The EU Should Stay Out of NATO's Lane

NATO countries that joined America abroad in the war on terror have faced double shocks that compel them to return to territorial defense.

This sounds about right in describing the effects of Russia's sudden invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and America's sudden defeat in Afghanistan in 2021:

For NATO, both the Republican and Democratic Administrations drove European militaries away from territorial defense to out of area defense. And the twin impacts of 2014 and 2021 are crucial. 2014 because the direct defense of Europe was key to many European states, and saw, for example, significant change in the Nordic region towards a return to “total defense” efforts.

2021 is the other key impact, for the Biden blitzkrieg withdrawal strategy in Afghanistan, has raised fundamental questions about any U.S. led “out of area operations” going forward.

First, the idea that Biden had an Afghanistan "strategy" is ludicrous. The idea was to run away just as fast as we could and assume we'd have a decent interval between getting out and the Taliban victory.

I agree that Europeans should largely keep their defense horizon limited to 1,000 miles to defend Europe from external threats, through NATO. Out-of-area operations should be coalitions of the willing outside of NATO.

I'm nearly ashamed that 19 years ago I supported out of area NATO emphasis. Even though I wanted an Army insurance policy in Europe, as I wrote about in Military Review (pp. 15-20) just a year later. The Russian invasion of Georgia ended my hopes that Russia would not be a serious threat; and Russia invading Ukraine confirmed Russia's hostile intent.

For now, Poland has to be the focus of NATO defense against Russia:

NATO forces based in Poland, including the Multinational Corps and Division Northeast Headquarters; the Force Integration Unit; and the U.S. Army’s V Corps Headquarters, are, indeed, a credible deterrent to Putin’s adventurism and revanchist inclinations.  Further, Poland’s rapid modernization of its military with the acquisition of the F-35, modern air defenses, and soon, the Abrams Main Battle Tank bolster the message sent by NATO's forward deployments.

But more forces and logistics preparations must be achieved. Poland must be the main line of defense and the jumping off point for an offensive to take Russia's Kaliningrad and for a counteroffensive to liberate the NATO Baltic states that fall to a Russian invasion.

In that initial article, Poland--with a nod to other states close to Russia--is the focus of how European states should react to the shocks of 2014 and 2021. And I fully endorse this, both for Poland and the EU especially:

But what this means is that Poland needs to shape a defense force fully competent to engage in warfare and conflict in the full spectrum of digital operations. And this also means, that cooperation will be ongoing with both NATO and EU partners. In my co-authored book on the return of direct defense in Europe, we argue that the EU should focus much more significantly on infrastructure defense than meddling in direct military conventional operations. [emphasis added]

The EU should not try to replace NATO. But it could have a bigger role sustaining the European logistics foundation of military operations under NATO command.