This is true enough:
Several [GNA] officials say their side entered the [maritime border] deals with Turkey reluctantly, late last year, believing they had no choice. They desperately needed an ally as their opponent in the war, Libyan commander Khalifa Hifter, bore down on Tripoli with his forces, strengthened by Russian, Emirati and Egyptian backing.
“It was like a give-and-take game,” said one official in Tripoli-based Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj's office. “They took advantage of our weakness at the time.” He and other officials spoke on condition of anonymity, fearing for their safety in a country largely ruled by an array of militias.
In the end, Turkey sent troops and thousands of Syrian mercenaries and other military support that helped pro-Sarraj forces repel Hifter’s assault this spring, preventing the collapse of the Tripoli-based administration and shifting the tide of the war.
But the real opportunity for Turkey to intervene and extort energy concessions from Libya was Hiftar's granting of the precious gift of time to the GNA by failing to exploit his strength to rapidly defeat the GNA when the LNA had the GNA on the ropes:
Taking your time in a war--even one you are winning--grants your enemy time that they may use to change the course of the war. You may think being slow and careful is compassionate, but it is not. ...
[Consider] Libya, where Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) has been involved in a long and slow effort since March 2019 to take Tripoli from the officially recognized Libyan government (Government of National Accord, or GNA). Victory there would pretty much knock out the government which controls little else. Haftar went slow to minimize casualties.
But the slow pace also granted his enemies time. Who used it as Turkey intervened on the side of the government[.] ...
Efforts to reduce casualties by slowing down the intensity of offensive operations only reduce the rate of casualties. If reducing the rate of casualties extends the time you endure that "lower" rate of casualties, your total casualties could end up being much higher than if you had endured a higher rate to win in a shorter period of time.
I called this kind of effort to reduce the rate of casualties "false compassion:"
Perhaps Hiftar had little choice because his troops would not die at a higher rate to ensure they didn't die at lower rates for a much longer time.
But it is an example of the false compassion that motivates calls for ceasefires, stricter rules of engagement, and that farcical "proportionality" confusion that is so prevalent.
Just what are the limits of Erdogan's ambitions, anyway (back to the initial article)?
“We are tearing up maps of the East Mediterranean that were drawn up to imprison us on the mainland,” Erdogan deputy Fuat Oktay said.
The Eastern Question is revived for the 21st Century. And there's more to Erdogan's ambitions on the way to rebuilding their caliphate.
