China has modernized and refocused the People's Armed Police (PAP):
Between 2017 and 2018, the PAP was divested of almost all its lower-intensity law enforcement responsibilities. These previous missions included border defence, forestry and natural resource protection, firefighting and hydropower. Most of the units that fulfilled them have been transferred to other parts of the Chinese government. In their place, the PAP has gained responsibility for the Chinese Coast Guard (中国 海警局) and is now focused on three core missions – internal security, maritime security and supporting the PLA in times of war.
Other than the Coast Guard, the remaining PAP operational units are now divided between the Mobile Force and the Internal Security Force. The former comprises two corps-leader-grade formations created from 13 of the 14 ex-PLA divisions that transferred to the PAP in 1997, which form a strategic reserve of sorts; one corps covering northern and central China, including Beijing, whilst the other is responsible for eastern and southern China. The Internal Security Force has 32 regional commands, covering China’s provinces, cities and autonomous regions. Each of these has at least one mobile unit, and some key commands, such as Beijing and Xinjiang, have several more.
The PAP has more divisions in their Mobile Force than our active Army (10). Although obviously they are not going to be as good as our active divisions.
I've noted more than once that the PAP is a hidden army that can support the PLA army.
Not that America should have a national paramilitary force that could be used for internal security to match the PAP or Interior Ministry troops. I don't like that at all. But we should be aware of potential enemy forces that fall our of our usual framework of defining military power.
NOTE: Oh, and note that Putin also created the personally loyal (on paper anyway) National Guard which grabbed the best Interior troops plus paramilitaries.
