One, while the Suwalki Gap between Poland and Lithuania (and Latvia and Estonia north of there) is important, the Smolensk Gate east of Belarus is the really important piece of terrain:
For Poland, the Smolensk Gate makes the Baltic states a secondary area of operation in any major confrontation with Russia. Poland is most vulnerable on this axis, as is Russia. Essentially, Belarus serves as the potential battlefield. NATO security policy in Eastern Europe must take this reality into account since it decouples the interests of Poland from the U.S. and the Baltic states. Russian military theorists understand as much, hence the 2016 formation of the powerful 1st Guards Army at the entrance to the Smolensk Gate. This single Russian army has more offensive weapons than all of the Baltic states, Poland, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg combined. The covering force on this axis consists of one skeleton Polish brigade and one Polish cavalry regiment. Behind the 1st Guards Tank Army is the 20th Guards Army, which is currently being organized and which will have equally substantial firepower.
I've hammered on that point for a while:
If Russia is denied access to Belarus bases and territory, Putin has a harder time threatening NATO or even defending their Kaliningrad enclave.
And if Putin's paranoia is to be believed, Russia needs just such a buffer to keep the NATO panzers from sweeping across the steppe to the gates of Moscow.
Belarus is essentially a road between Russia and NATO.
As an aside, I've noted the "new" armies. Although I have some doubts about the real target.
But I digress (a bit).
Further, the GF analysis claims there is a myth about defending the Baltic States:
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the Baltic front lacks sufficient depth to be successfully defended, the region is approximately 300 kilometers deep and features rivers, streams, swamps and densely forested terrain that impedes maneuver warfare. The terrain provides ample opportunity to conduct defensive operations to halt rapid movement and to attrite attacking forces.
Yet the GF analysis seems to recognize that sufficient defender's force isn't the only issue:
Any Russian approach along the Belarusian front will cut off the Baltic states, deny them access to their ports and may rapidly bring war to central Poland near the northwestward curve of the Vistula River, i.e. to the very heart of Poland.
I never said that the Baltics could not be defended. I've said it would be unwise--because of that Smolensk Gate issue:
I've argued that it is foolish to try to stop Russia from taking the NATO Baltic states and that a better bet is to plan for a counter-offensive--following the conquest of Kaliningrad* to secure the flank, secure unimpeded access for Poland-bound reinforcements, and as a bargaining chip--to liberate the Russian-occupied territory.
Basically I think that NATO can't really put enough ground combat power in the Baltic states to stop Russia; and if NATO could it would both be seen as a threat to St. Petersburg, prompting even more Russian power threatening NATO there, and be an opportunity to simply attack through Belarus to link up with Russia's Kaliningrad and cut off the best NATO combat units in a Baltic pocket to be reduced at will.
Do read the analysis. Geography has not changed Poland's--which is now NATO's--defense problem.
