A Quality All Their Own

The Taliban haven in Pakistan has challenged Afghansitan's security the last few years. The threat formerly didn't require too many Western troops, didn't require us to use them that much, and allowed us to avoid the risk of a rapid increase in Afghan force numbers in order to train them properly and slowly. Defeating al Qaeda in Iraq by the fall of 2007 has also led jihadis to look to Afghanistan and Pakistan instead. So now we need more troops to handle the enemy in Afghanistan.

We shouldn't commit too many troops to Afghanistan given the fragility of our supply lines. Our allies won't or can't commit many troops to Afghanistan. And Afghanistan's central government can't afford to support enough troops to pacify the country on its own.

This program is absolutely critical in creating enough Afghan security forces to hold off the Taliban an al Qaeda:

After three weeks of training, the newest U.S.-funded experiment in protecting the countryside from Taliban insurgents was on display this week for this village in central Afghanistan's Wardak province. Dozens of American and French military officers mingled with hundreds of Afghans who came to watch.

Among the 243 security guards was Zekeria, a tall, skinny man with a scraggly salt-and-pepper beard who has only one finger on his right hand — the trigger finger. For the job he has signed up to do, that might be enough.

Zekeria and his fellow guards wear olive-green uniforms and are called the Afghan Public Protection Force. Their members come almost exclusively from the Jalrez Valley — a known haunt of insurgents.

Local defense forces are critical in defeating insurgencies. It doesn't matter that they have little training. They are static self-defense capabilties that can hold off small groups of the enemy out to indimidate Afghan villages. And they are eyes and ears to call in for help if the enemy takes the time and effort to mass enough force to overwhelm APPF elements. Our special forces will be nearby to help, too.

The criticism that these units have little training misses the point that quantity has a quality all its own, and this program aims for quantity. Quality comes from police, Afghan army, Coalition regulars, and special forces in ascending order. Plus air power, of course. These units should be on call to help the APPF.

That criticism also misses the point that the enemy usually gets less training than what the APPF members will get. And ideally, experience and further training will make APPF forces better in their narrow band of responsibilities.

The APPF cannot--and is not intended to--replace the army or even police. But they are crucial to defeating the enemy.