First, Austin Bay addresses China in light of the 30th anniversary of the Falklands War:
The Chinese have concluded, according to the SSI, that Argentina failed to conduct an "accurate pre-conflict strategic assessment." Indeed, the junta underestimated British resolve. Chinese war planners intend to avoid that mistake. However, the Argentines were tasked with "preventing an outside power from interfering in a territorial dispute" -- a direct analog to Taiwan, in Beijing's estimate.
The Chinese believe Argentina failed to attack Britain's biggest weakness: its long sea and air supply line. The Argentines did not dramatically reinforce their ground units on the islands, nor did they upgrade island airfields to handle high-performance jets. Their aerial refueling capabilities were limited. As a result, Britain's jump jet carriers provided just enough air power to give the fleet a protective "bubble."
China intends to pierce any adversary's protective "bubble." Beijing has ballistic missiles designed to suppress Taiwan's airfields and conceivably U.S. bases on Guam. China intends to triple its arsenal of land-based maritime strike aircraft; robust air refueling capabilities increases their range. China is building more diesel and nuclear submarines, to attack supply ships and -- yes -- super-carriers. Trust that any Chinese invasion force successfully seizing an island will receive heavy ground, air and air defense reinforcements with alacrity. And never say never.
Still, this doesn't mean that I think that China automatically attacks America when they attack Taiwan. China insists that this is an internal matter so why would China make it an inter-state fight right off the bat by attacking America (and Japan, if it hits our bases on Okinawa, too)?
Not that I'd assume that when we plan our deployments and readiness in range of Chinese assets. Never say never.
I looked at the same publication that Bay addresses and figured the biggest lesson was that China doesn't need to defeat us to win--they just need to batter us enough to hold us off and buy time while they achieve their objectives.
On the Taiwan question, Stratfor does say never. Their overview of China's geopolitical environment is excellent. They even rightly point out that China may be rising but they aren't anywhere near to overtaking us as the most powerful country on the planet.
But in discussing buffers needed to shield the Han eastern core, they strangely don't mention Taiwan. It is doubly strange since China has elevated the status of Taiwan to a core interest on par with the status of Tibet. They aren't shy about reminding us:
Addressing reporters at an annual news conference, [China's Foreign Minister] Yang said the key to sustaining momentum is for each to heed the other's core concerns, although he mentioned only issues important to Beijing.
"In particular, the U.S. side needs to honor its commitments and carefully and properly handle Taiwan- and Tibet-related issues that concern China's core interests," Yang said at the packed conference, held on the sidelines of the annual meeting of the National People's Congress, China's legislature.
Beijing has long pressured Washington to end arms sales to Taiwan — a territory China claims — and withdraw support for Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, whom China accuses of fomenting separatism in Chinese-ruled Tibet.
Granted, seizing Taiwan still doesn't address the problem of our Navy's ability to blockade China from a distance, but it does prevent Taiwan from being used as a jumping off point for attacks along the Chinese coastal core--such as attacks to disrupt their shore-based anti-access/area denial assets like aircraft and anti-ship missiles intended to keep us at bay.
But as I noted, Stratfor thinks invasion of Taiwan is not possible:
Indeed, the fear of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is unfounded. It cannot mount an amphibious assault at that distance, let alone sustain extended combat logistically.
I've long disagreed, noting that China might take risks and that it is wrong to assume an American template for amphibious operations.
Stratfor is useful for geopolitical information, but on military matters I don't have the same level of respect. Stratfor notes that China wants ports on the Indian Ocean (Burma and Pakistan could be of use here) but needs rail access to these ports to be useful:
Beijing cannot simply assume that building a port will give it unrestricted access to the port. Add to this that roads and rail lines are easily sabotaged by guerrilla forces or destroyed by air or missile attacks.
It is simply not true that rail lines are easily cut. Sure, those long stationary targets can easily be sabotaged or struck from the air, but our experience with supply lines in long conflicts in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam shows that rail (or road) lines can be struck but they can't be closed. The enemy will repair damage or reroute traffic. Perhaps the mistake is in thinking that a supply line needs to run 24 hours a day and 7 days a week with rail cars or trucks bumper-to-bumper moving supplies. That is wrong. A supply line needs to be open only a fraction of the time to supply all a military force needs to operate. Indeed, enemy attacks on our supply lines in Iraq demonstrate the same problem, too. We never ran short of supplies because of the extensive effort against our convoys.
So I take Stratfor's claim that China could never attack Taiwan with a sea of salt.
Again, I won't say China is about to overtake us in power. They have many problems with their military that would hobble them in a war with America:
In reality, a lot of the budget still disappears into questionable projects or non-military activities. Corruption remains a major problem in the military, as it has for thousands of years. China does not like to give this much publicity, and foreign media tend to ignore it.
But as I've emphasized, China doesn't need to defeat us. They need to delay fighting us while they defeat Taiwan. Is Taiwan's military likely to be more like ours or China's? If China is facing a Taiwanese military with similar problems as China has, doesn't that change all the calculations?
And as I've repeated enough to be tiresome, China is close to Taiwan and we are far. China has an opportunity in the time it takes us to move our military power close.
Strategypage also makes a mistake in assuming China won't attack Taiwan even though they aren't in the "never" school of Chinese capabilities:
The Chinese try to explain away the military buildup opposite Taiwan as political theater. This may be true, for a failed attempt to take Taiwan by force would not only disrupt the economy (and create a lot of unhappy Chinese), but would be a major failure by the government. Dictatorships cannot survive too many such failures, or too many angry citizens.
Strategypage dismisses the hot rhetoric of China's top brass:
For example, what alarms Americans most frequently is how the U.S. is being demonized by the Chinese military leadership. Chinese politicians speak in more friendly terms, while tolerating the bellicose attitudes of their generals and admirals. The politicians refuse to rein in the aggressive attitudes of their military commanders. China experts counsel that the rants from the military are mainly to build morale within the ranks, and make it easier for the politicians to reduce corruption in the armed forces.
That's a dangerous game China's leaders play. And we dismiss it as theater at our peril.
First of all, if defeat in war could be fatal to the regime, doesn't the nationalistic propaganda create danger in failing to try to win? At what level does failing to attack Taiwan become a defeat in the minds of the people of China raised on that bellicose attitude? China's leaders could well decide that the certainty of losing power to a revolt or to fellow leaders willing to fight (or just say they are) is more dangerous than attempting an invasion of Taiwan even if it risks war with America.
Further, the Chinese leaders believe they get to decide when China goes to war even if their generals have a more bellicose attitude. We are supposed to ignore the threats of the generals on the assumption that the more reasonable and rational political leaders would never ever risk war with us and doom their economic growth. But what if we have no idea about who gets to order the PLA into action?
And most broadly, how do we know that the Chinese who get to decide on questions of war or peace will define what is rational the same way we would (or think we would define it in a crisis, as if we are immune to passions that distort reason)?
The Chinese purportedly take the long view and are patient. Whether or not that is true (I'm not convinced), "never" clearly falls outside any rational definition of the long view.
China most clearly wants Taiwan and I don't know why we spend so much time explaining to ourselves that it is impossible for China to invade or that it is irrational for China to invade. I take the Chinese at their word that they want Taiwan and think that someone will give the order when it makes perfect sense for them to do so.
China may be stewing in a host of internal and strategic problems that hobble their military in relation to us. But China is making ROC soup and the ingredients are adding up.
