control in their cities and provinces and the further reduction of U.S. combat forces from Iraq," the White House said.


So it looks like goals rather than strict dates to draw down. If an "aspirational goal" is met, then some troops will come home. If the aspirational goal is not met, we keep working with the troop level stable until the goal is met. It might be tough for a future president determined to retreat to insist that an aspirational goal is met when it is not.

Maliki's confidence from our recent winning record will take him only so far in negotiations. Yes, Maliki needs to silence critics at home and give supporters a reason to support the agreement. But Maliki needs a good agreement that keeps us fighting at his side. Does Maliki really think he can wait for the next administration to get a deal that will provide more security? That sounds awfully risky to me.

It would be foolish to have a strict timetable. I don't believe that the Iraqis are going to insist on something like that. But the wording will be vague enough to make it look that way.

Kampfgruppe Victory

The latest buzz is whether we've won in Iraq (see here for example). Yes, terrorists are still there and militias could become a greater a problem if we let up, but corruption and rule of law are fast becoming bigger issues than these declining internal armed threats. The former can be fought by Iraqi forces with decreasing direct US action over time. The latter will need our help for years to come. And we need to base 4-5 combat brigades and aircraft for external defense for a decade, I should think, unless Iran and Syria become friendly countries before then.

Ever fearful of the many ways our Congress could snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, I'm hesitant to say more than that we are clearly winning. Sure, the anti-war side that just wants to end the war isn't happy that President Bush chose a course to end the war by winning it, but it is ending. It would look bad for the anti-war side to complain too loudly about that inconvenient aspect. And there seems like less and less chance that we could blow the battlefield victory with stupid actions in Washington.

Nor do I see any other armed threat waiting to take the place of al Qaeda or the Mahdi Army. Absent direct Syrian or Iranian intervention with conventional forces, only open revolt by existing Iraqi forces (army, police, or Kurdish regional forces) could pose an armed threat to the Iraqi government.

I guarantee that President Bush won't declare victory given the unfair hammering he took in 2003.

But there is a way to declare victory in Iraq without the words. We should convince the Iraqis to send an infantry battalion to Afghanistan. We want to send more US troops but we can't shake loose more than a single complete brigade until next year probably, so if we want to send something to Afghanistan in 2008 that isn't taken from Iraq, it will have to be odds and sods.

So why not send a provisional brigade to Afghanistan composed of one Iraqi infantry battalion and one American infantry battalion plus American support formations to round out the unit? It could be for a seven month tour to bridge the gap until we can flow American brigades. We wouldn't ask Iraq for more than one tour. And maybe it would shame some of our NATO allies into letting their soldiers fight in Afghanistan.

Imagine the signal that would send about Iraq's place in the world. From an enemy to ally in the Long War in less than six years. That would sure look like victory, eh?

Only We Can Do the Job

While I am coming to the conclusion that we won't initiate any aerial campaign against Iran until they roll out a missile that glows brightly enough for the New York Times to see, when that time comes, this will be a weeks long campaign that will be far more intense than the Kosovo War in 1999.

Ralph Peters thinks that Israel can do no more than hit Iran's nuclear facilities while it will be necessary to hit a broad target set to blunt an Iranian counter-attack. Peters sets forth the target sets.

I think his list is too short, as I wrote two and a half years ago.

Yes, such a campaign may make Iranians hate us, as Peters writes. So it is hardly ideal. But perhaps not for long. Our Left got over their "we're all Americans, now" moment within a couple years of the 9/11 attacks. I bet another attack on our country would lead large portions of the Left to argue Bush is responsible.

And as I've said many times, why would it be superior to have Iran's mullahs armed with nuclear weapons ruling a population that likes us over an Iran defanged with their people angry at us? I repeat, I will not take much comfort that the Iranian people are really sad that Iran nuked Charleston.

Unless we get lucky, there is no easy solution to the Iran problem. And an aerial attack would be no surgical strike that quickly and cheaply ends the problem.

Thursday, July 17, 2008

This is Unworthy of a Great Nation

This had best be a false rumor:

The United States will announce in the next month that it plans to establish a diplomatic presence in Tehran for the first time in 30 years, a British newspaper said on Thursday.


Unless CENTCOM establishes our presence, we should stay out of Iran as long as the mullahs rule in Tehran.

Why deliver hostages to Tehran? Make them take them in the Persian Gulf the old fashioned way.

And if the Iranians want our "presence" that badly, they can give us back our effing embassy.

Do Not Stand in His Line of Fire

James Lileks goes off. Rather nicely.

Enjoy.

Ignoring Reality at Their Peril

Israel gave up enemy bodies and five terrorists for the bodies of their dead soldiers captured in the Hizbollah War.

So what's wrong with this sentence from this story?

The prisoner exchange with Hezbollah closed a painful chapter from Israel's 2006 war against the militant group.


Astute observers will note that only Hizbollah got back prisoners. Israel got corpses. So this was not a "prisoner exchange."

But I guess Israelis need to feel better about signing the death warrants of future soldiers captured. Why should jihadis keep Jews alive when dead Jews get live terrorists out of Israeli custody? All for the false comfort of having a funeral for a coffin with a body in it.

And not just Israeli soldiers but Israeli civilians will die, too.

How do I know this?

In Lebanon, attention centered on Samir Kantar, who spent nearly three decades in an Israeli prison after being convicted of killing a father, his 4-year-old daughter and a policeman during a 1979 attack. He denied killing the little girl.

He and the four other freed militants visited the grave of Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeh, who was killed in a car bomb blast in Syria in February. Hezbollah blamed Israel, which denied playing any role in his killing.

"We swear by God ... to continue on your same path and not to retreat until we achieve the same stature that God bestowed on you," Kantar said. He referred to Mughniyeh's "martyrdom," saying: "This is our great wish. We envy you and we will achieve it, God willing."


The Israelis expressed shock that gambling is going on upstairs:

Israeli government spokesman David Baker denounced the celebrations in Lebanon, particularly the warm welcome given to Kantar.

"Kantar is a brutal child murderer who instead of being rejected upon his return was cheered and greeted like a rock star, and this is disgusting and deplorable," Baker said in a statement.


As the saying goes, that disgusting and deplorable behavior is not so much a bug as a feature. Baker's denunciation is hollow. Israel pretended to close a chapter but another one is already scripted by Kantar and his cheering squad.

But hey, the Israelis kept Ehud Barak after he screwed the pooch on the Hizbollah War. They have the leader they deserve at this moment.

So get ready for the next ugly chapter. We know how that story will end. The Israelis should be ashamed. They should know better.