I did not know this World War II idea:
"[General] Marshall firmly refused [the American commander of forces in China and Burma] Major General] Stillwell's request for an American army corps to spearhead the fighting [against the Japanese] in China."
That is from page 273 of Antony Beevor's The Second World War, which I am reading now. I like it. It weaves in granularity that I never saw before, making it more than just another retelling of World War II.
I would have included that detail in my article in Military Review calling for the Army to plan for a major land campaign in the Asia-Pacific region--and not just in the Korean peninsula.
China's army is professionalizing and being reduced so it is no longer like punching sand to take it on. And while I don't rule out using up to a 5-6-division Army-Marine force on the mainland of China--or perhaps in Pacific Russia (perhaps for a major raid or to temporarily hold key coastal territory to support the Navy, but more importantly to make sure China has to worry about such an expedition)--mainly I wanted our Army to plan for landing a major force to support larger allied armies who could use our force as a spearhead force with unique capabilities to fight an enemy more effectively--as Stillwell wanted an American corps to do.
But our World War II strategy was not to defeat Japan in China but to keep the Japanese stuck in China while we won in the Pacific Ocean.
Despite that choice, the notion of fighting in Asia is hardly out of the question despite the simple warning of "don't fight a land war in Asia" without any context on why you shouldn't--and why you might need to.
