Pursuit of the Perfect Destroyed the Good

We should have stayed the course in Afghanistan from the beginning.

 We had a good enough result in Afghanistan with little effort: 

By 2004, three years into the intervention, most of Afghanistan was safer, freer, and more prosperous, with better services and opportunities than it had had in 30 years. But there was a dark side to this story: the corruption was far worse than during the Soviet occupation or Taliban rule, the police were brutal, and the judicial system worked only for those who could afford the bribes. The production of opium poppies—which had been nearly eliminated by the Taliban by 2000—soared, with profits flowing to the most senior government officials.

That would have been enough for me. 

But between support from the right to get better results and cries from the left that Iraq "distracted" America from Afghanistan, Bush ordered a gradual increase in troop strength. And then the Obama era major troop surges dramatically increased troop strength and combat intensity. For no apparent reason other than to cement Obama's reelection campaign.

I didn't think we needed the surges but trusted that the military knew what it was doing when it promised better results. I was wrong to trust that confidence. Although I still didn't expect much from the escalation:

The end result in Afghanistan, if all goes well, will be a nominal national government that controls the capital region and reigns but does not rule local tribes and which actually helps the locals a bit rather than sucking resources from the locals, who in turn do not make trouble for the central government or allow their areas to be used by jihadis to plan attacks on the West. We press for reasonable economic opportunities, with bribes all around (I mean, foreign aid), to keep a fragile peace.

And we stick around this time, unlike after the Soviets left Afghanistan when we ignored the place, for a generation or two to see if we can move Afghanistan into the 19th century (hey, let's not get ahead of ourselves).

Hopefully our military surge recedes by the end of 2011 and we can get down to a single combat brigade plus air power that function as a fire brigade and a hammer for the central government should a local difficulty exceed Afghan military capabilities.

Is the American age of intervention over? Probably for now. I recognized that some time ago. But I hoped that we could convince the American public that muddling through is good enough. 

Opinion polls show Americans are unhappy with losing in Afghanistan despite the Biden administration's conviction that opinion backed fleeing from Afghanistan and damn the consequences. But Biden lost the war. And here we are. 

Anyway, it is an interesting essay. He says that if we'd stayed we could have prevented a Taliban victory with minimal costs compared to what it cost us so far. I agree.

The age of intervention began in the enemy power vacuum between the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of fascistic China. As the threat from China rises and as Russia acts dangerously paranoid, that age of being able to devote resources to secondary threats is now gone. 

Even if Afghanistan had succeeded, the age of heavy American intervention was surely going to end. For now.