This is helpful:
Supporting the U.S.-led international order, Britain will establish a new naval base in Southeast Asia. To be most effective, the Royal Navy should use that base to facilitate submarine operations.
Still, the U.S. should be grateful for Britain's decision here.
This is not new.
It may also reflect a history of Britain preferring not to commit heavily to continental land warfare if they don't have to. And Russia's power relative to a fully mobilized NATO means it isn't necessary. Perhaps getting busy elsewhere provides them with a reason not to commit a corps to eastern Europe as they did in Germany during the Cold War.
Let's hope that this measure of national power (which is not a measure of national military power, keep in mind) reflects reality:
The audit also shows that once again that the UK – though far behind the US – still enjoys a lead over China (albeit less than in 2017), despite having access to a far smaller national base.
“Indeed, in 2019, the UK remains second only to the US in terms of overall geopolitical capability, with a particularly strong performance in relation to diplomatic leverage and national resolve.” [emphasis in original]
Branding the UK “a truly global power”, the rankings find Britain retains its “unique capacity to project and extend itself around the world”.
This is the latest ranking, FYI*:
And I suspect there is an economic component if the European Union continues to punish Britain post-Brexit:
Britain might build bases in the Caribbean and Far East after Brexit. This sounds like a "trade follows the flag" policy to encourage trade with Commonwealth countries if the European Union continues to punish Britain for leaving the EU.
Either way, it is helpful in the South China Sea as long as Britain knows their limits, which that initial author rightly notes. Nuclear attack submarines are probably a wise choice, all things considered.
*Allow me to digress (as I can!). The article on national power notes that Britain is ranked above China and Russia in the military power category that contributes to the overall score because "the logistical capability to deploy, support and sustain those forces overseas in large numbers" is lacking in China and Russia.
That is misleading.
In many ways the old USSR was a regional military power--albeit across a vast region from the Elbe River to the Amur River. But the ability to drive to the Rhine River a short distance away would have achieved global results by defeating NATO and driving America from the continent. Russia today is weaker than the USSR and is so far east that it lacks a close target in NATO with global impact.
So a "regional" military reach can have global implications depending on the geography. Although again it is important to keep in mind that the ranking in question is not a military power ranking. But my objection does apply to the military category.
The article on national power says our soft power is lower now as a result of Trump-era polling data abroad. I'm not sure that is a proper metric. As long as other people risk life and limb to reach America, I don't think our soft power appeal has weakened.
Also, that overall score for Turkey has to hurt Erdogan given his ambitions for his revived caliphate.
