The enemies in Iraq are coming over to our side:
For the U.S. military, the current stability has required a reconciliation of sorts with former Sunni insurgent and Mahdi Army enemies—which includes promising to set free thousands of jailed Iraqis. "We had to make peace with the Mahdi Army, recognize the needs of the people that it was trying to serve and recognize its, in many ways honorable, roots," says Frank. At meetings with local Shiites in the capital's Aamel district, Frank's PowerPoint presentation includes a slide that acknowledges that the militia has "defended Shiites from attacks, provided essential services, and encouraged participation in elections."
This recognizes that Shia groups formed to protect their neighborhoods from al Qaeda terrorists and Sunni Arabs cooperated with al Qaeda to protect their neighborhoods from Sadrist death squads. The key has been to get rid of the death squads and al Qaeda terrorists form the mix. Which is why a year ago I advocated local defense forces for Iraq composed of local citizens who would defend their neighborhoods and villages.
From the early stages of the insurgency, I've recognized that the way to win isn't to kill every last insurgent but to persuade them--while fighting and killing them to keep them from taking control and to protect our side's people--to switch sides. Early in the war, many war supporters were outraged at the suggestion that we might let enemies switch sides.
Now the anti-war side seems to be most upset. They've forgotten their earlier attacks on the idea of killing our way to victory and say they worry we are arming a future Sunni Arab revolt. We can't kill them and we can't accept their cooperation, I guess.
This article is good on the surge in general and describes these two impulses against accepting cooperation:
This was no easy decision. Americans had been dying at the hands of Sunni Arab resistance groups since 2003. Many of the "concerned local citizens" (CLCs, now called "Sons of Iraq" because "concerned local citizens" translates poorly into Arabic) were themselves former members of the insurgency. There was some grumbling among U.S. troops about cooperating with former enemies and much concern that the "transformation" of these insurgents into partners would only be temporary.
Petraeus and Odierno, however, saw it as an opportunity. Contrary to popular misconception, they refused requests to provide weapons to the CLCs (who almost invariably had their own weapons anyway). They insisted that all CLCs provide detailed biometric data (fingerprints and retinal scans), the serial numbers of their weapons, their home addresses and family relationships. Counter-insurgency experts have often wryly remarked that it would be easy to end an insurgency if the enemy would only wear uniforms. By collecting all of this information about the CLCs, Odierno and Petraeus were in essence putting uniforms on them. Any CLC who turned against the Coalition or Iraqi forces could be readily identified if he, or his weapon, were captured--and Coalition troops would know immediately where he and his family lived. There have been very few reports of any CLC members taking the risk.
This description of the point of no return is exactly right. If the Sons of Iraq go back on their surrender, they are weaker and now we know where they live. Recent noises that the Sunni Arabs will restart their war are mostly noise at this point. Many Shias would be happy for total war given past Sunni crimes against Shias. And knowing where the Sunni fighters live would go a long way to making such a total war quick and bloody for the Sunnis.
Many of our enemies in Iraq are essentially surrendering. Most of the remaining enemies are beyond surrendering and must be killed or driven from Iraq, but the efforts to divide those who won't surrender from those who will has paid off.
After I finished this piece on Monday, but before posting today, Strategypage writes up a nice description of the surrender. It adds good points, so let me just add some of their material rather than try to integrate it into the main post with a rewrite:
Many of the [2.5 million Iraqi] Sunni Arabs refugees had ties with the Baath Party (with which Saddam Hussein terrorized the country). That doesn't get reported on much. The majority of Iraqis (the 85 percent who are Kurds and Shia Arabs), hate the Sunni Arabs for what they did in support of Saddam. While many Sunni Arabs did not participate in these atrocities, and some even opposed Saddam, most non-Sunni Arab Iraqis don't bother make a distinction. ...
The U.S. Army has angered many Kurds and Shia Arabs by protecting Sunni Arabs, and siding with them in property disputes (when the Sunni Arabs were in the right). This sort of thing has made Sunni Arabs more willing to work with American troops in hunting down Sunni Arab terrorists. The Iraqi Sunni Arabs still hate the Americans for invading, and ending the sweet deal (mainly possession of most of the oil revenue) the Sunni Arabs had enjoyed for so long. But after five years of getting killed by Americans, Kurds and Shia Arabs, the Iraqi Sunni Arabs are just looking for some security. Living as exiles only works if you are one of the senior Saddam cronies who had managed to open a foreign bank accounts, and stock it with stolen cash. For most Iraqi Sunni Arabs that fled, the future is bleak, unless they can come home. The U.S. promises to make that possible, if a little cooperation in the counter-terrorism department is provided. It's an offer many Iraqi Sunni Arabs cannot refuse, especially since none of the majority Sunni Arab countries in the region are willing to go out of their way to help.
Not willing to become the New Palestinians with eternal grievances propped up by survival-level aid from the world community, Sunni Arab Iraqis are realizing they must help drive out the al Qaeda invaders to regain a place in Iraq.
Yet another reason I don't want international aid to help Sunni Arab Iraqi refugees, which would let them sit tight hoping for a return to power. Make them choose peace.
