Our "pivot" to the Pacific is more of a foreign policy play than real, in that it doesn't really involve moving many assets, and what is moving is part of a two-decade long trend since we won the Cold War. It's great that we can reassure allies with this policy, but it is more psychological reassurance.
Don't forget that pivoting to Asia makes the best of a worst-case scenario and real strategy would get China to pivot away from the sea and toward the interior of Asia (yikes, years later I fixed this link):
While all this looks good for building an alliance to fight and defeat China, this is not playing the Great Game. This is making the best of a worst case scenario--war with China. Sure, if we must fight I'd rather win, but just going to war is going to cost us in lives and money.
One can say that we hope that by becoming strong enough we deter the Chinese but this is still only second best. A deterred China will always be on the verge of attacking, just waiting for the moment when we cannot stop them for one reason or another and so cannot deter them for even a short window of opportunity.
No, defeating China makes the best of the worst case and deterring China makes the best of the second worst case. We need to shovel the Snow back north. We need to play the Great Game in Asia to achieve our best case--a China pointed away from the south--Taiwan and the United States and our other allies--and pointed toward the north and the interior of Asia.
I speculated that only the draw of energy in Russia and Central Asia (including pipeline routes to Pakistan) could exert enough of a pull to get China looking away from Taiwan (and now the South China Sea) to focus on the interior of Asia.
In that light, our bizarre refusal to allow the Canadians to ship their oil to us and instead ship it across the Pacific has the effect of keeping the Chinese focused on the sea.
Consider the advantages of getting China focused to the land side of their country:
1. They must split their resources between naval forces and ground forces. That makes it more likely they'll fail at both endeavors, as the Kaiser's Germany did. Or break their economy as the Soviets did.
2. Russia will have to stop pretending that NATO is the big threat and pay attention to their Far East defenses in the face of increased Chinese land warfare capabilities.
3. We retain stronger abilities to defend our allies near China and reduce the numbing effects of being under a lengthening Chinese shadow that could wear down the will to resist China and result in the Finlandization of China's neighbors. We're doing fine now, but there are rumblings even in long-time ally, Australia (tip to Instapundit).
4. The Europeans might see the approach of Chinese power along the Silk Road as a reason to avoid selling arms to China--a resolve that seems to be weakening since 1989.
5. We reduce the chances that war will take place between ourselves and China by reducing friction. Indeed, if China focuses inland and stops threatening freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (and East China Sea for that matter), we will have less interest in how China resolves territorial disputes with other countries who have conflicting claims to all those little islands in the western Pacific.
The Soviets were able to point Japan south prior to Pearl Harbor, and seem to have had success with the same notion regarding China. I don't have to like that to admire it. I think we should return the favor.
UPDATE: China looks to Central Asian energy a bit more. Come on guys, pivot ...
