The Russians pretend all is well and Westerners believe Russia's cardboard cutout bravado to justify retreating before Russia.
Russia and Ukraine trade punches across the front without achieving anything decisive on the ground. Although Ukraine seems to be inflicting heavier losses on the Russians. On the other hand, America is faltering in providing military aid to Ukraine as Congress continues to deny additional aid. We need to take Vienna rather than explaining how it isn't possible and anyway, victory doesn't require Vienna.
Putin has reason to believe that time is on his side. At the front line, there are no indications that Russia is losing what has become a war of attrition. The Russian economy has been buffeted, but it is not in tatters. Putin’s hold on power was, paradoxically, strengthened following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion in June. Popular support for the war remains solid, and elite backing for Putin has not fractured.
I truly appreciate the authors' argument that America should accept their assessment to prepare for a long struggle against Russia. That is true regardless of the outcome of the Winter War of 2022.
But I fear that they are dismissing the ability for Ukraine to win with sufficient Western aid in their haste to write that off and prepare for the long struggle. Worse, too many will see their call as "recognizing" the truth that Russia is too strong to defeat. And once that line is crossed then the logical question is not how to prepare for a long struggle but how to accept that reality of Russia's inevitable victory and cut a deal to give Russia whatever it might accept to get a ceasefire.
I don't think the authors' evidence of Russian strength holds up. There are certainly indications that Russia is losing the war of attrition in manpower, equipment, and supplies. Russia's economy is being hurt and we can't know when that pain becomes too great to bear. Certainly Russia's military industry hasn't been able to replace losses with anything but ancient substitutes; and means to cope with substitutes are growing thin. We have no real idea what Putin's support looks like behind the facade of confidence--Putin has so far refused to mobilize the nation for war, after all. We don't know how Russia's army will ultimately react to its casualties and lack of resources. And we have no idea what elite support really is. The Wagner Revolt's failure wasn't a sign of Putin's strength. It was a sign of fissures.
It is magical thinking to believe the evidence for Russia's purported strength is clearly evident.
Like Iran, Russia has a 3:1 advantage in population. But Russian morale as a conqueror, that is clearly not liberating people from Nazis, is not superior. This could break Russia before Ukraine. Just how do we define the transition from the short run to the long run?
What about GDP and defense spending? You'd think Russia clearly has the edge with a 9:1 GDP advantage.
But Russia is under Western sanctions that will harm Russia's ability to go to war production levels. Russian Soviet-era stockpiles will run low in time--or reach the material and ammo almost more dangerous to Russian users than Ukrainian targets.
And Ukraine is being supplied by the West, which has an immensely greater GDP advantage than Russia's advantage over Ukraine. So you can't just count the value of the arms and services provided to Ukraine when comparing the economic advantage.
During that war, Iraq was expected to succumb to Iran's numbers and Islamist morale. But Iran ultimately faltered when Iraq finally struck Iran and Iranian troops cracked. Yet Iran's broken morale was hidden for a long time as the narrative of Iraqi fragility and Iranian limitless willingness to die obscured the truth. As I've noted about the Winter War of 2022, Ukraine has to attack to exploit Russia's shaky troop morale.
This year, Russia's fortifications and firepower combined with Ukraine's inability to maneuver larger units to pierce the Russian line have stymied Ukraine's attempt to do that. But Ukraine has seemingly inflicted disproportionate casualties on the Russian ground forces. Russia's ground forces seem to be very weakened.
Russia is fully capable of telling a big lie to obscure its weaknesses. And has a record of it.
Man cannot tell but Allah knows
How much the other side is hurt.
The funny thing is, the reason Putin seemingly believes time is on his side is that Russia's system may be denying Putin's core leadership accurate information. Putin may not be able to see his own side's weaknesses because he is fed a stream of news to make him see a frightening bear doing his bidding to defeat a scared NATO. With Western sources providing supporting information. (Although even if Putin knows the true status of his forces, he might see no option but hoping the horse will sing.)
That may be the real magical thinking.
So don't make a Russian victory a self-fulfilling Western prophecy. Redefining Ukraine's defeat as a Ukrainian "victory", as these authors do, is delusional. Claiming that Republicans will cause Ukraine to lose this war is a bizarre argument for causing Ukraine to lose before Trump even takes office.* It worries me that this advice is in Foreign Affairs, which is nothing if not the official transcriber for conventional wisdom in Washington, D.C. But it makes sense given I think Biden only accidentally supported Ukraine and is looking for a way out of the commitment:
I'll say again that I think Biden is accidentally supporting Ukraine. I think Biden was told Ukraine would lose fast. I think the early war shipments of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons were designed for a post-invasion Ukrainian insurgency. The arms would be a relatively cheap way for Biden to show resolve after needlessly losing Afghanistan.
But Ukraine and Russia didn't cooperate with that political strategy. Russia effed up and Ukraine fought. Oops. Biden got trapped into backing Ukraine. And I worry he's looking for an exit ramp.
Hey, Biden redefined defeat in Afghanistan as victory. Why not try again? And then focus on the real threat!
Russian victory may very well rely on Westerners believing Russia's bluff (or delusion) and giving up claiming glorious victory before Russia faces defeat from accumulating problems. And no matter how narrow that gap is, we may never know how close Ukraine was to victory if we ensure Ukraine's defeat.
To be clear, it is certainly proper to think about what strategy is best to help defeat Russia. And those essays I cite certainly seem to be trying to do that. Perhaps I am being unfair to them by not taking their pieces as a whole. But with the growing trend of people thinking Ukrainian resistance is futile and that America is at fault anyway, those essays could have their arguments copied and pasted with only the concluding 10% edited to argue for giving up.
Let's figure out how to break the apparent stalemate for victory in this war and not risk defeat dressed up as Smart Diplomacy.®
UPDATE (Tuesday): The war is settling into a routine and that might entrench the territorial stalemate:
Clearly there are talks underway at some level between Russia and the United States. Whether my solution has merit is dubious. That we are near the end of the war (expressed in months) is not. Perhaps the world’s relative indifference to Ukraine and Russia will send a signal to both.
But I did warn that Ukraine had to demonstrate on the battlefield that it can win to keep the West arming it enough to eject Russia. Ukraine failed this summer. Despite some positive results, the territorial status is largely unchanged. How long does Ukraine have to provide that military victory? I worry that next summer might be too late.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Indeed: "We must provide everything Ukraine needs to win; otherwise, there is the real prospect they may lose, and bring a dark cloud down on Europe which we have not seen since 1939."
UPDATE (WEDNESDAY): Remember that EU aid is European aid funneled through the EU:
American military aid dominates--but most of that is not actual weapons, but services.
UPDATE (Friday): An argument that Russia is shakier than it appears and that its luck is running out:
As Putin rearms, he is forcing the Russian people to tighten their belts. Russia’s key economic weakness is its inability to control capital flight despite some capital restrictions. But the financial and energy sanctions imposed by the West are managing to limit Putin’s rearmament.
It's out of my lane to evaluate. But I do know that Russia bluffs.
*And note that Trump did not withdraw from NATO. He spent time bluntly pushing European NATO states to spend more on defense. He reinforced American forces in Europe. And he was the first American president to sell Ukraine weapons. I don't think the evidence for Trump abandoning Ukraine and NATO is clear as his critics say.
NOTE: The image was made from DALL-E.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
