Q General, Muqtada al-Sadr announced the extension of his cease-fire last month. I'm wondering, in your estimation, how pivotal has that cease-fire been to the downturn in violence?
GEN. ODIERNO: Well, I mean, I think it all plays a role.
I think it's overplayed a little bit, frankly. But I will tell you, what's important is Muqtada al-Sadr, I believe, is trying to refocus his movement. I think he's trying to move away from a militia-based organization to one more that is helping, which it started out to be, which is helping the poor Shi'a community have a role and a vote in what goes on in the government of Iraq, politics and other things.
So I think I see him trying to move towards that, and what we're seeing is a separation of what I call mainstream Jaish al-Mahdi and then those rogue elements that have now broken off, that tend to be the Iranian-supported elements, ones that are being funded by Iran. And so I think we've seen that split, and that's actually helpful for us because we now understand who's doing what. And so we'll continue to work in going after those who we consider to be irreconcilable, where we think the majority of the Sadr element is becoming more reconcilable in terms of working within the framework of the government of Iraq. We hope that's where it's going. I think he's moving more towards what his father wanted to do with this movement, and I respect that he is trying to move it that way.
Since fall 2004 until about a year ago, I worried that Sadr and his Iranian puppet masters could engineer an astroturf revolt that fools enough Shias long enough to seize control of the Iraqi government. Since Shias are the majority, I figured only a threat from this community was a genuine threat to the Iraqi government even if others killed in horrifying numbers.
But once we started going after Sadr's goons in spring 2007, I gained confidence that he was a spent force, having squandered the appeal he had gained from his survival of his August 2004 failed revolt. His ceasefires of August 2007 and February 2008 reflect his weakness and not his generosity. It is certainly nice that we don't have to crush his forces if they fight, but we and the Iraqis surely would crush them in short order if it comes to an open fight.
Sadr appears to have learned the lesson that surviving two revolts is pressing his luck far enough. And if enough Arab Iraqis reject religious authority, Sadr will find in a few years after he completes his religious training in Iran that offering Persian Shia religious rule to Iraqis isn't the sure-fire path to victory he thinks it is.
Once, Sadr appeared as if he could lead a revolt of poor Shias loyal to his vision of a Shia dictatorship. He tried this twice, losing each time but looking like a brave resistance to the American presence and the lawful government we supported. I actually wouldn't be surprised if Sadr tries a third revolt in the future. But he'll be arrested and tried by a freely elected government too strong for an idiot like Sadr to destabilize.
