Saturday, November 30, 2019

Expensive and Vulnerable is a Bad Combination

American carriers are a symbol of American power. And that's a problem.

The Economist notes that American carriers are a symbol of American military power. But that the ships are vulnerable:

Aircraft-carriers are the largest and most expensive machines in the history of warfare. A new American Ford-class ship costs $13bn—more than the annual defence budget of Poland or Pakistan. However, as precision missiles become faster, more accurate and more numerous, these beasts look increasingly like giant floating targets.

I've been on this issue even before The Dignified Rant:

The question of whether large aircraft carriers deserve to be the center of our future naval strategy is a fundamental question that has not been adequately explored. Network-centric warfare signals the beginning of the end for the United States Navy's large aircraft carriers. They will lose their value as an instrument of forward presence and become valuable targets that, if struck, will encourage an enemy at the outset of war by apparently demonstrating that American technological prowess can be nullified and beaten. In the long run, large aircraft carriers will add little to most offensive missions and will absorb scarce resources and assets simply evading attack rather than striking the enemy and contributing to victory.

And I've long noted that the carriers are too big to lose given their symbolism:

I've worried that the loss of a carrier (or more) in the western Pacific should we come to blows with China would be a major psychological blow to America given how much our super carriers are seen as a symbol of our power. Even though our Navy could fight and win without our super carriers, the image of a big carrier in flames and going down would be potent.

Carriers were useful when they exclusively had the role of power projection. Against powers without anti-ship weapons or the ability to even find and track our carriers, as floating air fields they were great. The problem comes with the sea control role against powers with robust anti-ship capabilities.

Those two mission are very different. What kind of Navy should we build in an era of great power competition?