Friday, October 08, 2021

Kill the MPF Now Before it Explodes in Combat

The Army is taking another step toward having a light tank, with the properly ambiguous Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) term to conceal its basic worthlessness. Attach Abrams companies/battalions or Abrams/Bradley teams/task forces if our light and airborne infantry need armored support.

Nooooooo!!!!!

Ideally, the MPF vehicle will bridge the gap between adequate armor protection and weight to be air-mobile. This will be far from easy. The last airborne-capable tracked armored vehicle in Army service was the problematic M551 Sheridan. Other light tanks like the M41 Walker Bulldog proved too heavy for air mobility. 

Why do we supposedly need them?

Notably, the Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle, essentially a light tank, won’t go to the Army’s heavy armor brigades, which already have an effective armor platform and organic armor support infrastructure. Instead, the MPF will equip light infantry and airborne units within the Army that do not have a tracked armored vehicle.

The reasoning that the MPF can go where tanks can't to justify the MPF light tank is insane. Just where can MPF light tanks go where tanks can't?

Light tanks can go up mountains better than heavy tanks? Or littoral (coastal) regions (then why does the Marine Corps have Abrams tanks and include them in their MEUs forward deployed afloat?)? And in jungles? In World War II we used our primary medium tanks there. Further, Abrams functioned very well in cities in the Iraq War--and we even have a version to better enable city operations.

I don't even know what to make of a defense of light tanks for underground operations. I mean other than to laugh hysterically.

Oh, and any defense of light tanks as being something needed to support "fast moving" leg infantry is just fantasy-level thinking.

Note that the Marines have since abandoned tank to focus more on amphibious operations and direct support of the Navy--not because the tanks weren't able to support Marine infantry in combat.

I completely reject the notion that airlifting light tanks is necessary or can be done in any volume to make it worthwhile:

"Some scenarios" are a BS justification for this project. The times when we will need to rapidly airlift light tanks are rare. And the times that the situation is so bad to require that will not end well for the few light tanks that make it to the front rapidly with American heavy forces weeks or months behind loading on ships in US ports.

And for any sizable light tank force, given shortages of airlift you quickly reach the point where sealift is actually faster. And really, let's see a show of Army hands for those who believe the Air Force will free up the cargo planes and fighter escorts and all the other supporting assets needed to move the light armor in numbers that could make a difference?

Face it, if we need to cross a bridge in a "heavy firefight," the enemy capable of mounting that kind of resistance will have the hand-held anti-tank weapons needed to blow up the lightly armored light tanks that are spearheading the frontal assault right in the middle of the damn bridge.

Further, explain to me just what scenarios do we anticipate that has an enemy without heavy tanks to support their infantry?

The light tank only survives in a fantasy world of convenient assumptions. In almost all circumstances, American light infantry and airborne forces will go into battle overland. And if what they have to support them is the MPF that is what they will take with them. And they will light up the battlefield as flaming coffins where enemy heavy armor roams.

I prefer a much more accurate term for the MPF light tank, Future Burned-Out Hulk (FBOH):

Light tanks are stupid. New light tanks are a waste of money. Just call them FBOHs (which I suggest be pronounced "Fu-bohs" to be similar to FUBAR).

Lord, people, has nobody noticed we have a lot of surplus heavily armed, well protected, tracked Abrams tanks not in the force structure that could be given to infantry brigades? 

The above link goes to Army magazine where I argue against light tanks and for using heavier armor to support our infantry. And remember, a couple hundred formerly Marine Abrams are now available for that usage. 

And if the Army really wants something to airlift for mobile direct fire support? How about an Ontos-type vehicle--perhaps based on an ATV--that uses Carl Gustav recoilless rifles that can fire any type of round the troops could need?