The tempo of military operations appears to be slowing. Can Russia rebuild enough to resume a large-scale offensive? Can Ukraine build up its army and air force to reclaim land in more than small amounts? And will the Russians and Ukrainians called on to fight and die keep going into the field?
Fighting continues along the front with small-scale attacks and minor changes in the front line. Both sides attack and defend. Ukraine had seemed determined to maintain its counteroffensive over the winter despite the poor weather and lack of more weapons. But will it? Can it?
As the battlefield reached stalemate in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, both Iran and Iraq waged "wars of the cities" trying to kill civilians with unguided ballistic missiles or artillery when close enough. Russia has already bombarded Ukraine's cities. Ukraine is starting to return the pain:
Moscow airports were forced to shut on Sunday as Ukraine launched its most intense drone attack on the Russian capital for months.
An effort to seek a new way to defeat the enemy when current armies prove unable. Consider the Ukrainian drones an entirely new front, I suppose.
I don't discount that Russia's population advantage over Ukraine could yet lead to victory using human wave assaults. I recognize that efficiency is not the same as victory.
But because of Western support for Ukraine, Russia has not yet managed
to rebuild an equipment advantage to match their population edge. In World
War II, Stalin had massive Allied economic and military help with that production advantage. And as I like to point out,
Iran--with only the population edge with much better Islamist
fanaticism (Shia version) morale--saw their own ground forces break
after battering against Iraqi defenders again and again in the 1980s Iran-Iraq War without breaking through (to reach Jerusalem through Iraq, the mullahs pledged).
After three years it gets harder to maintain the public's willingness to fight. So the year 2024 could be the last year of efforts to win a battlefield victory in this war. Much depends on Western military aid deliveries this year.
Under Putin it seems likely that after a ceasefire Russia will simply regroup and plan for the next war. Perhaps with a timeline based on Putin fearing his own mortality--or ability to hold power--to get the credit and "the Great" honorific tacked on in the history books.
But the best-case scenario for the Winter War of 2022 after a ceasefire is, as I speculated early in the war, the aftermath of the short Winter War of 1939-40. Perhaps Russia's casualties are similarly so high in the ongoing war that the Russians decide it isn't worth it to resume the war. After all, Russia knows it has bigger threats elsewhere.
As the war grinds into its second winter, a growing number of Russian soldiers want out, as suggested in secret recordings obtained by The Associated Press of Russian soldiers calling home from the battlefields of the Kharkiv, Luhansk and Donetsk regions in Ukraine.
The intercepts were from January, after all. In fact the Russian soldiers have continued to sit there and die. Or their replacements if the recorded soldiers died.
Who knows? Maybe high casualties are the feature--rather than a bug--of Russia's war methods to tamp down the bad morale. Kill off the troops who have soured on the war and replace them with new troops who have yet to realize what they got into.
UPDATE (Monday): A Ukrainian Abrams tank was "spotted" near the front recently.
Is this to divert Russian attention to that spot or to make the Russians think it is a diversion? Or given the weather and slowed military action, is it just for domestic consumption?
I honestly don't know if Ukraine really depleted their ground forces with their low-level summer offensive. I doubt it. But what do I know sitting so far away?
Also, I doubt the tank's IFF system is useful (if it is even installed on this export model) because I doubt Ukraine' vehicle fleet is equipped with it.
UPDATE (Monday): This is not breaking news. It was widely speculated early in the war and even before:
Russia offered to stop its invasion of Ukraine on the condition that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's government abandon its ambition to join NATO, the Kyiv Post reported.
Neutrality talk was in the air almost immediately after Putin invaded.
What does "stop its invasion" mean? Holding what it took? Because I find it hard to believe Putin was willing to withdraw. Or willing to believe any neutrality guarantees about Ukraine. I suspect it was an offer meant to divide Ukrainians and confuse Westerners about aiding Ukraine.
And of course the Ukrainians didn't trust the Russians. Czechoslovakia trusted that losing only the Sudetenland would bring peace. It was just an appetizer before Hitler swallowed the main course.
Don't pretend we somehow rejected a chance for peace early in the war.
UPDATE (Tuesday): The freeze is also literal:
A cyclone in the Black Sea and southern Ukraine caused infrastructure damage in many areas of coastal southern Russia and occupied Ukraine and is impacting the tempo of military operations along the frontline in Ukraine, but has notably not stopped military activity entirely.
Naval mines could be scattered into the Black Sea, too.
UPDATE (Tuesday): We'll see how much Ukraine--which also endured the storm--can exploit any Russian problems:
A massive cyclonic storm that hit the Black Sea area Monday is a vivid illustration of how weather effects combat operations. With wind speeds of up to 90 mph, it was the equivalent of a Category 1 hurricane. The storm's impact could allow Ukraine to exploit gaps that emerge, even if temporarily, in air and port defenses, sea surveillance, among others. Major logistical disruptions to the war effort are also a given. ...
Another immediate concern for Russia is that the storm apparently wiped out trenches and other defensive lines it has been building up in Crimea. The full extent of the damage, however, won't be known until after the storm subsides.
I'd guess Ukraine's best chance is exploiting problems from the air (aircraft and missiles) where air defenses have temporary gaps.
UPDATE (Wednesday): The head of the Ukrainian military worries that Russia could expand the front to the dormant length of the border if Western arms support withers.
UPDATE (Thursday) It would be nice if Ukraine could exploit this weakness on the Kherson front:
The apparent Russian failure to establish a cohesive command structure among forces defending on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast continues to degrade Russian morale and combat capabilities.
But that requires enough reserves to push across the river; an artillery ammunition reserve to commit; bridges to move and sustain a larger force across the Dnieper river; and more air defenses not tied to defending Ukraine's cities to protect the advancing troops and logistics effort.
On the positive side, Ukraine seems to have degraded Russian air defenses in western Crimea, which would also help Ukraine commit their air force to supporting an offensive. But I have no idea about what Ukraine has for the other four.
Also, after the Dnieper River dam was blown, the water receded from a lot of land. As that ground freezes, does that open up options for a winter offensive for the side that has prepared to exploit the new frontage?
UPDATE (Friday): I don't know how accurate this is, but it highlights that we should not assume Russia's size guarantees victory:
A recent Russian opinion poll indicates that the number of Russians who fully support the war in Ukraine has almost halved since February 2023 and that more Russians support a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine than do not.
UPDATE (Friday): Interesting:
Ukrainian forces have blown up the main railway [through a tunnel] connecting Russia to China, in one of the most ambitious strikes deep into enemy territory.
But:
Russian trains have now been diverted over the 35-metre-tall Devil’s Bridge.
So close, but no cigar?
UPDATE (Saturday): Cigar?
Ukrainian intelligence reportedly damaged another train along a section of the Baikal-Amur Railway on December 1 in an apparent effort to degrade Russian logistics in the Russian Far East.
In addition, Ukraine seems like it is going to improve its ability to handle increasing Russian offensive actions:
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi signaled intent to increase Ukrainian defenses and fortifications around the Ukrainian theater, but notably did not include Zaporizhia Oblast in discussions of ongoing and future defensive measures.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
